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ABSTRACT
In the era of globalization, cities function as 'gateways of democracy,' the spaces and
places where the civil society literally 'marches through' in order to deliver oppositional
claims into the global arena. However, this paper documents a broad, increasing pattern of
political repression directed against peaceful protest in US cities, signifying that important
avenues for democratic participation may indeed be closing.
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Protest and Democracy
"In a democratic society, citizens have a right to gather peacefully and protest the policies of their
government with demonstrations, marches, petitions, boycotts, strikes, and other forms of direct
citizen action. Direct action is open to everyone in a democracy... Protests are a testing ground for
any democracy."
-From "What is Democracy?" an educational publication from the US Department of State,
which seeks to inform people in other countries about "American life and culture".'
Shortly after September 11, 2001, despite the concerns of civil liberties and human rights
organizations, US Attorney General John Ashcroft affirmed that basic political rights were not
under attack in the United States. In fact, those who suggested this were helping to "aid terrorists"
by "trying to scare peace loving people with phantoms of lost liberty." 2 Judge Robert Bork
concurred, stating that concerns about eroding political rights were merely "alarmism" by those
who would "recklessly exaggerate the threat to our liberties" and "give ammunition.. .to our
~,3
enemies".
But what does the evidence say? If protests are indeed 'a testing ground for any democracy' is
America passing the test? This paper examines the US Government's response to mass protest
across in cities across the nation in order to understand the current condition of political rights in
the United States. Do members of the public face state repression if they attempt to exercise their
rights? Are civil libertarians merely alarmists who are 'shouting fire in a crowded theatre' or is the
'theatre' actually burning?
This study collects data from mass protests events between 1999 and 2005, focusing on the two
largest protest-based social movements in the nation, the Anti-War movement, and The Global
Justice movement. A standard definition of 'repression' was applied to these protest events to see if
' Cincotta, Howard (ed). What is Democracy? U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs, 1998.
2 US Atty. General John Ashcroft. Testimony Before The Senate Judiciary Committee. December, 2001.
' Bork, Robert. Civil Liberties After 9/11, Alarmism puts Americans' safety at risk. Wall Street Journal. August 25, 2003.
any instances or patterns of repression could be found, using six categories of repressive tactics: (1)
media tactics, (2) legal tactics, (3) use of force tactics, (4) intimidation tactics, (5) spatial tactics,
and (6) intelligence tactics. The results are presented and analyzed in chapters 2 and 3.
Before turning to the evidence however, this paper examines the issue of repression and democracy
through the lens of urban history. A skeptic might ask: so what if the evidence does ultimately
show that protests are being repressed in a few major cities in America, does this really mean we
are living in a more repressive society? In order to understand the focus of this study, as it is
limited to cities, it is important to understand Democracy's close relationship to The City. This
provides insight into how a government can effectively enact repression without having to deploy it
universally throughout the nation.
The second chapter examines the details of the data. If repression is indeed happening, how is it
being accomplished? Furthermore, how could egregious acts of repression take place without the
rest of the population knowing? This chapter uses the six categories of repression outlined above
to deconstruct the mechanics of modern protest repression.
The third chapter analyzes these findings to see how they compare with earlier studies on protest
policing. Do these findings signify a shift in protest policing since the 1980s and 1990s? If so, what
are the implications of these trends for local governments, and the general population? Are we
returning to a previous era of government secrecy, infiltration, and lack of accountability?
The fourth chapter asks a question of special importance to the field of urban planning. Should
protest (and for that matter, the repression of protest) present any special concern for urban
planners? In addressing this question, this paper argues for an expanded notion of democracy that
sees protest as an inherent part of the democratic planning process.
Finally, in the fourth chapter this paper looks at possible remedies. If an erosion of political rights
in cities is indeed occurring, how might we re-imagine the function of cities to restore them as
places of political freedom and democratic practice? How might notions of local autonomy and
local democracy strengthen cities' role as Gateways of Democracy? In doing so, I use Henri
Lefebvre's concept of 'The Right to the City' as a valuable way to envision a way forward.
Chapter I:
Cities and Democracy
Cities are not merely centers of economic or cultural exchange, but also of political exchange. They
provide the 'focal points' of democracy; the primary spaces where the public enacts vital forms of
democratic action, particularly those that take place outside the formal channels of government.
Hence, they are also the places where the political rights that protect these citizen-based actions are
most necessary. Since their inception, basic political rights such as freedom of speech and
assembly have been closely connected to urban form.
The Greek Agora: The City as Birthplace of Democracy
In the West, the first formal political rights arose from the city. While democratic decision-making
structures certainly existed within village life throughout the ancient world, the basic rights
associated with democratic governance were first created in, and for, the urban landscape.4 Ancient
Athens (5th century BCE) is where political rights such as freedom of speech and assembly were
first consciously conceived and put in practice. Specifically, in 507 BCE the Athenians began to
use a form of government they called demokratia, meaning rule by the people, or demos. Unlike
modern democracy, it was a form of direct democracy, in which every citizen had the right to vote
directly on all issues brought before the government.
Within demokratia every citizen had the right to bring a petition before the governing assembly, or
ecclesia, and had the right to address all of its members without obstructions or intermediaries. As
long as the individual spoke honestly, it is said, they could speak critically without fear of reprisal
for the content of their words. This early form of free speech, which guaranteed every citizen an
equal right to political speech, was referred to as isegoria, meaning literally 'equality in the agora,'
or public square.
The agora was a physical space at the center of urban social life in Athens, and it provided the
guiding metaphor for this new, democratic approach to government. According to historian
' Mumford, L. The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961.
Richard Sennett, the agora was "a place of assembly that had no visual barriers, no
compartmentalization... spaces were used for political confrontation." 5
Debate, dissent and confrontation were central to the political life of the Greeks,' offering citizens
ability to directly confront their leaders with their failures. This freedom of speech before the
institutions of government was accompanied by a similar, if not greater amount of freedom of
speech in public and in daily life, practiced ubiquitously throughout the public spaces of the city.'
Democratic norms were so strong within Athenian society that for citizens, direct involvement in
government was seen as a social obligation. The essential meaning of "freedom" for the Greeks
was the freedom to participate in political life. 8
While cities were major centers of economic and military power, the great Greek philosophers saw
the political life of cities as more important. Socrates saw the city as first and foremost as place for
the open exchange of ideas. He bemoaned politicians who "filled the city full of harbors and docks
and walls and revenues and all that, and have left no room for justice and temperance." Aristotle
described cities as in essence, "built politics."
The modern Western concept of political rights still draws upon the Athenian formulation, which
provided protections for dissent and promoted the unrestrained use of public space for political
purposes. The ancient relationship between the urban landscape and democracy also endures,
preserved within our language. The word 'politics' itself is derived from the Greek word for city,
polis. Similarly, the words 'civilization,' 'civility' and 'citizen' all stem from the word city.
However, this describes only one side of Athenian democracy. While the citizens enjoyed the
ability to speak freely, move freely, and question their leadership, more than 2/3 of the population
of Athens - women and slaves - were not allowed to attain citizenship and so had no democratic
rights whatsoever. Many slaves were subject to brutal forms of labor. None were allowed to enter
many of the 'public' spaces of the city, such as the gymnasium or the public assembly.
Astonishingly, it was right in the middle of the agora, the place where 'all citizens were equal,' that
slaves were bought and sold. While Athens prided itself as a city of unequaled openness, in truth, it
Sennett, R. The Spaces of Democracy: The 1998 Raoul Wallenberg Lecture. Ann Arbor: Goetzcraft Printers, 1998.
6 Walters, Frank D. Isocrates and the Epistemic Return: Individual and Community in Classical and Modem Rhetoric. JAC Journal, 1993: v. 13.
7 Ibid.
was a highly segregated city, where access to the spaces of democracy and freedom were regulated
by an unequal distribution of rights.
At the height of Athenian democracy, Greek democrats never seriously challenged the institution
of slavery. Aristotle states quite plainly: "the lower sort of mankind are by nature slaves, and it is
better for all inferiors that they should be under the fold of a masters."9 Athens was simultaneously
the birthplace of democracy and a cradle of oppression. It is this contradiction that perhaps best
illustrates the often fractured nature of democracy within cities.
The Middle Ages: The City as a Space of Freedom
Throughout the middle ages, cities continued to be the preeminent laboratory for new social
experiments in democracy, as they provided the most fertile ground for popular movements to
grow and overthrow existing regimes. The news middle classes produced by the urban economy
became a social force capable of making demands (sometimes violently) upon the existing power
elites, the nobility.'" Throughout the Italian city-states of Venice and Florence, to the German 'free
cities,' to English towns and boroughs, new experiments in power sharing, democratic self-rule and
political liberties took shape.
One method of legally ensuring new rights to urban citizens was called a "charter of franchise"
wherein freedoms and liberties were not bestowed upon individuals, but instead upon the city's
territory. The city itself was the space of freedom and people acquired freedom by virtue of living
in it. " As such, these 'free cities' became a place where feudal serfs could escape the cruelties of
feudalism that dominated the countryside. " " In many regions of Europe, residing in a city for 'a
9 Aristotle. "Politics.Book I: Pt. V." in Jowett, Benjamin. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Jonathan Barnes (ed). Princeton University
Press, 1991.
Dahl , Robert A. On Democracy. Yale University Press, 1998.
" Patterson J. and S. Allsford, Medieval English Towns, A Glossary. (Accessed on April 10, 2005)
http://www.trytel.com/-tristan/towns/glossary.html
1
2 Ingersoll, Richard. "The Uses of Decorum" in Cities in History. Rice University, Fall 1995. (Accessed on April 10, 2005)
http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/-arch343/lecture10.html
" Dahl , Robert A. On Democracy. Yale University Press, 1998.
year and a day' automatically granted a serf freedom from feudal servitude. Many of these towns
were run by new democratic structures, such as town councils."
Enlightenment Democracies: The City as a Space of Revolution
While city-states had been the birthplace of democracy, nation-states had become the prevailing
political unit by the time democracy began to re-emerge. This shift from city-state to nation-state
forced a shift away from direct democracy towards representative democracy for practical reasons
of scale. S 16 In the much larger nation state, there were no practical means by which the entire
nation's population could participate directly in the day-to-day decisions of government, as the
Athenians had done in their direct democracy. To surmount "the practical limits that a sizeable
citizenry imposes on democracy"" a new fusion of governmental forms was created that merged
the existing non-democratic elite structures of government that existed at the time, with the Greek
concept of democracy. The new formulation, dubbed 'representative democracy,' was widely
replicated in the past-revolutionary nation-states of the United States and Europe.
Ironically, this transition away from the city-state only served to increase cities' importance to the
functioning of democracy. In city-states, democratic governments had represented only those who
lived within city bounds and directly attended public forums. However, in nation-states, cities
became the decision-making centers for a population and territory of much greater size. This
concentrated the political role of cities as epicenters of democratic decision-making.
However, the representative formulation raised concerns among democratic theorists as to whether
representative democracy was actually true democracy. Influential democratic theorists like
Rousseau pointed out that reliance on 'representatives' could give rise to an entrenched class of
ruling elites that could abuse their position and operate in their own self-interest. He described the
shift from monarchy to representative democracy as merely a shift from 'hereditary aristocracy' to
an 'elective aristocracy."'
14 Knox, E.L. S. History of Western Civilization: Medieval Society. Boise State University, 2004. (Accessed on April 10, 2005)
http://history.boisestate.edu/westciv/medsoc/22.shtml
15 Dahl, Robert, "The City in the Future of Democracy" in John Arthur. Democracy: Theory and Practice. Belmont, California: Wadsworth,
1992.
16 Mansbridge, Jane J. "The Limits of Friendship" in John Arthur. Democracy: Theory and Practice. Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1992.
17 Held, David. Models of Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996: 119
18 Rousseau, J. "The Social Contract" in H. G. Leigh, Oliver (ed.). Ideal Empires and Republics. Washington, DC: 59
To address these critiques, the architects of the new national democracies added a set of liberal
institutions and rights - in addition to the right to vote- to serve as safeguards meant to ensure to
the proper functioning of democracy. Chief among these were the rights of the people to and speak
out publicly on the issues and form their own autonomous associations, embodied by the rights
such as the freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.'" Citizen action was seen as a necessary
countervailing set of checks and balances to prevent a new oligarchy from forming out of the
representative elite. These additional institutions, values and rights, like the Greek ecclesia, were
meant to allow the people to represent their own interests directly - in case their representatives
failed them. As democratic historian Robert Dahl writes, under liberalism democracy "was
transformed into a pluralist political system in which autonomous associations were held to be not
only legitimate but actually necessary to democracy on a large scale." 2 (emphasis added)
It was understood that in order for government to remain accountable to the people, citizens must
have rights that allowed them to impact the decision-making process from 'outside' the formal
representative process. As historian Susan Wiltshire states, the freedom of assembly is "the
freedom of last resort for people who feel they don't have other forms of access to the established
structures of government."21 In the United States, the freedoms of speech, assembly and the press
(meant to guarantee an ongoing role for these 'outside' forms of citizen action) were enshrined in
the First Amendment of the Constitution. The reasoning behind the first amendment is to allow for
the 'Redress of Grievances,' which asserts that rulers are not all-knowing and need to be informed
of citizens' goals and desires. 22
Democratic theorists underscore the importance of these liberal institutions and rights, and the
types of citizen-based action they engender. Tom Bottomore asserts that within Western
democracies, social movements are a "permanent feature of political life, reflecting a broader
movement to extend democracy. Representative government, parties and elections are now seen
" Bottomore, Tom. "Political Sociology: A Classic Study Of Modem Politics." Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993. In Cherry, Janet.
KWAZAKELE: The Politics of Transition in South Africa (Doctoral Thesis). Rhodes University, 2000.
2' Dahl, Robert A.. Democracy and Its Critiques. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989: 30
21 Greece, Rome, and the Bill of Rights: an interview with Susan Ford Wiltshire. Transcript from 'Speaking Freely' Radio Program
(Recorded May 24, 2000 in Nashville, Tennessee).
2 Berry, Gregory and P. Broussard. Why First Amendment Rights Are Essential to the Functioning of a Free Society: Individual Rights
and Collective Benefits. Howard University School of Law. November 1, 2001.
increasingly as providing an essential framework but as inadequate by themselves to establish a
democratic society in the more radical sense of government by the people."'
Byron Miller concurs: "Social movements are essential to any well functioning democracy. While
electoral and judicial processes render key governance and regulatory decisions at specific
moments.. .social movements give voice to people and causes outside the established power
structure.. .and create the conditions and pressure necessary for broader debate and action within
the official institutions of democracy."'
What is largely unappreciated within historical narratives of western liberal institutions is their
deeply urban character. The nations' cities and towns were the primary locations where
autonomous organizations formed, and where the laws protecting them were most needed. Despite
the pre-dominantly rural population distribution of both French and American societies, the
architects of the new democracies in both countries knew from direct experience that cities were
the places that had fomented their democratic revolutions, and were the most likely site to provide
the basis for its ongoing health.
In France, this point was made most obviously by the revolution itself. While discontentment was
widespread, the revolution only began in earnest with the staging of the 'municipal revolutions.'
Starting the storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789 in Paris, these urban insurrections became a
full blown revolution when twenty-six out of the countries largest 30 cities ousted their royal
officials and installed citizen rule.
The American Revolution was also sparked primarily by urban uprisings. The first acts of
revolution erupted in 1765 when the Sons of Liberty staged protests against the Stamp Act in
several American port cities. The revolutionary campaign further increased in militancy in the
wake of another urban incident, the Boston Massacre in 1768, wherein citizens took to the city
streets in protest and were then violently repressed by British troops. When open against the
British erupted, even though a majority of the military confrontations took place in rural
battlefields, it was the cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Newport, and Charleston that
provided the political basis of resistance against British rule. As Gary Nash describes in his
' Bottomore, Tom. See above.
24 Miller, Byron. "Spaces of Moblilization: Transnational Social Movements" in Barnett, C. and M. Low (eds). Spaces of Democracy
London: Sage, 2004: 223
historiography of the American Revolution: revolutionary agitators and supporters of anti-royal
activity were able to organize much more effectively in urban areas than in the rural hinterlands. 5
It is not coincidental that after the revolution had been won, the "town hall meeting" became pre-
eminent symbol of American democracy in action.
Because the architects of both the American and French democracies knew full well the necessity
of people coming together in public places, and taking to the city streets if necessary, rights
protecting this behavior were built directly into their constitutions.
As stated earlier, the great historical leap away from democracies based upon the city-state, to
those based upon the nation state, only served to increase cities' importance to democracy, as it
concentrated the political functions of the city. This transition to the nation-state also resulted in the
introduction of 'representative' democracy, a shift which 'extra-institutional' action by the
populace a necessary part of democracy. Therefore, this meant that cities were no longer just the
sites of formal democracy (i.e. governmental institutions), but also the sites for mobilization and
action by the people, meant to impact these institutions from the outside. In other words,
representative democracies now required an additional layer of democracy - mobilization by civil
society - and cities were the most likely sites for this activity to take place.
When the government has sought to formalize the role of this kind of activity in cities, the ancient
Greek agora still provides a guiding example. The US Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
sidewalks, streets, and parks are long-established First Amendment forums: "Wherever the title of
streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens."
However, the contradictions that were present in ancient Greek democracy raises similar questions
about the nature of our modern 'spaces of democracy.' Are US cities inclusive spaces of free and
open political exchange as they were for the citizens of Athens? Or, rather, like the slave
auctioning block that stood the center of the agora, are US cities fractured spaces, promoting the
democratic rights of some, while actively denying them to others?
25 Nash, Gary. The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1979.
Globalization: Cities as "Gateways of Democracy"
The relationship between cities, political rights and democracy remains a critical issue in the age of
globalization. If the transfer from city-state to nation-state increased the city's importance to
democracy, then the emergence of global governance institutions has only further increased cities'
importance as a "strategic site"2 6 for the maintenance of democracy. Globalization has meant the
increasing interdependence of national markets and politics, with cities serving as the "hubs" for
exchange of goods, services and ideas." Meanwhile, new global institutions have emerged to
manage this process, creating an additional layer of representative governance atop an already
representative layer. This meta-representative layer includes institutions like the United Nations,
The World Trade Organization, The G-8, The International Monetary Fund and The World Bank.
While citizens of democracies (and non-democracies) across the globe are directly affected by the
decisions made by these institutions, they are not able to vote upon their policies, nor are they even
able to elect the 'representatives' who populate these institutions. These institutions are one step
further removed from popular control. This further exacerbates the weaknesses that Rousseau
warned were inherent in representative democracy: that without direct citizen participation, an
isolated class of decision-makers would emerge that acts in its own interests.
Today, within this globalized context, cities are no longer merely the sites where local, state and
federal governments assemble to craft national policy; they are the sites where global political and
economic powers congregate to construct global policy. Cities are now decision-making epicenters
for governing global trade, international debt and deciding upon international military intervention.
Just within the United States, cities like Washington DC, New York, Seattle, San Francisco and
Miami have all hosted high-profile meetings of such global governance institutions.
Despite the formation of this new layer of global governance, no new democratic mechanisms have
emerged to oversee their operations. In the absence of citizens' ability to impact their decisions
directly, the traditional role for citizen action that occurs outside the formal institutional process
26 Sassen, Saskia. "The Global City: Strategic Site/New Frontier" in Isin, Elgin (ed). Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City.
London and New York: Routledge, 2000: 59
27 Ibid.
has taken on new urgency. As such, major public protests have shadowed these global institutions
in every city in which they have met.
Much has been made about the de-territorializing effects of globalization, including the growth of
the information economy, the emergence of intergovernmental institutions, and even the use of
'virtual space' by transnational social movements to organize themselves. However, the practice of
democracy is still very much bounded within specific places and times. Face to face meetings are
still required by every key player involved in the political equation, be they multinational
corporations, global institutions of governance or the social movements that seek to challenge
them. Corporations must be able to locate specific sites favorable to production and marketing.'
Global governance institutions must congregate and make decisions in 'global cities' (or lavish
resort towns) that provide operational resources and bestow symbolic status upon new institutions
seeking credibility. Similarly, social movements (even transnational ones) must still congregate in
person to establish trust, define mutual goals, and undertake collective action. In almost all cases,
cities are the focal points for these meetings to coordinate action. Moreover cities are the contact
points where conflict between these two opposing groups takes place, the primary sites of political
contestation and democratic dispute.
As such, cities have become the launching point for people in various countries to deliver
contesting political ideas and demands into the global political arena. In the case of social
movements, cities have literally become the 'gateways of democracy', the physical sites that people
march through in order to be heard by the institutions of power. This has enlarged the original
Athenian concept of the agora to encompass the entire city. Whereas the agora used to be a single
space within the city, the city now plays the role of agora for the larger global arena. If
globalization has indeed created one giant interconnected network of political debate, then cities
have become the open public squares where the population assembles to make itself heard.
The metaphor of the ancient Greek agora still influences today's conception of urban space and
rights. The US Supreme Court has repeatedly held that sidewalks, streets, and parks are long-
established First Amendment forums: "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
28 Miller, Byron. "Spaces of Moblilization: Transnational Social Movements." in Barnett, C. and M. Low (eds). Spaces of Democracy
London: Sage, 2004: 225
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens." 29
However, the contradictions that were present in ancient Greek democracy raise similar questions
about the nature of our modem 'spaces of democracy.' Are US cities inclusive spaces of free and
open political exchange as they were for the citizens of Athens? Or, rather, like the slave
auctioning block that stood the center of the agora, are US cities fractured spaces, promoting the
democratic rights of some, while actively denying them to others?
Democratic Rights as Urban Rights
As argued earlier, many of the rights guaranteed by liberal democracies are deeply urban in
character. These rights, while universally applied throughout the nation, are rights that were
abstracted from the urban environment. While they are relevant to a wide range of political
behaviors, they took as their model forms of collective action that took place predominantly in
cities.
There are two underlying factors that help explain the close interdependence between the
democratic form and the urban form. First, cities are the most likely sites of political targets;
second, cities are the places that provide the greatest potential for political mobilization.
Cities are the most likely sites for political targets because they are, in essence, a centralized,
material manifestation of any society's wealth and power. As such, they are the most likely sites
where the institutions that preside over these resources reside. The most obvious case in point is the
fact that political capitols are almost universally cited in cities. It follows that the democratic
political rights intended to allow citizens to participate in and challenge the affairs of government,
were structured to fit this same environment. For example, the right to petition government for a
redress of grievances, using the freedoms of speech and freedom of assembly, were closely linked
to the central gathering spaces of cities, such as the town hall, the marketplace or the public square.
29 Roberts, Justice. Hague V. Committee For Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)
However, cities are not merely the place where the targets reside. They are the places where those
doing the targeting are able to organize most effectively. The city is a place where individuals who
desire social change "constitute themselves" as a social and political force. " The city is a space
where information flows between people are denser, face-to-face interaction encourages
relationship building, and collective resources can be amassed more easily. For aggrieved persons
and groups, cities are a place where they can more easily meet with others to acknowledge
common injustices, craft shared identities, and generate oppositional strategies."
Stated simply, the possibility for collective political action increases with population density. This
is supported by empirical investigations: "In densely populated polities, [there is] a significant
increase in the number of protests, indicating most directly the importance having a number of
people available to mount a collective action.""
Hence, as democracy emerged throughout history, many of its freedoms and guarantees were in
essence, urban rights, tailored to fit political behaviors that were most likely to take place in the
urban environment. This is natural considering these urban-based forms of contestation were what
had created these democracies in the first place.
This observation does not dismiss the prevalence, or importance of rural struggles, nor the kinds of
democratic practices that take place outside cities. However, cities remain the principal points of
contact between aggrieved groups and governing powers, and the primary strategic launching pad
for contesting ideas of globalization.
Even armed, rurally based social movements, such as the Zapatistas, once they chose to suspend
armed struggle and challenge the government through primarily political means, staged a dramatic
journey from their mountain hide-outs to the zocalo (central square) of the capital city of Mexico,
an act which re-invigorated public support for their movement.
" Kohler, Bettina and Markus Wissen. "Glocalizing Protest: Urban Conflicts and Global Social Movements" in International Journal of
Urban and Regional Research. December, 2003. 27 (4): 942
" Isin, Elgin and Myer Siemiatycki. Fate and Faith: Claiming Urban Citizenship In Immigrant Toronto. Joint Centre of Excellence for
Research on Immigration and Settlement (ERIS), 1999.
1
2Camp Bayliss and M. Kaliner. State-Directed Political Protest in US Capital Cities: 1998-2000. The Hauser Center for Nonprofit
Organizations. Harvard University, 2002.
This urban dimension of political rights is of course, not reflected in law itself. These rights are
meant be applied universally across all geographic regions, both urban and rural, and for good
reason. However, the importance of illuminating the deeply urban character of political rights is
this: If essential forms of democratic practice are most acute within cities, then the cities' inability
to guarantee these rights critically impairs the functioning of the larger democracy. Hence, if these
rights are most expressed when they are used in cities, then political repression does not need to be
universally applied. Repression, to be effective, only needs to be selectively applied in those places
and times where political dissent is most likely, and practiced most effectively. Hence, while
repression may be far from ever-present across the entire country, it does not need to be in order to
be effective. If only the cities themselves become inhospitable to political freedom, then the larger
democracy would still be decisively undermined.
In other words, democratic action by the populace does not occur uniformly throughout the social
and physical landscape, but rather, is more acute in specific places and times. Only certain parts of
the population mobilize, and even then, they only do so at particular strategic moments, in places
that best facilitate their actions. To use the gateway metaphor, cities can be viewed as the crucial
conduits through which the people deliver contesting ideas into the global discourse. This gateway
metaphor becomes vivid reality when social movements literally 'march through' urban spaces, in
the hopes that their alternate perspectives will be heard by decision makers at the global level.
However, if cities constrain population's ability to use urban space as this kind of political
platform, thereby closing the 'gateway,' then a major avenue for redressing their grievances is no
longer available to them. In short, an essential guarantee of liberal democracy has been eliminated:
the right of citizens to have alternate recourse when they feel their representatives have failed to
listen to them.
Global Cities and the Global Justice Movement
In the age of Globalization, cities have remained the epicenters of democratic practice. One of the
most prominent social movements of the present time, the Global Justice Movement (sometimes
referred to as the 'anti-globalization' movement), makes this point most succinctly. This global
movement is symbolized by almost entirely by the names of cities - Seattle, Genoa, Prague." In the
Americas: Quebec, Miami, Cancun and Quito. Each of these cities has chosen to host high-profile
3 Kohler, B. and M. Wissen. Glocalizing Protest: Urban Conflicts and Global Social Movements. International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research, 2003. 27(4): 942
meetings of global institutions like the WTO and G-8, only to find themselves hosting dramatic
confrontations between these organizations and civil society. These city names, just by
themselves, resonate strongly with protesters and politicians alike, as they mark milestones in the
confrontation over the shape and politics of the global economy.
As cities continue in both size and number, they will likely intensify as epicenters of political
practice and contestation. By 2007, for the first time in human history, more than half the world's
population will live in cities. 4 Even within the United States, cities are increasingly the place
where people reside as 80% of Americans now live in metropolitan areas.35 The question is, if cities
are indeed, the 'gateway of democracy,' then in the United States, are the gateways opening, or are
they being closed? In other words, are the liberal institutions required to keep democracy
functioning - autonomous associations, public assemblies, free speech - allowed to flourish in US
cities, or are they being systematically repressed? The next chapter seeks to answer this through
empirical investigation.
' United Nations Population Fund. State Of World Population 2004: Migration And Urbanization. 2004. (Accessed on July 10, 2005)
http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2004/english/ch1/
"Khator, Renu. Public Engagement and the American Metropolis. Center for Local Autonomy, 2002.
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Chapter II:
Descriptive Data
Methodology
Data was collected from 14 mass protests events between 1999 and 2005, using information about
the two largest protest-based social movements in the nation, the Anti-War movement and The
Global Democracy movement. These events were chosen because they had the most available data
regarding media coverage, police after actions reports, and court documents. A standard definition
of 'repression' was applied to these protest events to see if any patterns of repression could be
found. Stockdill's definition of repression is used as it captures both the general nature of
repression as well as specific categories of repressive tactics. According to Stockdill, repression is
defined by "any actions taken by government authorities to impede mobilization, intimidate
activists, divide organizations, and physically assault, arrest, imprison, and/or kill movement
participants,"" Six specific categories of repressive tactics are used to match this definition: (1)
media tactics, (2) legal tactics, (3) use of force tactics, (4) intimidation tactics, (5) spatial tactics,
and (6) intelligence tactics.
1. Media tactics: this category includes verifiable incidents in which misleading information about
protesters is publicly disseminated through the media by government agencies in ways that
undermine protesters ability to form effective coalitions, garner public support, mobilize in the
streets or achieve other aims. This includes the demonization of non-violent protest groups by
falsely associating them with terrorism and/or violence; the arranging or mischaracterization of
physical evidence to imply protesters' violent or criminal intent; the use of 'embedded media' by
local law enforcement to frame events from a state/law enforcement perspective; and the targeting
(using arrest or violence) of non-embedded media sources that provide independent perspectives.
2. Legal tactics: this category refers to the use of the law, or legal procedures (such as arrest) to
restrict freedom of assembly and speech when it is being exercised in a non-violent, and/or non-
criminal way. This includes the suspension of ordinary law just prior to protest events, such as pre-
emptive declarations of 'state of emergency' or local ordinances, that provide a basis for unusual
36 Stockdill, Brett C. Multiple Oppressions And Their Influence On Collective Action: The Case Of The AIDS Movement (Ph.D.
Dissertation). Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, 1996 cited in Earl, Jennifer. Taxes, Tanks and Teargas: Towards a
Theory of Movement Repression. Sociology Theory, 2003. 21 (3)
restrictions on speech and assembly; the delayed issuing of legal permits for public gatherings in
ways that hamper the efforts of protest organizers to plan events effectively; the unjustified
termination of permitted or otherwise legal protest event; the use of false arrests, mass arrests, or
'pre-emptive' arrests to clear streets of non-violent and/or non-criminal protesters; the arrest of
bystanders and third party witnesses such as journalists, legal observers and street medics who are
identified as such; the prolonged detention of those arrested; the use of excessive bail amounts or
exorbitant charges against those arrested; and random search and seizure.
3. Use of force tactics: this category includes the excessive use of force against protesters or
bystanders. This includes the use of so called "less-lethal" (re: "potentially lethal")3" weapons
against protesters and bystanders who were not engaged in violent and/or criminal activity. These
weapons include chemical weapons (tear gas, pepper spray), projectile weapons (rubber bullets,
pepper balls, wooden dowels), electroshock weapons (Tasers) and experimental weapons (Long
Range Acoustic Device, Electro Magnetic Pulse Weaponry).
4. Spatial tactics: This category includes restrictions on the use of public space for political
assemblies. This includes declaring large portions of the city as "No Protest Zones" or confining
public assemblies to enclosed, fortified "Free Speech Zones"; the shutdown of business districts to
all public access during protests; the use of heavy fortification or security perimeters to close off
public areas; the hampering of protesters ability to access legally permitted protest areas by
restricting pedestrian access or obstructing transportation services; the imposition of curfews; and
the use of mobile metal barriers or flexible plastic netting to herd, push and/or arrest protesters.
5. Intimidation tactics: this category includes pre-emptive "shows of force" meant to publicly
demonstrate the amount of force police they are willing to use, in an effort to affect dissenters
behavior. This included dramatic law enforcement training drills conducted publicly just before
protests; the prominent presentation of massive quantities of police weapons, vehicles and
personnel onto the streets during the protest itself; the visible deployment of uniformed US Armed
Forces personnel onto the streets; the stationing of Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) in public
places or the repeated flying of helicopters closely over protest and rallies. This also includes the
" Statement by Amnesty International Spokesman in "Controls urged on 'lethal' Tasers" BBC News Online. November 30, 2004.
(Accessed on July 10, 2005) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk-politics/4053221.stm
conspicuous surveillance of organizers' homes, and the physical raiding of protesters meeting
spaces.
6. Intelligence tactics: This category includes verified incidents where law enforcement agencies
actively gathered information on groups or persons not engaged in criminal or violent activity; the
direct infiltration of protest groups by law enforcement personnel; or the disruption of protests by
undercover law enforcement posing as protesters.
In analyzing the data from these mass protest events, this study seeks to reveal if incidents or trends
can be deduced that can be said to have reshaped the urban landscape as a venue for democratic
practice, in essence, closing the 'Gateways of Democracy.'
This study does not separate the data from the two movements in question, as the Anti-War
Movement and the Global Democracy Movement at times overlap and converge, particularly at
national political conventions and presidential inaugurations. However, in the case of Global
Justice protests (WTO, IMF/WB, WEF, FTAA) and national political conventions (DNC, RNC),
the protests coincide in both time and place with a meeting of national or international significance.
In contrast, in the case of Anti-War movement, most of the protests took place at sites that had
symbolic significance, such as New York, and Washington DC, but in the absence o high-profile
meetings were being held there at the time. In all cases, the protesters who lived in or traveled to
these cities considered their message to be national or global in scope, meant to reach an audience
at the locality of protest, as well as others around the nation or world. The cities and events
included are the following:
CITY EVENT DATE(S)
Seattle, WA World Trade Organization (WTO) Nov 30 - Dec 3, 1999
Washington, DC International Monetary Fund, World Bank Apr. 16 -17, 2000
Philadelphia, PA Republican National Convention (RNC) Jul 25-29, 2000
Los Angeles, CA Democratic National Convention (DNC) Aug 14-17, 2000
Washington, DC Presidential Inauguration Jan 20, 2001
New York, NY World Economic Forum (WEF) Jan 31 - Feb 4, 2002
Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund, World Bank Sep 22, 2002
Oakland, CA Anti-War Apr 7, 2003
New York, NY Anti-War Feb 15, 2003
Miami, FL Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Nov 20-21, 2003
Sea Island, GA Group of 8 (G-8) Jun 8-10, 2004
Boston, MA Democratic National Convention (DNC) Jul 25-29, 2004
New York, NY Republican National Convention (RNC) Aug 29-Sep 4,2004
Washington D.C. Presidential Inauguration Jan 20, 2005
Data sources for these protest events include news articles, police "after action" reports, reports
produced by government agencies such as Citizen Review Panels and Civilian Investigative Panels,
reports compiled by national civil liberties organizations, and photo documentary evidence taken
by independent media sources. (To see the complete data set, please see the attached document:
Incidents of Repression at Mass Protest in US Cities (1999-2005); For a full and detailed account
of each data point, please see Appendix: Data Citations).
The data is of two kinds. The first section is quantitative (see below) tracking numerical data about
each protest event such as the number of protesters, police, and arrests. The second section is
qualitative, using the six categories of repression. All six are categories of tactics that if deployed
by police or other public officials, function to undermine the exercise of basic political rights of
citizens and residents. These fields are tracked to see if there was, in fact, demonstrable evidence of
repression being enacted during protests in the US.
WTO IMF RNC DNC Inaug 9/11 WEF
1999 2000 2000 2000 2001 2002
Anti-
War
2003
IMF Anti-War
2002 2003
FTAA G-8 DNC RNC Inaug
2003 2004 2004 2004 2005
# of Protesters 50,000 10,000 10,000 8,000 3,000 7,000 500 4,000 250,00 8,000 300 2,000 400,00 10,000
0 0
# of Law 1,100 1400 7000 2,000 6800 4,000 165 3200 5,000 2,500 20,000 5,000 36,000 13,000
Enforcement
# of Law Enforcemt. 28 na na 30 16 na na 25 na 40 136 40 ? 66 60+
Agencies:
Approx. Ratio I to 1 to 5 2 to 3 1 to 4 3:1 1 to 2 1 to 10 1 to 1 1 to 50 1 to 4 1 to 66 5 to 2 1 to 11 3 to 2
Police to Protesters: 25
# of Arrests: 631 1300 420 170 9 201 31 649 257 283 15 5 1821 6
# of Convictions: 1-23 na 23 50 na na 0 na na 0 15 na na na
Rate of Convictions 1-3% na 5% 29% na na 0% na na 0% 100% na 9% na
Total Security 11.2 10 13.3 22 6 44 na 14 5 23.9 37 60 76 17.3*
Expend.(in millions)
Total Fed. Funding 0 16 na na 6 na na na 0 8.5 25 50 50 NA
(in millions)
Police Overtime (in 6 na na 11.6 3 44 na 5.7 5 10.5 9.6 32.5 59 9.2
millions of dollars)
Figure 1: Ouantitative Data (Citations for each data point are provided in Appendix: Data Citations)
Descriptive Findings:
Media tactics:
The data set reveals a consistent pattern wherein law enforcement agencies and/or local politicians
made statements to the media that falsely associated them with violence and/or terrorism. (For
specific examples, see Appendix: Data Citations). Since 1999, statements by public officials and/or
police that imply protesters are violent occurred in almost 100% of the cases. Since September 11,
2001 statements made by public officials and police that associated protesters with terrorism
occurred almost 100% of the cases. A couple examples illustrate the kind of statements made: just
days before the Miami/FTAA(2003) protests, Miami Police Chief John Timoney described
protesters as "punks" and "outsiders" who were coming to "terrorize and vandalize our city."3"
While no acts of terrorism and vandalism occurred on the part of protesters, what followed was a
massive, violent crackdown by police on protesters who were by all accounts overwhelmingly law-
abiding and peaceful." Similarly, during the Republican National Convention (2004), New York
City mayor Michael Bloomberg drew comparisons between protesters and the attacks of September
11, when he stated that some want to "to destroy our city."* He condemned protesters' heated
verbal exchanges with convention delegates with the assertion that "that's exactly what the
terrorists did.",4 The Mayor's statements were made in defense of the more than 1800 arrests that
had occurred (only 9% of whom were found guilty on any charges).42
Police routinely made dramatic claims about protesters plans to do violence, usually citing their
own 'inside sources' or anonymous information found 'on the internet' that strangely, could not be
found by anyone else. This type of trend is explored in greater detail in the study: Getting Used:
How the Mainstream Media Helps Create Climate of Fear and Repression During Political
Protests.4"
38 Figueras, Tere. Big Police Presence; Few Clashes. Miami Herald. Nov. 21, 2003.
* Defede,. Jim. He respected the badge, but 'not in Miami'. Miami Herald. November 23, 2003. See also Goldberg, Michelle. This is not
America. Salon.com, December 16, 2003; Civilian Investigative Panel: A Developing CIP in the Aftermath of the Free Trade of the
Americas Summit. City of Miami, 2004: 133.
' Becker, Maki et al. Cops corral Prez protesters. NY Daily News. September 3, 2004.
" Archibold, Randall C. Protesters Try to Get in Last Word Before Curtain Falls. New York Times. September 3, 2004.
4 In Dwyer, Jim. Videos Challenge Accounts of Convention Unrest. NY Times. April 12, 2005.
* Anderson, Christopher. Getting Used: How the Mainstream Media Helps Create Climate of Fear and Repression During Political
Protests. Department of Communication, School of Journalism. New York: Columbia University, 2004. (Accessed on July 10, 2005
from The Indypendent ) http://nyc.indymedia.org/usermedia/application/2/GettingUsed-_Report.pdf
In many cases, physical evidence was mischaracterized or wholly invented in order to infer links
between protesters and violence. During the World Bank/IMF (2000) summit police raided the
activists' central organizing space, shutting it down just one day before protests were set to begin.
Police justified the action by telling reporters they had found weapons-making materials in the
warehous such as Molotov cocktails and pepper-spray, implying the space was being used to arm
protesters intent on doing violence. In fact, it was a puppet-making warehouse. Only after the
protests were over did the public find out that the items in custody were only generic cooking
equipment and food ingredients like pepper and onions." During the During Boston/DNC(2004)
police widely publicized the claim that they had seized a Molotov cocktail from a protester in
crowd. They continued to assert this for days after they had the 'object' in custody, a claim which
was then widely circulated in the national media. It was later revealed that the object was in fact,
merely a hollow plastic and papier-mache 'pirate hook' that was part of an protester's homemade
costume.45 During Miami/FTAA (2003), police held a dramatic and angry press conference
claiming they had seized physical evidence that revealed how protesters had been constructing an
arsenal of weapons.' Among the common household items they presented, they presented coconuts
and bicycle tires side by side, insisting they were the rudiments of giant slingshots. One police
spokesman declared: "What is normally a harmless coconut can actually become a deadly
weapon."47
44 Ibid.
' Stidman, Pete. Three Arrested Over "Molotov Cocktail" (Translation: Empty Plastic Bottle). Boston Independent Media Center. July
29, 2004.
* George, Jim. The Miami Model: Observations on a Corporate and Government Alliance. Baltimore Independent Media Center.
January 31, 2004. (Accessed July 10, 2005) http://baltimore.indymedia.org/newswire/display/6159/index.php
4 Associated Press. Police Arrest Scores Of Miami Trade-Talk Protesters. NBC. November 20, 2003.
WTO IMF RNC DNC Inaug WEF Anti-War IMF Anti-War FTAA G-8 DNC RNC Inaug
9/11
1999 2000 2000 2000 2001 2002 2003 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2004 2005
Demonization of X X X X X X X X X X X X Xprotesters
Inferring link x x x x x x x
protesters/violence
Inferring link x x x x x x x
protesters/ terrorism
Misrepresented X X X X Xevidence
Embedded media; X X Xtargeting of non-
Figure 2: Media Tactics (Citations for each data point are provided in Appendix: Data Citations)
These ominous characterizations present an image of protesters as violent and dangerous to the
public, providing a pre-text for extreme police actions in 'response.' They have been used to either
create a pretext for pre-emptive police action absent any crime, or to justify excessive police
actions after the fact. As one Miami observer said of the media coverage during the FTAA: "This
strategy is about convincing the public of something that is not true, and then using this as a basis
to enact public policy. Effectively, this gives the police a blank check to do whatever they want." 4
On the eve of the Boston/DNC (2004) one protest organizer commented on how this undermines
protesters' relationship to the public while at the same time leaving them vulnerable: "They try to
build a divide between the community and us because if we're isolated, we're segregated, they can
do whatever they want, and they can use whatever tactic, whatever style they want, to try and
suppress us."49
Typically, it was revealed days or even weeks after the protests had passed, that police claims made
at the time of protests were exaggerated, if not totally false. By the time that this disinformation is
revealed, however, the media spotlight had moved elsewhere and public perceptions remain
uncorrected.' While the basis for the characterizations may ultimately be disproved, the
disinformation has already served its purpose by sustaining about 'violent and dangerous
protesters', thereby establishing a pretext for security operations at the next event.
* Statement by Max Rameau, Director of Miami Workers Center in personal conversation.
49 Dodero, Camille. Free Radicals. The Providence Phoenix. August 13 - 19, 2004.
* Anderson, Christopher. Getting Used: H ow the Mainstream Media Helps Create Climate of Fear and Repression During Political
Protests. Department of Communication, School of Journalism. New York: Columbia University, 2004. (Accessed on July 10, 2005
from The Indypendent ) http://nyc.indymedia.org/usermedia/application/2/GettingUsed-_Report.pdf
In regards to media tactics, it is also important to note that immediately after repressive acts were
carried out, police and public officials usually engaged in a series of well-publicized self-
congratulations, complimenting officers for demonstrating enormous "restraint" and
"professionalism" in the face of incredible danger.5 This final piece of public relations creates a
self-justifying cycle; a circular argument that begins with a manufactured threat, followed by a
repressive solution. Once it becomes clear to the public that contrary to police predictions,
protesters did not in fact engage in violence, police can claim that it was in fact, their own
repressive operations that actually prevented the violence from happening.52 What gets lost
between these two contrived end endpoints are the actual facts of protesters' non-violent intent and
methods. The pre-packaged storyline about police stemming protester violence is often what
consumes media coverage of protest events; effectively sidelining the political content of
protesters' message.
Legal tactics:
WTO IMF RNC DNC Inaug WEF Anti-War IMF Anti-War FTAA G-8 DNC RNC Inaug
1999 2000 2000 2000 2001 2002 2003 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2004 2005
Ordinances, "State of
Emergency' used to X X X
restrict assembly
Delayed issuance of
permits
Improper termination X
of event x
False/mass/pre-emptive X X X X X X X
arrests XXX
Arrest of journalists/ x
legal obs/medics X X X X X X X X
Prolonged detention X X X X X X X X
Exorbitant bails X X X
Random detention or
searches & seizure X X X
Figure 3: Legal Tactics (Citations for each data point are provided in Appendix: Data Citations)
51 NY Police chief praised his officers for showing:"great restraint in the face of relentless provocation. "in Moore, Martha. Nearly
1,000 protesters arrested. USA Today. September 1, 2004.
52 Defede, Jim. Thanks to cops, the anarchists are the winners. Miami Herald. November 27, 2003; Also, the day after the FTAA the
Miami Herald declared: "An unprecedented show of force by police.. .quelled the city of Miami's worst fear -- widespread rioting." in
Nesmith, Susannah. Police praise selves on absence of chaos. Miami Herald. November 22, 2003.
Sudden changes to the law just prior to a protest were used in at least 3 of the protest events to
create extraordinary restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly. For example, in Miami an
'anti-parade' ordinance was passed just days before the anti-FTAA protests,53 leaving civil liberties
organizations insufficient time for legal appeals. Among its many provisions, the ordinance
outlawed all public assemblies of over 8 people at any time anywhere in the city. 4 It was
successfully repealed on constitutional grounds, but only after the protests had ended and hundreds
of arrests had been made. In Georgia, just prior to the G-8 (2004) summit protests, the governor
declared a preemptive 'State of Emergency.' 55 This special emergency power is usually reserved
for major natural disasters, yet it was declared in the absence of any actual emergency situation.
Nonetheless, it fostered an environment of panic and fear among local residents and media, while
granting police unlimited legal latitude to deal with protesters during the summit, including the
right to break up 'any gathering.' '
Another common tactic was the delayed issuing of protest permits. During the RNC (2004) United
For Justice and Peace, a major national anti-war group, waited for over 1 year for a march permit to
accommodate 250,000 people. The permit was granted only days before the event and included a
changed route, throwing final plans into a tailspin. Late issuance makes protest planning nearly
impossible and has the effect of undermining the ability of protest organizers to plan effectively.5
Commented one NY city councilmen: "Permits delayed are permits denied."
The use of mass, preemptive arrests occurred in 50% of the cases studied. Many of these operations
included the indiscriminate arrest of more than a hundred persons at a time. During NY/RNC
(2004) the police swept up a staggering 1821 people, mostly in mass arrest situations. The
stunningly low rate of convictions among those arrested underscores the lack of 'probable cause'
for the arrests, as only 9% were convicted of any charges.59 The rate of conviction was actually 0%
5 "We would be kidding ourselves if we said that without the [Free Trade Area of the Americas] this law would have been passed,"
quoted in Salazar, Carolyn. Protest Law Headed Toward Repeal. Miami Herald Feb. 27, 2004; See also, Hermes. Kris. Federal court
takes control of Miami's protest permit scheme. Miami Activist Defense. March 3, 2004.
* Boghosian, Heidi. The Assault on Free Speech, Public Assembly, and Dissent. National Lawyers Guild. North River Press, 2004: 7
5 The declaration of emergency is ordered in Executive Order 05.07.04.01, The State of Georgia. May 7, 2004. Downloaded June 10,
2005 from: http://www.gov.state.ga.us/ExOrders/05_07_04_01.pdf
6 Ibid.
57 Dangl, Benjamin. An Interview with Heidi Boghosian. Upside Down World. July 27, 2004.
* Robinson, Gail. Summer of Protest. Gathan Gazette. June 21, 2004. http://www.gothamgazette.com/print/1012
5 Dwyer, Jim. Videos Challenge Accounts of Convention Unrest. NY Times. April 12, 2005
for both Miami/FTAA (2003)6 the Oakland Port Protest (2004).61 In over 70% of the cases cited in
this paper, clearly identified third party observers such as journalists, medics, and legal observers
were arrested alongside protesters. In many of the situations, police conducted mass arrests without
issuing any public warning or order to disperse (a legal requirement).62 In other cases, the dispersal
orders were issued, but then police physically blocked protesters from leaving the site. *
Prolonged detention occurred in over 57% of the cases studies, as arrestees were frequently held in
jail longer than legal limits. During RNC (2004), the length of detention became so suspect that a
judge actually fined the city $1,000 for every protester held over the 24 hour time limit, pointing
out that shoplifters and other petty criminals arrested at the same time had already been released. "
These mass arrest tactics have two important outcomes: First, they act as a deterrent. Mass arrests
generate extensive media coverage and send a message of intimidation to would-be protesters. 65
When it appears to interested parties that they have a high likelihood of being arrested (even for
even for being a bystander) then the perceived costs of participation are raised, thereby decreasing
people's willingness to get involved. Secondly, mass arrests serve as a form of 'preventative
detention,' putting large numbers of protesters in jail absent any crimes, and physically detaining
them for the duration of the protest event. Even though a majority of those arrested get absolved in
court, invalidating the arrest, the mass arrests had already served its purpose as a form of
preemptive crowd control. "
6 Solnit, David. FTAA Scorecard: 283 Arrested / 0 Convictions. Save Our Civil Liberties. May 3, 2004.
61 The Dispatcher. Charges Against ILWU BA, Protestors Dropped. International Longshoremen and Warehouse Union. June 9, 2004.
62 "In violation of department policy, police frequently failed to wear identifying badges, refused to give shield numbers, arrested
peaceful protesters without a warning or an order to disperse." in Allen, Terry. Breaking Law to Keep Order. In These Times. May 29,
2000.
63 Ross, Robert. Killmon, Bentley et. al vs. City of Miami, United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami
Division. March, 25, 2004.: 5-12
" Dangl, Benjamin. "Arrestees, Lawyers, Medics Condemn Conditions of RNC Protest Detention." The NewStandard. September 3,
2004.
65 Boghosian, Heidi. The Assault on Free Speech, Public Assembly, and Dissent. National Lawyers Guild. North River Press, 2004: 40
6' Also sometimes referred to by attorneys as "Preventative Detention". NYC accused of creating 'Guantanamo on the Hudson' .
Associated Press. November 23, 2004.; See also Kamanetz, Anya. Target: Dissent. Village Voice. September 28, 2004.
Use offorce tactics
WTO IMF RNC DNC Inaug WEF Anti-War IMF Anti-War FTAA G-8 DNC RNC Inaug
1999 2000 2000 2000 2001 2002 2003 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2004 2005
Excessive force vs. X x x x x x x x
non-violent protesters
Chemical Weapons X X X X X X
Projectile Weapons X X X X
Electroshock XWeapons
Experimental XWeapons
Injuries caused X X X X
Critical Injuries X X X
Figure 4: Use of Force Tactics (Citations for each data point are provided in Appendix: Data Citations)
Excessive force was deployed in over 50% of the cases studied, and in many of these cases, the
consequences for protesters and bystanders were severe in nature. During the Oakland port protest,
although the police's own videotapes revealed protester did not provoke police,' OPD responded
with a hail of projectile fire, hospitalizing both protesters and nearby dock workers alike.' During
Miami/FTAA video footage showed that contrary to police claims, protesters did not precipitate
police with acts of violence.' However, police deployed a massive barrage of projectile weapons
into a crowds of unionists, teachers, retirees, and students. Dozens of protesters required
hospitalization7 including a youth who lost his eye as result of being shot in the face.7 Even non-
protesters suffered severe injuries. A Miami journalist suffered permanent paralysis in his face after
being shot while on the sidelines.72 Ironically, he was there to make a pro-FTAA film.73
67 Burt, Cicely. Video doesn't show rocks being thrown: Oakland Tribune. May 15, 2003.
"Photo Gallery: Protest at the Port of Oakland. Oakland Tribune: (Accessed June 10, 2005)
http://extras.insidebayarea.com/ot/gallery/index.asp?folder=news/protest60103
69 Footage from documentary: The Miami Model. A collaboration of the Independent Media Center. 2004
7 Photos of protester shot in the back. Miami Independent Media Center. Downloaded June 10, 2005)
http://www.ftaaimc.org/en/2003/11/1997.shtml
71 Information given to me in a personal conversation with victim's legal representative. Information withheld upon request of victim.
72 Transcript from broadcast: NOW, with Bill Moyers. PBS. February 27, 2004. (Accessed June 10, 2005)
http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript309_full.html
7 Pick Your Reality. Miami New Times (Photo series) http://www.miaminewtimes.com/issues/2003-12-04/korten.html
http://www.afsc.org/pwork/0407/040726.htm
Seattle/WTO (1999): Police fire
teargas and rubber bullets point
blank into seated crowds of
protesters practicing non-violent
civil disobedience.
Miami/FTAA (2003): Police move in on a permitted
rally firing rubber bullets, beanbags and tear gas into
the crowd. Video by independent journalists
subsequently showed the police use of force was not
precipitated by protester violence.
Port of Oakland Anti-War protest (2003): Police
lob concussion grenades and fire wooden dowels
into crowd, hospitalizing several protesters and
nearby dock workers. The police's own video
disproved the officers' claims that protesters threw
rocks and bottles before police acted.
Spatial tactics
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Mobile netting X Xbarriers to corral
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areas of city
Figure 5: Spatial Tactics (Citations for each data point are provided in Appendix: Data Citations)
The physical closing off of public areas to assembly through various means occurred in over 70%
of the cases. This figure was careful to exclude those cases where there were plausible concerns
about security and fences and/or other barriers were used to protect the immediate vicinity of
government buildings. In Seattle, the entire downtown area was declared a "No Protest Zone" and
put under curfew. A Federal court determined that the police used the no-protest zone as a way to
discriminate specifically against certain people with anti-WTO sentiments.74 During Miami/FTAA
nearly a half square mile of the downtown area was encircled by a security perimeter, eliminating
all public access. During both Los Angeles and Boston Democratic National Conventions special
"Free Speech Zones" were created to house protesters. In Boston (2004) this zone was fortified
with concrete barricades, steel fencing, razor wire, covered by plastic netting, and was situated
under an active construction site. It had a maximum capacity of 1000 people and was guarded
outside by heavily armed police, with US Army soldiers stationed above it. A judge called the
comparison to a concentration camp "an understatement."75
In many of the cases, large numbers of protesters were kept from reaching the permitted assembly
area. During NY/Anti-war (2003) tens of thousands of protesters were barred from reaching the
' Federal Appeals Court: "In some instances police conduct may have gone too far and infringed on certain individual protesters'
constitutional rights by making the content of their expressed views the test for their entry into the restricted zone," in Johnson, Gene.
Court: Seattle Police Perhaps Erred in wTO Protest. Associated Press. June 3, 2005.
75 Emery, Theo. Judge upholds 'free speech zone' but permits march on FleetCenter. Associated Press. July 22, 2004.
rally through the use of metal 'protest pens.' 6 During Miami/FTAA(2003), despite a prior
agreement with police, 13 busses carrying retired union workers who had traveled across the
country were denied entry to the permitted protest area.
The Secret Service has been the driving force in stipulating restrictions on the use of space, under
the reasonable theory that they are necessary to keep crowds of unknown people away from high-
ranking government officials. However, in practice, the Secret Service has frequently allowed
supporters of the president to get within close range of his person, while anti-administration
demonstrators were forced to stay far away in free speech zones, sometimes miles away.77 As one
observer pointed out: "if someone wanted to kill the president, I would go with a sign saying 'I
love the president."" This double standard suggests that the 'security' concerns in question may
have more to with protecting officials from public embarrassment, rather than the presence of any
real security threat. Legally, this is unconstitutional as it is considered limiting free speech based
upon on the content of ones message.
Boston/DNC (2004): Views from inside the heavily fortified "Free Speech Zone." A judge called the comparison of the zone to a concentration
camp 'an understatement'. (Photo: David Meiren)
7 Dunn, Christopher, et al. Rights and Wrongs at the RNC: A Special Report about Police and Protest at the Republican National
Convention, ACLU, 2005: 17
7 An ACLU complaint filed in U.S. District Court in Philadelphia lists eight instances in cities in which demonstrators protesting
administration policies were allegedly forced into areas well away from where President Bush or Vice President Dick Cheney would be,
while supporters with signs were allowed to be much closer.
8 Associated Press. Florida protesters sue over free-speech zone arrests. August 7, 2003.
Intimidation tactics
WTO
1999
IMF RNC DNC Inaug WEF Anti-War IMF Anti-War FTAA G-8
2000 2000 2000 2001 2002 2003 2002 2003 2003 2004
DNC RNC Inaug
2004 2004 2005
Public training drills X X X X
Media showcase of x x x x x
weapons, tactics
Massive
presentation of force
on streets
US armed forces X X X Xdeployed on streets
Helicopters or X X X X X X XArmored Personnel
Carriers
Activists' homes X X X X X
surveilled
Activist meeting X X X X
spaces raided
Figure 6: Intimidation Tactics (Citations for each data point are provided in Appendix: Data Citations)
Pre-emptive forms of intimidation were used in 85% of the cases studied, occurring in the absence
of any violent activity on the part of demonstrators. These included stationing of large numbers of
heavily armed police inside permitted protest areas (42%), the prominent display of armored
vehicles and weapons and/or the repeated flying of police helicopters and other aircraft over rallies
and demonstrations (50%), and publicly staged 'field force training drills' or media displays of
weapons to exhibit the amount of force on hand (50%). Technically labeled as 'show of force'
operations by police, these preemptive displays are designed to use the threat of violence for
psychological effect. In describing the police department's use of this tactic during the FTAA, a
high-ranking department spokesman stated: "Just about every alleyway or street you tried to go up
you'd see a show of force. I think the psychological factor worked very well." 7
7 Williamson, Eric. Savannah police won't have Miami's muscle for G-8. Savannah Morning News. November 25, 2003.
Miami/FTAA (2003): The pre-emptive "show of force" on display (photo: www..ftaaimc.org)
Intelligence tactics
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Figure 7: Intelligence Tactics. (Citations for each data point are provided in Appendix: Data Citations)
Revelations that police had infiltrated or surveilled non-criminal and/or non-violent protest groups
were frequent (71%). (It can logically be assumed to be even more widespread than is presented in
this dataset, which relies on public information, as such operations are by definition, secret). The
common justification offered by police is that they are legally allowed to do this because the
Justice Department has advised them that, like anyone else, they are free to attend any meetings
open to members of the public.8" However, this crosses over into legally and morally dubious
territory as officers accomplish this by assuming false names, hiding the fact that they are on-duty
officers (not just members of the 'public'), and are entering private under false pretenses and
without warrants.
Of greater concern, concrete evidence of agent provocateur tactics was found in more than one
instance. Under intense legal pressure, the District of Columbia was forced to reveal that during the
Presidential Inaugural (2000) two 'anarchists' dressed in black ski-masks who were videotaped
shoving people and sprayed tear gas into the crowds were in fact, on-duty police officers."' During
Miami/FTAA (2003) there were numerous incidents where 'protesters' were witnessed and
photographed being disruptive, and then walking through police lines and conversing casually with
police. Undercover police officers were also photographed creating disruptions in the crowds by
engaging in 'snatch squads' tactics wherein, dressed as protesters, they would surreptitiously
8 Noah Leavitt. John Ashcroft's Subpoena Blitz: Targeting Lawyers, Universities, Peaceful Demonstrators, Hospitals, and Patients, All
With No Connection to Terrorism. February 18, 2004.
1 Two men in street clothes -- one wearing a black ski mask -- were captured on amateur videotape roaming through the inauguration
crowd. They shove bystanders and one pepper-sprays people seemingly at random. After two years of legal pressure, the District of
Colombia acknowledged the men were on-duty police officers. in Montgomery, David. Stirring a Cause. Washington Post. Monday,
May 12, 2003: COI; See also, D.C. Committee on the Judiciary. Report on Investigation of the Metropolitan Police Department's Policy
and Practice in Handling Demonstrations in the District of Columbia, Council of the District of Columbia, March 11, 2004.
surround a particular protester suspected of criminal conduct and pounce on them, subduing them
with tasers and by brute force, and then dragging them behind police lines for arrest.' Media
outlets were confused by this police tactic, mistakenly reporting the actions of evidence of protester
violence."
DC/Inauguration(2000): Video still of on-duty police officer dressed Miami/FTAA (2003): A police 'snatch squad' dressed as protesters
up as 'anarchist.' Footage showed them shoving and spraying people and armed with tasers, takes down a person in the crowd. One has
in the crowd with pepper spray. (Photo: Partnership for Civil Justice) "FTAA sucks" written on his backpack (Photo: www.ftaaimc.org)
8 Miami Independent Media Center Photo Series: "An undercover police snatch squad that infiltrated the crowd and nabbed a couple of
people... They fired tasers into the crowd and then dispapeared behind police lines, dragging the person they arrested with them." Stem,
Andrew. N20: Photos Of Snatch Squad. FTAA Independent Media Center. November 22, 2003. (Downloaded June 10, 2005)
http://ftaaimc.org/pt/2003/11/1849.shtml
* A TV news video showed a protester being subdued by an undercover snatch squad, but described the footage as protesters starting a
fight. Warner Brothers, Channel 39 news, November 20, 2003.
Chapter IV:
Data Analysis
A New Model of Political Repression
The data shows a widespread and consistent pattern of political repression taking place within US
cities. The ominous claim made by Miami officials after the FTAA (2003) summit that their heavy-
handed operations culminated a new 'model,' appears to be supported by the evidence. While the
exact operational details of the 'Miami Model' remain classified within police documents," the
basic characteristics of this model can be plausibly 'reverse engineered' by looking at the empirical
data. Despite the many variations in urban contexts, the data reveals a fairly consistent set of
general features. These include: the demonization of protesters in the media that serves as a
justification for repressive acts; the manipulation of local laws in order to deny or restrict protesters
basic rights to assembly and speech; mass, indiscriminate arrests absent probable cause; an
increased reliance force via the use of "less-lethal" weapons; restrictions on the use of public space
based upon the content of political speech; overt intimidation via the prominently stationing of
military-grade weapons, personnel and vehicles on the streets; the use of undercover officers to
infiltrate non-violent political groups; and the occasional (proven) use of agent provocateurs to
stimulate violence.
This is a dramatic reversal of policing trends documented in the 1980's and 1990s. In a landmark
study, McPhail et. al discovered that in 1980's and 1990's protest policing in western democracies
had become dramatically less repressive than in the 1960's and 1970's, increasingly relying on
moderation, restraint, and the absence of the use of force." One scholar summed up this
transformation by stating: "avoidance of large clashes was evidence that police had successfully
policed the protest."' This marked a distinct turn away from the repressive tactics that resulted in
infamous episodes like the 'police riot' of Chicago's Democratic National Convention in 1968 and
the killing of 3 students at a demonstration at Kent State University in 1970.
' For example, the operations plan for the Miami/FTAA (2003) remains classified. "Miami police officials refused to hand over the
document on the grounds that it contained security information that could jeopardize future operations nationwide. Authorities
throughout the country have since adopted the plan." Rodriguez, Ihosvani. Appeals court protects secrecy involving police strategy for
Miami trade talks. Miami Sun-Sentinel, August 19, 2005.
8 McPhail, Clark, et al. "Policing Protest in the United States: 1960-1995." In Dontatell Della Porta and Herbert Reiter (eds). Policing
Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.
' John Noakes quoted in Shaffer, Gwen. Force Multiplier: Treating Protesters Like Terrorists. The New Republic. August 2, 2004.
The evidence in this paper strongly suggests a return to the previous era of police approaches that
emphasize preemption and force. Moreover, the evidence suggests that this new model is not
merely a relapse of old habits, but a modem re-invention. The new model takes full advantage of
advancements in media and weapons technology that can enable repression to be more widespread,
and yet harder to discern by the larger public.
According to Della Porta the main cause of the shift to less-repressive approaches was not simply
good will on the part of police, but criticism by government commissions and intense public
outcry. However the new model is capable of circumventing these barriers to repression. The
more adept use of mass media and public relations by public officials helps to obscure repression
by criminalizing protesters, giving political repression the appearance of a normal, justified police
response. A key component of this media strategy is the use of 'embedded media' that helps
frames media stories from this kind of police perspective. 'Embedding' is a method adapted
directly from military strategies in the War in Iraq," The use of embedded media is often
complemented by the selective arrest and assault of media who are not embedded with police.'
Non-embedded media have been selectively targeted for arrest, and been the victims of police
violence. As one journalism professor in Miami pointed out after the FTAA, embedding of the
media encouraged reporters to buy into police spin that protesters are "the enemy."94
Another factor has been the introduction of less lethal weapons as the primary tool of force.
Despite their 'less-lethal' label, the use of these weapons actually increases police ability to use
force against civilians, because it reduces the likelihood of fatalities. 9' Simply put, since they are
less likely to kill their targets, they can be used more without fear of generating public outcry.
These weapons were developed for military use, specifically to aid in 'politically sensitive'
environments abroad where civilians are the targets. With the use of these weapons, it is less likely
that there will be another 'Kent State' in which the deaths of peaceful protesters shock a nation.
87 Della Porta, Dontatella and Herbert Reiter (eds). Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.
m Pacenti, John. "Embedded Obstacles." American Journalism Review. February/March, 2004.
89 During the mass arrests that occurred during the Miami FTAA, police asked media personnel if they were embedded. Those who were
embedded were let go, those who were not were arrested. Source: Goldberg, Michelle. "This is not America." Salon.com. December 16,
2003.
' Pacenti, John. "Embedded Obstacles." American Journalism Review. February/March, 2004
91 The Stern Commission Report on Less Lethal Weapons (Commission Investigating the Death of Victoria Snelgrove), explains "the
introduction of certain less lethal weapons can actually increase the severity and frequency and severity of injuries."
Instead, lethal incidents will be substituted by a greater number of lesser injuries, that while
sometimes crippling, will draw less attention. Whether these weapons kill or not, however, the
amount of force is sufficient to maim and injure, causing people to stay away from protest
situations. While not as lethal, they are just as effective as normal firearms as a means of depriving
people of their basic rights through the use of force.
Port of Oakland (2003): Protester shot by Miami/FTAA (2003): Journalist shot by
"less lethal" weapon during the. She police "beanbag" projectile which lodged
suffered permanent nerve damage. itself in his temple. Half of his face remains
(Photo: Paul Sakuma) paralyzed. (Photo: www.ftaaimc.org)
Miami/FTAA (2003): Protester shot by
police while kneeling and praying on a
grass field. (Photo: www.ftaaimc.org)
Transferring the Model
The evidence suggests that this new model of repressive tactics is being enacted on a broad,
nationwide scale, being transferred from city to city, protest to protest, with many of its basic
operational features intact. This was confirmed by the police whemselvces when Miami Police
admitted in court that the "Miami Model" of protest policing used during the FTAA protests is in
fact being actively adopted by departments across the country. The department had refused to hand
over the police 'operations plan' to the city's own Civilian Investigative panel (even though the
CIP is the official body charged with investigating police conduct) on the grounds "that it
contained security information that could jeopardize future operations nationwide Ibecause]
authorities throughout the country have since adopted the plan."2 (emphasis added).
' Rodriguez, Ihosvan. Appeals court protects secrecy involving police strategy for Miami trade talks. Sun-Sentinel. August 19, 2005.
Compounding this evidence, the second most repressive event in the dataset, G-8(2004) has also
been held up as a model by law enforcement officials across the country. In a massive operation
whose main focus was crowd control, G-8 operations saw over 20,000 law enforcement and
military personnel occupy an entire island and neighboring city, using miles of steel fencing and
dozens of military vehicles on such a scale that while protesters decried the overt intimidation and
non-protesting tourists comparing the operations to 'martial law'. An article from the Atlanta
Journal Constitution quotes several law enforcement underscoring the operation's role as a model:
Officials say their success at squelching potential terrorism and violent protests has persuaded federal,
state and local agencies across the country to make the Georgia experience a blueprint for 'national
security special events.'
"Much of our planning will be helpful for the upcoming national political conventions. The
information we gathered and the way we planned for this event is transferable."
"What we did here is absolutely exportable. The things we did here are going to become a model for
future events of this magnitude."
"Lessons learned here will definitely be useful going forward."
The tactics already are being replicated for Boston, New York and other American cities scheduled to
host major events, law enforcement officials said. 3
Looking at the publicly available data, the transference of these protest-policing models across the
country can be tracked along three avenues of transmission. First, it is occurring through top-down
(vertical) channels, as federal law authorities have had direct oversight of security operations in
almost every single event in the data set. The FBI, Secret Service and (since September 11, 2001)
the Department of Homeland Security, are now more intimately involved in the design and
execution of local protest policing than ever before. As the highest-ranking officials present in
these protest situations they are able to transfer lessons and plans from one protest situation to the
next.
The second method by which the model is being transferred is horizontally. Public statements by
police officials repeatedly describe an ongoing and vigorous practice of sending officials to observe
police operations in protest events in other cities, in advance of protest events in their own city, in
order to bring these tactics and strategies home for implementation. For example, observers from
* Hirschman, David. Security tactics set standard for events. Atlanta Journal-Constitution. June 10, 2004.
both New York and Boston police departments were present in Miami for the FTAA and in
Georgia for the G-8.'
The third avenue is via training by international specialists in crowd control, mostly coming from
situations of military occupation in other countries. 95 For example, in advance of Boston/DNC
(2004) BPD revealed they had received training from a range of international experts, including
"Israeli suicide terrorism specialists and crowd-control tacticians in Northern Ireland."'
Taken together, public statements made by police, court arguments, and the empirical data suggests
that the 'Miami Model' is being widely adopted by police departments across the country. This
lends greater weight to the boastful claims made by Miami Police Chief John Timoney in the wake
of the Miami/FTAA operations, calling them ""the first big event for Homeland Security...the first
real realistic run-through to see how it would work."97
Post 9/11 - A Quantitative, Not Qualitative Shift
While protesters bear the brunt of these operations, the overt nature of many of these new policing
practices can easily offend the general non-protesting public, as they often require the prominent
stationing of tanks, soldiers and weaponry on US city streets. This has increased the importance of
public relations by police officials, as they have had to explain the necessity of these tactics. The
ubiquitous explanation offered federal officials, politicians, and local police is 'September 11' i.e.
the threat of terrorist attack. The data shows that almost without exception law enforcement
officals offer the 'War on Terror' as the reason for the extreme security measures used to police
protest events.
However, the data shows that while September 11 did mark a quantitative shift in scale of these
operations, it did not mark a significant qualitative shift in the nature of repressive tactics used.
Hence, it is difficult to credit the events of September 11 as the proximate cause for introduction of
these news policies. The data reveals, supporting the claims made by the NLG and ACLU, that
these new repressive tactics were established long before September 11, at least as far back as
9 Ibid.
95 Klein, Rick. Security overtime put at $32.5m. The Boston Globe. June 25, 2004.
* Estes, Andrea. Police getting expert aid on DNC security. Boston Globe. May 9, 2004.
' NOW, with Bill Moyers http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript309_full.html
Seattle/WTO (1999).' This shift is also supported by police statements made subsequent to
Seattle/WTO (1999) that claimed entirely new models of policing were required to address the
increasingly sophisticated tactics of protesters." This suggests that the precipitating event for the
introduction of these new new tactics was not a violent act of terrorism, but rather, the success of
protesters' tactics in Seattle, which were overwhelmingly non-violent.
That being said, the data does show important correlations with September 11. First, is strongly
linked to the use of terrorism as a public rationale for the use of these new tactics. While these
tactics were already in use prior to 9/11, there were few statements made in the media by
politicians or law enforcement linking protest groups to terrorism. Since September 11 however,
police and/or public officials have justified repressive policing tactics by inferring links between
protests and terrorism in almost every instance.
Taken together, these two findings show that while the events of September 11 may not be the
proximate cause for the introduction of repressive protest policing tactics, it has provided a popular
rationale for their deployment.
There is a second correlation between the data and September 11. This date is linked to a dramatic
increase in the quantitative scale of the repressive tactics used. In the quantitative data section,
before and after September 11 comparisons between the number of agencies, police personnel, and
amount of money devoted towards deploying these tactics all demonstrate dramatic quantitative
increase. (See Charts 1 & 2, below).
Manufacturing Links Between Protesters and Terrorism
There is no evidence that any of the protest groups included in the dataset have any connection to
terrorism, or for that matter, any policy of organized violence against people. That being said, a
small section of the Global Justice movement has at times, made a grand display of engaging in
acts of targeted vandalism and property destruction. The dramatic media images that this has
produce - masked 'anarchists' clad in black, smashing Gap and Niketown storefront in Seattle - do
98 Boghosian, Heidi. The Assault on Free Speech, Public Assembly, and Dissent. National Lawyers Guild. North River Press, 2004:17
" Nation Looks To Learn Lessons From Seattle's WTO Problems. Seattle Post-Intelligencer. February 29, 2000.
provide a factual basis for increased security concerns about property destruction. However, these
dramatic and oft repeated images provide the only factual 'kernal of truth' that sits within a larger,
factually unsupported characterization of these protesters as violent: dangerous to both people and
local businesses.
A defining aspect to these groups' behavior that has been largely ignored by the media, is that
while they are associated closely with images of chaos, the most militant among the anarchist
groups that attend mass protests behave according to a strict, explicitly-stated philosophy that
rejects violence against people (in fact, against all living things, including animals). Even property
destruction must be highly constrained according to their approach, as it is only considered
politically and morally acceptable when directed at the property of large corporations who they see
as engaged in exploitative practices and not small, locally owned businesses. 100 In fact, these
militant groups routinely promote small, locally owned businesses during protest events as an
antidote to what they see as a corporate domination of the local economy.'"' While these definitions
may seem arbitrary to many (as property destruction can certainly be described as 'violent') these
guidelines have severely constrained the scope of even the most 'hardcore' groups to a very narrow
set of practices. In contradiction to police characterizations, these guidelines show a great
disinterest in undertaking orchestrated acts of violence against others.
Interestingly, in the course of this research project, in which hundreds of police reports, news
articles, videos, and personal testimonials were examined, the author was unable to find any
evidence of pattern of organized violence by protesters hat fell outside these guidelines. There is
clear evidence that several brand name stores did have their windows broken in Seattle. There is
also evidence of countless instances of arguments and shoving matches between protesters and
police that produced minor injuries on both sides. However, the oft-repeated claims that protesters
have thrown Molotov cocktails, engaged in 'widespread arson,' or have launched concerted attacks
on police are contradicted by the evidence (in some cases, even by the police departments' own
oo The militant protesters approach to property destruction was outlined in the Anarchist N30 Black Bloc Communiqui , a document
publicly released on Dec. 12, 1999 immediately after Seattle/WTO: " We contend that property destruction is not a violent activity
unless it destroys lives or causes pain in the process. By this definition, private property--especially corporate private property--is itself
infinitely more violent than any action taken against it. Private property should be distinguished from personal property."
101 Anarchist protest groups often do door-to-door outreach to local businesses before and during protests, providing them with
information about their goals and aims. During the Boston/DNC(2000) a self described 'anarchist' group called the Black Tea Society,
printed hundreds of posters declaring their support for small, locally owned businesses, encouraging people to patronize their businesses
and avoid corporate chain stores.
video footage)." There have been no instances where protesters were found to carry bombs. There
have been no instances of protesters launching violent attacks on members of the public or media
(though heated exchanges are many). Even the New York Times had to retract it claims that there
was any 'widespread arson' in Seattle after reviewing the evidence.'" It is interesting that
Seattle/WTO is the lynchpin in the narrative about protester violence and yet the Seattle Police
Department's own 'After Action Report' reveals that there were 'no serious injuries' during the
event. 104 By their own admission, the less-than-serious injuries that police suffered were mostly a
result of handling their own weapons.'"5 As of yet, there is no compelling evidence that the image
of protesters in the US as being dangerous to the larger public is anything more than an urban
legend circulated by police and other officials, one which gains more 'credibility' with each
retelling.
That being said however, there is ample empirical evidence of hundreds of lawful, peaceful
protesters and non-protesting bystanders being seriously injured by police. While no protester
fatalities have occurred in the US, many protesters have required emergency surgery or have
suffered permanent, life changing injuries like partial paralysis or loss of an eye. In Seattle/WTO
(1999) while police were not seriously injured, there were serious injuries caused by police. This
sheds some light on the true nature of violence during protests, and suggests which parties may be
the more likely cause of it. This is supported by earlier studies of riot situations, which concluded
that police actions were often the precipitating cause of riots and other violent events.'0 Even if
one accepts the argument that there is a small cadre of 'hardcore' protesters that seeks to do
violence, this does not explain the widespread and indiscriminate use of repressive tactics that are
chronicled this paper. Even when there have been incidents that can arguable be stated to have been
provoked by a few protesters, the deployment of massive crackdowns in their wake seem to imply
102 Burt, Cecily. Police Video Does Not Show Rocks Being Thrown. Oakland Tribune. May 15th, 2003.
"03 The NY Times issued a correction about its coverage of the Seattle WTO demonstations stating "there were no reports of widespread
arson." Corrections. NY Times. October 30, 2004.
"0 Seattle Police Department. Miami After Action Report. City of Seattle. 2000. 3
"" "Of the 56 officers who reported injuries, many were hurt by the crowd-control devices they were using to disperse demonstrators.
Deafening concussion grenade explosions, stinging clouds of tear gas, and pain-inducing bursts of pepper spray were a major cause of
injuries. Seventeen officers reported hearing loss, four listed exposure to chemical irritants, one was burned by a hot tear gas canister,
and another claimed a snug-fitting gas mask broke his teeth. A dozen complained of strained backs, hurt hands and sprained knees from
handling protesters." Chasan, Daniel and Christine Walker. Out of Control: Seattle's Flawed Response to Protests Against the World
Trade Organization. ACLU. July, 2000.
" See Kerner, Otto. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. New York: Dutton, 1968; and Eisenhower,
Milton. Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1969.
that police used these acts by a few as a pretext for punishing the overwhelming majority, who had
engaged in lawful and non-violent forms of dissent.
Nevertheless, the ominous specter of protester's extreme violence and terrorism is routinely used to
justify massive security operations. When news reporters have raised questions about the
plausibility of the connection between protest and terrorism, police officials have found ways to re-
frame this connection by stating that the links are not actually direct. An exchange between a Fox
News anchorman and Miami Police Chief John Timoney illustrates this:
FOX: Chief, the big question: could convention protesters actually leave us vulnerable to terrorism?
TIMONEY:: Oh, absolutely....
FOX: Now, do you believe that their intention is to provide a smoke screen, a cover, while real
terrorists slip around in the background and blow up something big?
TIMONEY: I wouldn't say that that's their intention, but that could be the result of their actions."
According to this 'indirect' argument, it is not really the protesters themselves who present the
terrorist threat (which there is simply no evidence for) but rather that protests could be used a
pretext for a terrorists attack, making the heavy security operations necessary. Police officials have
even gone as far as claiming that these operations on the street are not even directed at the
protesters, but rather to protect the protesters from terrorist attack.
However, all these terror-based justifications for repressive crowd control measures break down
when examined on the tactical level. From a tactical point of view, while there may be legitimate
fears of terrorist attacks, the methods that are actually surround the protest events have no strategic
relevance to addressing a potential terrorist attack. Riot police armed with 'less lethal' and 'non-
lethal' projectiles, tear gas launchers, electronic riot shields, and high-tech sound weapons cannot
not help locate car bombs, deter people strapped with explosives, repel armed insurgents or stop
airplanes from crashing into buildings. These weapons, strategies and tactics are designed and used
for a singular purpose only, crowd control of civilian populations.
" John Gibson, Transcript of Interview With John Timoney. Fox News. July 15, 2004.
Big Threats Mean Big Money
In the absence of any plausible link between protest and terrorism, it become imperative to ask why
terror-based rationales are used so frequently to justify crowd control operations? The financial
data suggests a plausible alternate explanation. Since September 11, 2001, protest policing
operations present a massive financial windfall when protest policing can be justified in the name
of 'combating terrorism'. As the executive director for the City of Miami's Independent Review
Panel, noted after the FTAA protests: "Prior to 9/11, I'd never seen the federal government spend
this kind of money to prepare local police departments for a demonstration.""
This massive infusion of cash comes from Department of Homeland Security and can bring tens of
millions of dollars in training, new equipment and police overtime pay for a single 2-3 day event -
a dream come true for any law enforcement agency. For example, during the Boston/DNC (2004)
(even though Homeland Security asserted that there they had no intelligence suggesting a threat) a
whopping $32.5 million went directly into individual policemen's pockets in the form of police
overtime pay." Millions more went to purchase new crowd control equipment and training for the
Boston Police Department itself. During the Miami/FTAA (2003) tens of millions were spent at a
trade summit where the implication that it was a serious target for terrorist threat approaches the
absurd.
108 Shaffer, Gwen. Force Multiplier: Treating Protesters Like Terrorists. The New Republic. August 2, 2004.
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Chart 1: Comparisons Of Pre- And Post- September 11 Security Budgets For Same Event
This is not to say that a significant portion of these funds is not directed towards legitimate security
operations at these events, as there is at least some warranted concern over terrorism for some of
the events. The publicly available funding figures for 'security operations' for these events have
not been broken down into smaller categories, so it impossible to determine how much went
towards counter-terrorism tactics, and how much towards crowd control. However, even in cases
where the events held no plausible interest for terrorists - but protesters were sure to show - the
terror rationale was used.
For example, Al Qaeda's condemnations of the US and Europe have never touched upon barriers to
trade, farm subsidies, and trade liberalization. Hence, it is implausible that the wrath of Islamic
terrorists would be directed at an obscure regional trade summits, much less one that focused
primarily on Latin America, and had nothing to do with the Middle East. The only real security
concerns during the FTAA (2003) were the protesters who had haunted every previous FTAA
meeting. To be sure, the security arrangements were a crowd control operation, not a counter-
terrorism operation. Nonetheless, references to terrorism were made" 0 and $24 million dollars were
devoted to security operations,"' including $8 million from the federal Iraq War budget." 2
A significant threat must be posed to justify spending tens of millions of dollars for a 2-3 day
event. The threat of college students, school teachers, retirees and trade unionists, speckled with a
handful of 'militants' that at worst, break windows, is simply not a compelling enough threat to
justify these exorbitant budget requests. Clearly, a more ominous threat is needed.
In other words, it would be naive to ignore the influence that the availability of these massive funds
may have in promoting a 'terror' rationale for police operations that are, in practice, crowd control
exercises aimed at overwhelmingly peaceful protesters. As the Washington Post observed about the
'unprecedented' security for the 2005 inaugural: "In the end, massive anti-terrorism preparations
for what federal authorities promised would be the most secure inauguration in U.S. history turned
into an exercise in crowd control."" 3 Whether by design or circumstance, when terrorists fail to
show, these massive security operations become directed at protesters.
Transference to every day policing
For some readers, this evidence of increasing police repression raises a practical question: "If I
myself am not a protester, then why should this concern me?" What this line of inquiry fails to
understand is that mass protest events serve as a kind of 'emergency moment' wherein extra-
ordinary security procedures are introduced into police agencies that don't just disappear
afterwards. These new protest policing tactics become absorbed into daily policing efforts and in
turn, affect the well-being of the general public.
" Miami Police chief referred to protesters as outsiders coming to "terrorize" the city quoted in Figueras, Tere. "Big Police Presence;
Few Clashes." Miami Herald. November 21, 2003.
" Nesmith, Susannah A. Summit security costs public millions. Miami Herald. Feb. 22, 2004.; See also Diana Marrero. Security at
Miami's free trade meeting cost taxpayers $23.9 million. South Florida Sun Sentinel. February 24, 2004.
112 The money -- $8.5 million -- was tacked onto an $87 billion spending bill for Iraq. Driscoll, Amy. Probe of police action urged.
Miami Herald. November 25, 2003.
"3 Hsu, Spencer S. et. al.Crowd Control, Not Terror, Causes Tense Moments. Washington Post. January 21, 2005: A32
After Boston/DNC (2004), a massive surveillance camera system was installed throughout the
downtown area that allowed Boston police department to monitor protest activity. After the event
was over, BPD officials were excited that the massive surveillance camera network they purchased
to monitor protests would remain in place after the convention. "We own them now,' said a BPD
official. "We're certainly not going to put them in a closet." 1 4 After Miami/FTAA (2003) the
infamous "anti-parade" ordinance that was used to effectively outlaw protests in the city, remained
in place (though in a modified form)." 5
More worrisome, the militarized nature of these new policing approaches can increase the potential
of violent police responses to smaller, local demonstrations, or even to non-political gatherings.
Boston provides perhaps the clearest, and most tragic example. For DNC security operations the
Boston police used part of the $60 million security budget to purchase new FN-303 'pepperball'
rifles, a cutting edge "less-lethal" weapon. The FN-303 is a crowd control weapon that fires round
plastic bullets filled with a chemical toxin that is released on impact. Officers were seen carrying
these new weapons ubiquitously throughout the DNC, but they were never actually used as
protesters failed to live up to their characterizations as violent and disruptive. Afterwards, the
media accused the department of "sitting on an arsenal of weapons acquired in anticipation of
violence that never materialized.""16 However, rather than decommission these weapons, the
department underscored their potential for use in other situations. A BPD spokesperson assured
reporters, "they are not going to sit on the shelf and expire."" 7 3 months later, when a gathering of
Red Sox fans became rowdy while celebrating the city's historic win over the New York Yankees,
BPD officers used these weapons to deal with the disorderly crowd. They fired on the crowd, and
least 3 students were injured. One of them, a 21-year old student who did not engaged in any
disruptive behavior, was hit in the eye by an FN-303 round. She was killed.
"4 "The additional cameras.. .represent another chapter in Boston. Boston police say the 30 or so cameras installed for the convention
will be used throughout the city once the event is over." Ranalli, Ralph and R. Klein. Surveillance targeted to convention. The Boston
Globe. July 18, 2004.
"1 Conversation with Miami Atty. Rob Ross, who has been intimately involved in legal proceedings concerning the ordinance.
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A photo taken during the DNC: BPD officers with newly purchased FN- A photo taken on 3 months later: BPD officer aims an FN-303 into crowd
303 'pepper ball' rifles positioned outside Free Speech Zone of Red Sox fans at a post-game celebration, minutes before a 21-year-old
(Photo: Boston Independent Media Center) student was killed by an identical weapon. (Photo: Associated Press)
Chapter IV:
Institutional Contexts & Underlying Trends
The data shows a broad, documentable pattern of repression taking place during multiple meetings.
But the data outlined above only describes how this trend is manifesting in the public eye. Rational
consideration of these findings begs deeper investigation: how is this repression able to happen? If
similar tactics are appearing at multiple places and times, what underlying institutional processes
connect them? What factors may be facilitating this large-scale trend?
The Federalization of Local Police
One of the major trends in protest policing has been the increasing "federalization" of local police
operations, accomplished through the exercise of "joint operations" between federal, local and state
agencies during major events. During the event, new chains of command replace normal local
police structures, and put local agencies under the authority of federal law enforcement agencies
like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Secret Service (SS), and since 2001, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). During high profile summits when large numbers of
protesters are expected, massive amounts of local police personnel become integrated into these
federal command structures. The data is dramatic, showing that up to 136 different agencies have
participated in a single event (G-8, 2004). The new institutional relationships that form don't
simply disappear afterwards. As federal officials described after the Presidential Inaugural (2004):
"A host of other benefits will outlast the event.. .such gains include.. .forging critical
relationships among military and security decision-makers....A key benefit of the
extensive security planning was that the expertise and relationships developed this month
will survive......[Tom] Ridge said the cooperation of more than 70 federal, state and local
agencies for the inauguration was a model for what his department is trying to do
nationally. Department officials said the inauguration was the first event run under a
national emergency incident management system, which streamlines chains of command
under a principal federal officer and field office." 1"8
In short, mass protest events assist in centralizing local police operations under federal authorities.
" Horwitz, Sari and Spencer S. Hsu Experts Weigh Costs, Benefits of Inauguration Security. Washington Post. January 30, 2005: C01
This trend runs counter to the United States' distinct history of radically decentralized policing
institutions, which have made local police departments primarily accountable municipal
governments.
Chart 2: Increase In # of Agencies Involved In 'Joint Operations' For Each Event
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According to scholarship on policing, decentralization is considered a 'basic tenet' of democratic
policing" 9 and is said to improve "respect for human rights."" A cross-national comparative study
conducted by Can that concluded that decentralization is positive correlated with democracy 2 ' and
that decentralized police organizations were more likely to promote democratic values than
119 Das, K. D., & Marenin, 0. "Challenges of Policing Democracies: A World Perspective. Amsterdam" cited in Can, Salih Hakan. "A
Comparative Model of Democracy, Respect For Human Rights, And the Rise of Democratic Policing Reforms" in Fields, Charles B.
and Richter H. Moore, Jr Comparative and International Criminal Justice Traditional and Nontraditional Systems of Law and Control,
Second Edition. Prospect Hieghts, IL: Waveland Press, 1996: 77
"2 Can, Salih Hakan. "A Comparative Model of Democracy, Respect For Human Rights, And the Rise of Democratic Policing
Reforms" in Fields, Charles B. and Richter H. Moore, Jr Comparative and International Criminal Justice Traditional and
Nontraditional Systems of Law and Control, Second Edition. Prospect Hieghts, IL: Waveland Press, 1996: 78
121 Ibid. p. 87
centralized ones. 122
Conversely, centralized policing has often tends to be associated with authoritarian, repressive and
totalitarian regimes.'m There are of course exceptions to this rule, where greater centralization
under national authorities has provided more accountability and democratization such as in France,
Hungary and Sweden. However, this has been attributed to centralization's ability to give the
public even greater, stricter control over the police" when bolstered mechanisms of transparency
and accountability. Unfortunately, these important mechanisms seem largely absent from the new
model of policing in the US, as local, state and federal law-enforcement operations are increasingly
shrouded behind deeper and deeper layers of secrecy in the name of 'national security' and fighting
the 'War on Terror.'
In fact, many post-authoritarian nations in the midst of democratic transition list decentralized
policing as a major goal. 5 It is more than ironic that as other countries move towards democracy
(often looking towards the US as a model) the US may indeed be traveling in the other direction.
A note on the data: One may ask whether a direct connection between the 'joint operations' data
and the presence of mass protests can be made. It could be argue that the presence of these agencies
and mass protest are merely coincidental, as they are both present in regards to a third party -
powerful leaders attending international summits - and not because of each other. It follows that
these agencies (particularly military and federal agencies) are solely on hand to protect these people
and institutions, as well as the rest of the citizenry, from potential terrorism. They are not there as a
means of crowd control, despite what protesters imagine. There is some plausibility to this line of
reasoning, as it is logical assume that a significant portion of these security operations are fact
devoted to legitimate counter-terrorism efforts. However, even in the most extreme examples, for
instance, the US National Guard, which is supposed to play no role in domestic policing, there is
clear evidence that a great deal of these agencies' efforts are in fact directed at protesters, and not
122 Ibid. p. 92
m Bayley, D. H. Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1985.
12' Berkley, G. E. The Democratic Policeman. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969.
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societies. Transformation. (49): 3,8,13
terrorism. A rather candid article by a National Guardsmen appeared in an Guard journal right after
the DNC (2004), and clearly states the true focus of their 'military' operations:
Working alongside the Boston Police Department, Secret Service and 25 other local and
national agencies, the 211th Military Police Battalion, along with the 101st and 181st
Engineer battalions and the 1st Battalion, 182nd Infantry took part in securing one of the
nation's most prominent events... Soldiers trained for a week with state police to prepare
for the DNC, learning civil disturbance techniques.... "Our biggest concern going into the
convention was the number of protesters estimated,"... the two engineer battalions focused
on riots.. .They started from the ground up, training first on basic moves with the police
baton and riot shields, then building to full formations.. .The state police showed them
how to handle protesters handcuffed together ... Now the systems and techniques used in
Massachusetts will be shared with the New York National Guard in preparation for the
Republican National Convention."
The FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force
One central mechanism for the unification of local and federal operations has been through the
introduction of the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) into cities across the United States.
The FBI describes the JTTF's as "teams of state and local law enforcement officers, FBI Agents,
and other federal agents and personnel who work shoulder-to-shoulder to investigate and prevent
acts of terrorism""'. This is not an equal partnership, however. The JTTF remains a division of the
FBI, and deputizes local police officers who participate as federal 'US Marshalls.'m . Once
federalized, these local police officers gain higher security clearance than their own police chief or
the city's mayor. This has lead to complaints by elected city officials in some cities that they are
losing authority over their own officers.129
Prior to September 11, the FBI already created 34 task forces throughout major US cities.
Immediately after September 11, Attorney General John Ashcroft ordered that JTTFs be created for
all of the 56 FBI field offices. Currently, JTTF's exist in over "100 cities nationwide."43
126 Claffe, David J. Massachusetts National Guard backs up Democratic Convention. On Guard. US Army and Air National Guard.
September 2, 2005. 23 (9)
127 Federal Bureau of Investigation website: http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterrorism/partnership.htm
128 FBI "memorandum of understanding" the template to guide relationships with local police departments, p. 8, released by the Freedom
of Information Act on March 18, 2004. Obtained by Alasdair Roberts, Syracuse University.
129 William McCall, "City debates withdrawal from FBI's joint terrorism task force", Associated Press, January 28, 2005
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Information is centralized, channeled to a main office in Washington where the National JTTF
(NJTTF) provides daily reports to both the CIA and the Department of Defense, which are not law
enforcement agencies, but intelligence and military institutions."'
While the partnership is meant to provide mutual accountability between local and federal officials,
the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) that the local police departments are required to sign
shows otherwise. The MOU's reveal that the FBI maintains near total control over information
collected by local law enforcement agencies"2 . First, it requires that all files generated by
participating local and state police officers be housed exclusively in FBI offices, with no copies for
the local and state police departments. Second, once deputized, local officers are no longer able to
reveal information about their investigations to elected officials, the media, or any other avenue of
public accountability without the FBI's consent. Even high-ranking public officials, such as state
senators who sit on the Senate Intelligence Committee, do not have access to JTTF files of their
own state."3 This FBI policy on file ownership is also in conflict with common local and state laws
that require files on non-criminal activity to be regularly purged. 4
In short, while they directly enlist local police departments' resources, personnel, and informants,
JTTF investigations are not subject to any form of municipal oversight. Rather than describing
them as an 'equal partnership' between local, state and federal police agencies, it is more accurate
to say that JTTFs extend the reach of the FBI into local policing by incorporating state and local
officials into the FBI's existing structure"3 This clashes with public accountability and
transparency, and undermines the ability of local citizens to use whatever existing mechanisms
there are for democratic control over their own law enforcement resources.
This has provoked public outcry in many cities as citizen groups, recalling the COINTELPRO
fiascos of the 1960's and 70's, have actively petitioned their local government to limit JTTF
influence. This has ranged from modest reform, such as demanding that elected officials be granted
the security clearance to review JTTF investigations, to outright rejection, such as totally severing
131 Us Department Of Justice Fact Sheet: Overview Of Information Sharing Initiatives In The War On Terrorism. www.usdoj.gov.
September 19, 2002,
12 US Federal Bureau of Investigation. Memoranda of Understanding template for local police departments. March 18, 2004.
133 Redden, Jim, Terrorism Task force files off limits to Congress. Portland Tribune. September 24, 2002
14 Bures, Frank. City's split: fear for safety vs. fear for rights. Christian Science Monitor. October 17, 2001.
5 Roberts, Alasdair S. ORCON Creep: Networked Governance, Information Sharing, And The Threat To Government Accountability.
Government Information Quarterly. July 2004: 21 (3) 249-267
ties between their city and the JTTF. In February of 2005, the City of Portland was the first to end
its relationship with the local JTTF office, ordering their muncipal police officers to cease joint
operations. This was passed by the city council amidst much public outcry. The Mayor backed the
plan when the JTTF refused to raise his security clearance to a level that would allow him "to
provide full oversight of city officers on the task force and ensure they do not overstep their
authority under state law while acting as federal agents."136
The JTTF's ability to 'federalize' local law enforcement functions would not raise so many
objections if it were not for the growing number of incidents in which it has clearly violated it's
counter-terrorism mandate. Reminiscent of COINTELPRO fiascos of the 1960's and 70's, the
JTTF has been caught several times the last few years gathering intelligence on citizens who have
no relationship to terrorism, and are merely engaged in lawful, non-violent forms of political
dissent.
In November, 2003 the New York Times was leaked a classified FBI memo that revealed that the
FBI, relying on it's JTTFs, was conducting a "coordinated, nationwide effort" to collect
information on antiwar demonstrators.'37 The memo had been disseminated to local police
departments across the country just before major anti-war demonstrations were set to begin in
Washington, DC and San Francisco on February 15, 2003. The FBI memo advised local police to
track protesters' activities and relate this intelligence back to their local JTTFs.'38
While the document is entitled "Terror Alert" it does not cite a single act of terrorism, nor does it
offer any specific intelligence regarding unlawful or violent activity planned by demonstrators.139
However, it does advise police to keep track of a detailed list of peaceful, lawful protest tactics and
strategies. Police are advised to track activities such activities as the use of "the internet to recruit,
raise funds, and coordinate their activities prior to demonstrations"; the use of "media equipment"
for "documenting potential cases of police brutality"; and "fund-raising in support of the legal
defense of accused protesters." It goes so far as to label the videotaping of police behavior as a
136 Mccall, William. City Council approves Portland's withdrawal from the JTTF. Associated Press. April 28, 2005.
137 Lichtblau, Eric. F.B.I. Scrutinizes Antiwar Rallies. NY Times, November 23, 2003.
138 "Intelligence Bulletin No. 89", Classified FBI intelligence memorandum - available at:
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=14452&c=207
139 ACLU Slams Classified FBI Memorandum Directing Law Enforcement to Engage in Protest Suppression Tactics. Press Release.
November 23, 2003
form of 'intimidation.' It warns police "even peaceful techniques can create a climate of disorder,"
advising them to "report any potentially illegal acts. " (Emphases added). According to the ACLU,
"this bulletin confirms that the federal government is targeting innocent Americans engaged in
nothing more than lawful protest and dissent."
Just before the Democratic and Republican National Convention in the summer of 2004, other
JTTF investigations against protesters came to light, as JTTF agents paid personal visits to an
estimated 40-50 anti-war activists across the country in their homes and places of work."* News of
the visits spread quickly through the media and national activist websites. Many activists claimed it
was meant as a form of intimidation to cause a "chilling effect" to dissuade people from attending
the events. The FBI simply claimed that the visits were "part of a broader, nationwide effort ... at a
time of heightened concern about a possible terrorist attack." 14 1 However, most of the JTTF
interviews did not inquire about acts of terrorism, but rather asked if the interviewee planned to
attend and knew of any attempts at direct action and disruption. This suggests the concern was not
over terrorism, but the plans of protesters. Despite the combined attendance of over 500,000
protesters at the political conventions, no incidents of violence occurred beside minor scuffles
between protesters and police.
The JTTF was also discovered to be collecting intelligence on political protesters in Denver
Colorado in 2002, when under legal pressure from the ACLU, the Denver JTTF revealed it had
created a "Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File" for which they gathered intelligence on
thousands of the city's residents. Police documents revealed that majority of the residents in the file
had no criminal records. Many were labeled as "criminal extremist" and yet were included for
merely attending peaceful rallies, sending e-mails about upcoming events, or making a
documentary film critical of the FBI. In all, some 208 local organizations were profiled, including a
Quaker organization, a 'fair trade' coffee retailer, and a local police accountability group. Some of
the groups in this 'violent" file, actually had "unconditional non-violence" as part of their core
mission statement. 142 A rough tally of the numbers reveals that as much as 1% of the entire city's
population may have been included in the terrorism related files.143
" Eric Lichtblau. F.B.I. Goes Knocking for Political Troublemakers. New York Times, August 16, 2004
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The evidence suggests that local and state police operations conducted by the JTTF step far beyond
the counter-terrorism mandate granted to them by the public. Moreover, the secrecy afforded by
their classified status has had en enabling effect in allowing them to enlist local police officers in
activities that may be detrimental to their constituency. Police, unlike federal law enforcement
officials, are accountable to their city and local communities. This type of "federalization" of local
authorities has had the effect of undermining local autonomy, by allowing police activities to take
place within cities that escape oversight from local forms of accountability. These joint operations
undermine important mechanisms of local democracy, such as public review of law enforcement,
and oversight by elected public officials.
Electronic Federalization
In the wake of the COINTELPRO, federal agencies, in particular those that are not domestic law
enforcement agencies such as the Department of Defense (DoD) and Central Intelligence agency
(CIA), were legally prevented from information sharing with local law enforcement agencies. The
revelations surrounding COINTELPRO made it clear that local police, the FBI and DoD had
gathered and shared intelligence about peaceful civil rights and anti-war activists for political
reasons, including Martin Luther King and the League of Women Voters. As a result, legal
safeguards were instituted to prevent further collaboration between federal and local law
enforcement, and between domestic law enforcement agencies and defense or intelligence
agencies.
However, these safeguards are being rapidly dismantled in a post-September 11 political
environment, and non-violent protesters appear to be a major target of this change. Aside from
JTTF's another means of integrating the operations of local and federal authorities has been
through the rapid spread of "electronic information sharing" initiatives. Because these relationships
are 'virtual' in character, they can bypass the legal safeguards written in the 1970's. The case of the
Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) of the Homeland Security Information
Network (HSIN) is a case in point. Like the JTTF's this new system was founded on an anti-
terrorism mandate but has overstepped these boundaries to gather intelligence on non-violent
protesters.
The JRIES system is a 'counter-terrorism communications initiative" that creates a single, unified
information-sharing platform for law enforcement agencies across the country. By summer of
2003, it had grown to include 5,000 authorized users in 300 police agencies covering all US states,
and 50 major urban areas. It creates new inter-agency exchanges vertically, between local state and
federal agencies; and horizontally, across all regions of the United States. According to the
Washington Post, "the system [can] flash information from a police officer on the street to [the
Homeland Security chief's] office, to across the country in minutes."" Among the list of JRIES
users are the CIA and Pentagon, which are not law enforcement agencies and are restricted from
gathering intelligence on US citizens.
However, since it operates under the authority of the Department of Homeland Security, it's
investigations remain classified, and it does not allow access to indpendent or elected authorities.
According to statements by it's own founders JRIES has no formal vetting process to ensure the
information shared is relevant to anti-terrorism efforts."5 As a result, no safeguards exist to ensure
that JRIES acts within its counter-terrorism mandate.
The CIA and the DoD had been prevented from engaging in intelligence gathering since 1974.
After the scope of COINTELPRO abuses became apparent, the privacy act of 1974 barred these
agencies from receiving files from civil law enforcement. However, JRIES uses electronic file-
sharing, and not physical files, which allows the Pentagon and CIA to circumvent laws that prohibit
them from gathering information on US citizens. According to a report in Congressional Quarterly,
JRIES "was designed to avoid a briar patch of intelligence collection prohibitions and privacy
laws."" However, the evidence suggests that JTTFs are not simply investigating terrorism, but
political dissent.
When the director of JRIES was asked if the system has been used to monitor political protesters,
it's director responded, "As far as political protesters - I can't honestly say that there's been
absolutely none.""' Meanwhile, two police departments that sit on the 10 member JRIES executive
1 Hsu, Spencer. Anti-Terrorism Network Launched. Washington Post , February 25, 2004: B01
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board, Washington DC and New York City, have both been caught collecting databases on the
political views of protesters.
This has a direct effect on protest activity. The Port of Oakland (2003) protest reveals how this
information sharing arrangement, in practice, can have highly repressive impacts on legitimate
political protest. In April of 2003, an anti-war organization named Direct Action to Stop the War
(DASW) announced plans to picket the vehicle entrance to the Port of Oakland. The organization
targeted the location in order to draw attention to the issue of "war profiteers," corporations who
they believe gained lucrative contracts in the War in Iraq and were clients of the Port of Oakland.
Underscoring the lawful and non-violent intent of their planned protest, their announcement stated,
"This is not a civil disobedience action.. .our goal is to maintain the picket line, not to get
arrested."'"
However, days before the event the local police department in Oakland was alerted about the
protest through a "terrorism advisory" from the California Anti Terror Information Center
(CATIC), a founding member of the JRIES network. Based upon this terrorist advisory, the
Oakland Police Department arrived at the protest with in an aggressive, militarized posture.
Though the protest picket was peaceful as planned, without provocation'49 local police unleashed a
hail of projectile fire on the protesters, including wooden bullets, and concussion grenades. Both
protesters and nearby port workers were injured. Many were hospitalized with serious injuries."
The use of force was so excessive, that the United Nations stepped in to investigate and actually
cited this as one the worst incidents of government repression against activists anywhere in the
world during 2003."15
When questioned why a terrorism alert was issued for a peaceful protest, a CATIC spokesmen
offered a revealing justification for the warning. He stated that that in fact, peaceful protest could
be considered a kind of terrorism: "You can make an easy kind of a link that, if you have a protest
group protesting a war where the cause that's being fought against is international terrorism, you
" Hoffman, Ian et al. State monitored war protesters: Intelligence agency does not distinguish between terrorism and peace activism,
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might have terrorism at that [protest]. You can almost argue that a protest against that is a terrorist
act." He followed this up with his definition of terrrorism: "Anything that is violent or has an
economic impact... terrorism isn't just bombs going off and killing people." " (emphasis added)
This vastly inclusive definition of terrorism, not restricted to harming innocent people, would
include the civil disobedience practiced by Gandhi and Martin Luther King.
The JRIES system has been used to coordinate local, state and federal law agencies during other
protest events as well. The number of agencies involved in policing high profile political meetings
has steadily increased over time (from 28 agencies during the Seattle/WTO(1999) to 136 for G-8
(2004)). This has created an increased desire for interagency information sharing. The JRIES
system was used to police protests during the massive G-8 security operations which included over
20,000 police officers. It was also used to coordinate operations during the Democratic and
Republican National Conventions in 2004, and the presidential inauguration in 2005. The
inauguration, whose security cost remains undisclosed because "because it would be too
controversial" was the apex of such unified electronic command structures. Homeland officials said
the inauguration was the first event run under a national emergency incident management system,
which "streamlines chains of command under a principal federal officer and field office."
The increasing amount of joint operations is not just coordinating local and federal agencies to
fight terrorism, but creating new command structures where local police must act upon the
information given to them by secretive, and unaccountable intelligence agencies at the state and
federal level. These agencies, apparently, harbor many dubious attitudes towards lawful protest
groups. As with the JTTF's, local police departments are once again the 'lesser partners' in these
joint operations. Even though local police tend to have more actual knowledge of local groups
within their own community, information coming from Federal and State authorities is given
greater authority. As a result, local police serve as the 'blunt end of the baton', the personnel who
do the dirty work of federal agencies, often acting against residents in the community's which they
are sworn to protect.
The Militarization of urban protest policing
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The dramatic and aggressive security arrangements that confronted peaceful protesters at the
Miami FTAA (2003) ministerial woke many up to a trend that was long in formation: the
militarization of protest policing. Not just demonstrators, but local residents, journalists, and
indeed, judges, were shocked by the massive level of force and disregard for the law that was used
against peaceful protesters. Miami Circuit Judge Richard Margolis said he saw "no less than 20
felonies committed by police officers." "Pretty disgraceful what I saw with my own eyes. And I
have always supported the police during my entire career. This was a real eye-opener."' 53 The City
of Miami's Independent Review Panel stated that the city had appeared as if it had been put under
"martial law.""
Armored Personnel Carriers roamed the streets, 6 helicopters directed operations from the sky, and
thousands of police officers clad in futuristic looking riot gear indiscriminately fired an arsenal of
"less lethal" weapons into crowds of peaceful demonstrators. A frequent description of the police
actions was of a "paramilitary force" or "invasion."
These tactics simply made one more community of Americans - protesters - aware of a trend that
had advanced in other arenas: across the United States, local police departments have increasingly
adopted the tactics, strategies, weapons, and disposition of the US armed forces. Complementing
this, during mass protest scenarios military and law enforcement officials often directly participate
in operations themselves. Like the 'federalization' trends of JTTF and JRIES, these military style
operations use counter-terrorism as their justification, but in practice have been directed at forms of
peaceful dissent by the population.
As soon as the tear gas cleared after the FTAA meeting concluded, mayor Manny Diaz proudly
named the police operation the "Miami Model." In other words, these operations were not just an
isolated incident, but an example for other cities to follow. This was backed up by Miami police
chief John Timoney's statement that the operations were "the first big test for Homeland Security."
The trend towards militarization of protest policing began after the urban riots of the 1960's when
hundreds of riots occurred throughout American cities. Contrary to public opinion, this trend did
not reverse once the riots subsided, they simply faded from public view as protests became less
153 Driscoll, Amy. Judge: I saw police commit felonies. Miami Herald. December 20, 2003.
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prominent. However, since the late 60's there has been a steady, massive and ongoing transfer of
training, planning strategies, doctrine, personnel, intelligence, and weapons from the military sector
to the civil law enforcement sector.
The government appointed Kerner Commission, which studied the riots that occurred in 1968,
acknowledged that the principle causes of unrest were social factors like white racism, poverty, and
unemployment.' 5 However, aside from the initiation of social programs that fell far short of
commission recommendations, the major government response was increasing military
involvement in urban policing in order to better handle "civil disturbances." Within weeks of
Martin Luther King's assassination and the widespread urban unrest that followed, the Pentagon
initiated the Directorate of Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations. This was a domestic
operation led by the military. Dubbed the "domestic war room" it was a massive intelligence
gathering operation put in place to deal address the potential for unrest within the United States,
with "thousands of troops and riot police at the ready."'"
As one consultant to the Kerner Commission presciently pointed out, "it would be far cheaper to
repress future large scale urban violence through police and military action than to pay for effective
programs against poverty." 157
In 1968, the US military drafted a comprehensive operational plan for military involvement in
domestic policing in a foundational document entitled "OPERATION GARDEN PLOT:
Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2." GARDENPLOT is a 200-page plan for
"disturbance suppression" within US borders. It remains classified, but its mission, known via
citations in other public military documents, is to "conduct civil disturbance operations throughout
the United States" and provides guidelines for dispersing " unauthorized assemblages" in the US by
providing "wide latitude to a commander to use federal forces to assist civil law enforcement in
'restoring' law and order.""' Despite it's 1960's origin, GARDENPLOT continues to be a
touchstone for contemporary domestic operations. In today's military doctrine, it is still referred to
as "an appropriate guide for developing civil disturbance plans and operations." 159
155 Kerner, Otto et al. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. New York: Bantam Books, 1968.
1 Ridenhour, Ron with Arthur Lubow. Bringing the War Home.New Times. November 28, 1975. 5(11):18, 20-24
1 Downs, Anthony. Opening Up the Suburbs: An Urban Strategyfor American. Yale University Press, 1973.
1 Center For Law And Military Operations, Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook For Judge Advocates. 2001: 66
159 Departments Of The Army And The Air Force. Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA). Washington D.C., 1996.
At about the time GARDEN PLOT was originally drafted, military planners were also
disseminating information packets to local, county and state police forces: "Contingency plans,
called planning packets, were prepared for every city in country that had a potential for student,
minority, or labor unrest." 160
In 1985, an additional military document was drafted to guide military involvement in domestic
"civil disturbances." Army Field Manual 19-15: Civil Disturbances, states: "During a civil
disturbance, it may be advisable to prevent people from assembling.. .Prohibitions on assembly
may forbid gatherings at any place and time."
The master document, GARDEN PLOT, was not merely a theoretical plan that remained on the
dusty shelves of old military manuals. GARDENPLOT was officially deployed in Los Angeles,
during the "Rodney King riots" in 1992,161 when thousands of people angrily took to the streets in
response to an incident of police brutality, in which four white police officers who were videotaped
brutally assaulting a black motorist were acquitted by an all white jury. Hundreds of fires were set
throughout the city and policemen became the targets of gunfire by the population. In response,
GARDENPLOT was used to deploy over 10,000 California National Guard troops, 2000 active
component soldiers, and 1500 Marines onto the city streets. 62
Other military doctrines have become increasingly evident in this new style of protest policing, and
may be having an influence on the formation of the 'Miami Model' approach. Among these official
military doctrines are Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT), Operations Other Than War
(OOTW), Military Support to Law Enforcement Agencies (MSLEA) and Military Support to
Civilian Authorities (MSCA).'63 These doctrines are official guidelines for military operations and
describe approaches that are evident in the practice of the kinds of repressive tactics now used
routinely at mass protest events.
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Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) is a rapidly expanding area of military theory and
practice, which refers to cities as "the urban battle space." In 1998, at the same time that urban
geographers were writing that cities are places where identities form, social capital is built, and
new forms of collective action emerge the US Marine Corp. explained the phenomenon a bit
differently: "cities historically are the places where radical ideas ferment, dissenters find allies and
discontented groups find media attention" thereby making cities "a likely source of conflict in the
future." "
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) is an emerging military doctrine that outlines
operations just "short of war" that are conducted in order to be "more sensitive to political
considerations." This is military parlance for the deployment of military operations in a civilian
context. MOOTW provides guidelines for "the restoration of law and order in the aftermath of
riots""65 and provides recommendations for the "proper" use of military force against civilians,
chief among them, the use of "less-lethal" weapons. Less-lethal weapons were weapons originally
designed for military use abroad, particularly in situations of occupation, but have not found
themselves increasingly in the hands of local police departments. Less-lethal weapons have become
a regular feature of protest policing. Since 2001, they have been present at nearly 100% of all mass
protest events.
Military involvement in protest policing has been increasingly direct. During Seattle WTO, once
the level of widespread disorder became apparent, national guardsmen and Special Forces units
were deployed onto the streets alongside Seattle police in order to enforce the curfew and establish
a "no-protest zone" throughout the downtown area. However, since September 11, there has been a
distinct shift away from the policy of "restoring" law and order after-the-fact. The data table
compiled for this paper shows that military personnel were present on the streets at subsequent
events such as the G-8, both National Conventions in 2004, and the Presidential Inauguration of
2005. They were not simply there for counter-terrorism efforts, but also for crowd control
operations.'6 None of these situations experienced civil disturbances, so there was no need to
1" Marine Corp Working Paper, 3-35.3, Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain, in Morales, Frank (see above): 79
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"restore" order. This reveals a shift from response to emergency situations to preemptive troop
deployment in civil operations. 167
The real militarizing effect on protest policing however, may be indirect, practiced not by actual
military personnel, but via the adoption of military tactics and strategies into local law enforcement
agencies. The War on Drugs of the 1980s and 1990's provided the major conduit for this transfer.
Though it failed to significantly stem the flow of illicit drugs into the United States'", it was
successful in introducing police departments across the country to paramilitary-style training and
action. To facilitate the War on Drugs, the Department of Defense created 6 'joint task forces' in
1989 to coordinate joint operations between military and police agencies. This transfer intensified
in 1994, when the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice signed a memorandum of
understanding enabling the military to transfer technology to state and local police departments.'"'
The results of these exchanges were dramatic. One national study of local police departments
revealed that between 1980 and 1995, there was an over 500% increase in the introduction of
special operations units modeled on and trained in US military principles into civil police
departments. Nearly 90% of the police departments sampled had them by 1995."' This was
accompanied by the introduction of military style weaponry and vehicles into local police
departments, including semi-automatic weapons, armored personnel carriers, helicopters fleets, and
more recently, a broad array of so-called 'less-lethal' weapons.
Once embedded in police departments, these militarized tactics, tools and procedures became
commonplace in protest policing, but now fully administered by local police, not the military units.
A comparison between "civil disturbance suppression" strategies proscribed in US Army field
manuals and current police practice during protests reveals a striking degree of similarity. The
1985 document,US Army Field Manual 19-15, Civil Disturbances outlines a w hole host of
strategies for "civil disturbance suppression" that are evident in protest policing today.
Dispersal And Blockading:
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Army Field Manual 19-15 advises army officials that "crowd control formations may be employed
to disperse, contain, or block a crowd. When employed to disperse a crowd, they are particularly
effective in urban areas because they enable the control force to split a crowd into smaller
segments." and "if the crowd refuses to move, the control force may have to employ other
techniques, such as riot control agents or apprehension." During Seattle WTO (1999) police used
tear gas and pepper spray to disperse crowds that had sat down in the streets. Once they were
fleeing, the 'splitting' technique was used to continually divide the crowd down into smaller and
smaller units, often with the use of riot police, tear gas, rubber bullets, or armored personnel
carriers. On November 20, 2003 the first day of the Miami FTAA protests, the entire financial
district was cleared of protesters by riot police and police cars that were driven into agglomerations
of people in order to get them to split up and move. During the second day, a peaceful "jail
solidarity" vigil was completely surrounded by police in crowd control formation and then
prevented from dispersing, at which point they were all swept up in a mass arrest. During the
February 15 Antiwar Demonstration in NY, steel barricades and riot police were stationed at every
single intersection in order to keep the crowd from unifying into one mass.
Mass Detention Facilities:
Army Field Manual 19-15 states "the army must be prepared to detain and process large numbers
of people swept up in mass arrests." It describes the creation and operation of "temporary
facilities" meant handle a large volume of arrestees.
During the Philadelphia/RNC (2000), the operational plan for the protest included the use of a
Navy-administered "detainee processing center" in case of mass arrests. In the case of
Miami/FTAA (2003), nearly 300 peaceful protesters who were gassed, arrested and in some cases
physically beaten, were taken to a "temporary facility" built for mass arrestees. A multi-story
concrete parking structure had been converted into holding cells so that each individual parking
space had become its own chain link cage, transforming the facility into what appeared to be a
giant complex of dog kennels. Protesters had their clothes stripped from them with shears, were
decontaminated by fire hose, and then placed into the cages for processing. Police stated the
temporary mass detention facility had room for 10,000 people. During the New York/RNC(2004),
over 1800 people (not all of them protesters) were swept off the streets in mass arrests by police,
and taken to a gigantic temporary detention facility constructed on the Hudson River. Like in
Miami, the protesters were housed in chain link cages.
Transfer Of Materiel:
Authority for additional support to law enforcement officials is contained in DOD Directive
5525.5, "DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials," and permits such support as
loan of equipment, use of facilities, training, and transfer of information. Military doctrine also
provides for the "The loan of weapons, combat tactical vehicles, vessels and aircraft" 7 to local law
civilian law enforcement authorities. Perhaps the most compelling evidence is demonstrated
simply by photographs.
Miami/FTAA (2003): Military grade vehicles being used by police.
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Embedded Media
A more recent military strategy adopted into protest policing is the use of 'embedded media', a
strategy relied on heavily in the IraqWar. Much like it's military counterpart, domestic embedding
serves to portray events from the perspective of those the reporters are embedded with, thereby
eliminating journalistic objectivity. A statement from a Miami Police Department spokesman
describes the benefits of embedding this way:
"I believe that every reporter I have spoken to that was embedded said that they were able to
see things from our point of view.. .I think during the event, and you go back and look at
coverage--particularly television coverage--you will find it very positive and pro-police."
He goes on to say the operation was taken straight from the U.S. Military's media plan for Iraq.
"We just adapted it to the situation," Schwartz says. "We kept it pretty close to their form." 72
Conclusion
The militarization of protest policing has increased, facilitated by both the adoption of military
tactics by police, and the direct involvement of the military in protest security efforts. This is a
concern to the maintenance of political rights within cities, because militarized approaches directly
negate the concept of political rights. Theoretically, the aim of police is to ensure public safety,
uphold the law, and protect the rights of citizens. Conversely, the aim of military force is not to
uphold the law or ensure safety, but to eliminate all opposition. Unlike civil operations, military
approaches are not structured around the idea of "the citizen," but instead, "the enemy". The
critical distinction between the two approaches is the idea of rights. Citizens have rights. Enemies
do not. The increasing adoption of military style approaches into civil policing effectively
transforms protesters from citizens into enemies, a trend which has become increasingly evident in
police behavior.
Currently, there is only one law in the United States which limits the unrestrained use of military
troops for policing, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. Posse Comitatus bars the US armed forces
from "enforcing the laws" of the nation, and has been considered by many military officials as a
12 Pacenti, John. Embedded Obstacles. American Journalism Review. February/March, 2004.
clear barrier to their participation in domestic, civil or police matters. However, military legal
analysts are increasingly celebrating erosion of the act, particularly through "the increasingly
common use of military forces as security for essentially civilian events." Protests are of course,
prime among these civilian events. For example, the G8 summit saw 4,800 military personnel put
on active duty which one National Guard spokesman described by stating "In military circles, that's
pretty revolutionary. "'m According to advocates of this increasing militarization, "successful"
violations of the Posse Comitatus such as these are cause to celebrate, making Posse Comitatus in
reality more of a "myth" than actual law. "4 These encroachments are complimented by
simultaneous efforts in the legal arena, as since September 11, Bush administrations officials have
been mounting a concerted legal campaign for a repeal of the Posse Comitatus act altogether. 17
In other words, military legal scholars have inferred that "civilian events" such as large protest
events have set precedents that make it easier for the introduction of armed forces into civil
policing. Breaking the barrier from the opposite direction, the direct adoption of military strategies
by civil police departments, particularly during protest events, is eroding what meaningful
distinctions between the two institutions remain.
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Chapter V:
Democratic Planning: Some Assembly Required
Introduction
Is protest a planning issue? Today, the urban planning literature is curiously silent on the issue of
protest, leaving the distinct impression that protest (and the increasing repression of protest) may
not be of any specific concern to urban planners. However, the history of urban planning asserts
that contestational forms of civic engagement such as protest, civil disobedience and direct action,
have long played a crucial role in democratizing planning outcomes. In a field where democracy is
supposedly a defining concern, it is long overdue that protest is incorporated as a key planning
issue.
Since the 1960's, the concept of 'democracy' has been a central concern for urban planning theory,
giving rise to the 'democratic planning' approaches that currently dominate the discipline. At
present, democratic planning practice relies almost exclusively on theory drawn from deliberation,
conflict resolution, and multi-stakeholder processes. However, when compared to actual history of
democratic planning, the definition of 'democracy' implied by these approaches appears to be
deficient, neglecting (even rejecting) crucial aspects of the democratic process. In response, this
chapter argues that the current democratic planning paradigm is fundamentally impaired; creating
critical blind spots that must be overcome.
A more complete vision of democratic planning is required, one that acknowledges the ongoing
and vital role that democratic action such as protest, civil disobedience, and direct action play in
democratizing the urban planning process, a role that must be both celebrated and vigorously
defended if planning is to make good on its promise of fostering inclusion and equity. In light of
the current escalation of protest repression in cities detailed in this paper, it is now incumbent on
urban planners to become active participants in defending basic political rights in cities.
A brief history of planning and protest
Before delving into theory, a few case examples will help to ground the discussion on the role that
protest plays in the planning process. The following planning events show ample historical support
for the argument that civil disobedience and direct action have long been important and
irreplaceable tools for powerless groups seeking inclusion into undemocratic decision-making
processes, or struggling to re-direct inequitable plans already underway. To illustrate the ubiquity
of these practices, the following cases are drawn from across the planning spectrum, including
highways, waste disposal, housing, urban renewal, public transit, and international development.
Public Infrastructure
When building major urban roadways in densely crowded cities, "There was no way that highway
planners could avoid stepping on an extraordinary number of toes."'76 The question is: whose toes
get stepped on, and is the process and the outcome democratic in nature? In 1961, New York
City's uber-powerful planning commissioner Robert Moses proposed a bold plan for a 10-lane
Lower Manhattan Expressway that would have leveled fourteen city blocks, destroyed thousands of
historic structures, and displaced nearly 10,000 residents and workers. The community was
predominantly working class, with a significant number of Italian and Chinese immigrants. At the
time, Moses was considered to be 'arguably the most powerful person in NY politics' and had the
singular ability to make planning decisions that dramatically altered New York's landscape. His
authoritarian approach led critics to accuse him of running an 'autonomous government' without
any of the usual checks and balances in a democracy."' The expressway plan passed through all
official channels without resistance (earning millions of dollars of federal funding) until residents
from the affected area, upon learning of the plan, initiated a protest campaign, holding rallies,
staging demonstrations and jamming hearings to block the expressway at every step of the
process.' 8 Standing out among the protesters was Jane Jacobs, a writer with no formal planning
training. She articulated the demands of local residents in scathing articles about the plan in the
local press, and launched vicious attacks on what she viewed as the undemocratic, unaccountable
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exercise of power.179 In one instance, she was part of a direct action protest that marched
demonstrators into a planning hearing and caused massive disruption She was arrested on charges
of 'inciting a riot (which ironically, brought even more publicity to the protests).'84 The conflict
between the protesters (personified by Jacobs) and the planning commission (personified by
Moses) consumed city headlines. The protesters won. However, they not only succeeded in
stopping the expressway project in 1969, but the campaign is considered to be a contributing factor
in Robert Moses' fall from power. It is also recognized as having transformed the urban planning
discourse as a whole, by discrediting widely adopted planning practices such as slum clearance and
high-rise housing projects. Congress even responded to this event, in concert with growing chorus
of public discontent, by enacting laws that placed new hurdles in the way of highway projects.''
Urban Renewal
In 1968, the planning commission of Boston initiated an 'urban renewal' plan in the South End
neighborhood to make way for a new shopping mall and an adjacent 7 story parking lot. As a first
step, they demolished hundreds of existing units of low-income housing, mostly of African
American residents. Unwilling to go quietly, the displaced South End residents responded with
protest marches and a direct action campaign in which they camped out at the site, physically
blocking the city from moving ahead with the development, and refusing to leave until the mayor
agreed to build mixed income housing instead, with preference given to former residents. The 'tent
city' campaign generated massive media attention, and not only halted the individual projects, but
also stopped the displacement trend of urban renewal taking place across the city. The site
eventually became an affordable housing development of nearly 300 units, many of which went to
the original displaced residents. To this day, the complex is officially named "tent city" in
commemoration of the direct action that gave birth to it. The victory went beyond the individual
project to change public policy towards greater equity. As one sustainable development
organization states: "Tent City helped to change Boston's policies toward housing from that of
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developing luxury housing towards an integrated approach to housing provision, with emphasis on
retaining affordable mixed-income housing in inner city areas.""
Housing
The above examples date from the 1960's, when protest was a common phenomenon, but what
about since that time? In the arena of housing, several prominent advocacy organizations still rely
on protest tactics in their campaigns to push for more affordable housing, to reduce displacement of
poor communities, and to increase home loans to low-income families. A primary example is
National People's Action (NPA) which for the last 30 years has fought against the practice of
"redlining" by banks and insurance companies. Redlining is phenomenon of 'systematic
disinvestment' whereby home loans are unfairly denied to people on the basis of racial, income,
or location. ("The term 'redlining' is derived from the actual practice of drawing a red line around
neighborhoods in which credit is to be denied.) While it is a grassroots organization, the NPA is
credited with having played pivotal role in passage of a number of federal policies, such as the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977, and
the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990. By itself, the CRA is responsible for $117 billion
annually in home, small business, and community development lending and investing,""
Combating discrimination in the commercial housing arena often requires government action, and
the NPA find that lobbying is often not enough to compel political leaders into taking action on
behalf of marginalized communities. The strategy they find produces best results is to pursue
politics both inside and outside formal political channels simultaneously, turning to tactics of
protest and direct action when lobbying and negotiation fail. Making their confrontational side
clear up front, the organization introduces itself with the curt slogan: "We're not nice!" Their
primary strategy: "Direct action is a way to be heard.. .When someone in a position of power
refuses to meet with NPA leaders, NPA responds with an action... [that means] dozens of busloads
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of neighborhood people showing up at someone's office or front lawn with a bullhorn." An
example: when the head of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) refused to meet with NPA,
they bussed in a reported 1000 people to conduct a loud and raucous protest on the front lawn of
his private home. He responded with a face-to-face meeting within a day, and a formal partnership
between HUD and NPA within 2 months'85 wherein HUD has agreed to several of NPA's
recommendations.'" Explained one NPA member: "We don't let anybody off the hook until we get
what we want."".
Waste Disposal
Cities and industry generate massive waste, which is usually disposed of by incineration or landfill.
Both of these methods present potential health hazards to nearby communities. The Environmental
Justice movement has grown in the United States in response to the inequitable distribution of
waste sites and the undemocratic process by which these sites are decided upon. Just by itself, the
Environmental Justice arena provides an abundance of planning examples where politically and
economically disenfranchised communities utilized protest and direct action tactics to address a
lack of democracy and equity they encountered in the planning process.
The Environmental Justice movement has been defined as "an effort by local residents to gain
some control over the many attempts now underway to site hazardous and solid waste management
facilities in low-income and working-class communities, very often communities of color."'8 The
inequitable siting of polluting facilities has been described as a process where "waste tends to flow
towards communities with weak response capacity" 1 meaning, into communities with the least
political and economic power to prevent it. Many studies have been conducted to determine the
cause of this persistent imbalance, and most cite patterns of exclusion from the planning process as
a primary factor, even when 'community input' meetings and other 'participatory' methods have
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https://realtytimes.com/rtcpages/2 0 03 061l 1martinez.htm
" National Peoples Action. NPA Wins Demands that HUD Work with Community Groups to Address Housing Crisis. NPA Press
Release. March 30, 2004. (accessed on July 10, 2005) http://www.npa-us.org/npawinsdemands.htm
Disclosure. "HUD Pledges to Clean up FHA With NPA." May, 2001. (Accessed on July 10, 2005) http://www.disclosure-us.org/disc-
may200l/housing-hud-pledges-to-clean.htm
" Heiman, Michael K. Race, Waste, and Class: New Perspectives on Environmental Justice. Antipode, 1996. 28 (2)
189 Ibid.
been used. 190 191 2 Bullard concludes, "many of the at-risk communities are victims of land-use
decision making that mirrors the power arrangements of the dominant society." When the formal
structures inclusion in the planning process failed, protest and direct action became essential to
widening the scope of interests and increasing the power of marginalized groups.
The birth of Environmental Justice movement starts with a direct action protest in 1982. In Warren
County, North Carolina, upon learning that 6,000 truckloads of toxic laden soil were going to be
dumped near their community, hundreds of African American residents staged a demonstration.
Taking a cue directly from the Civil Rights era, they used their bodies to physically block the
trucks on their way to the dumpsite, forcing the police to arrest 523 protesters before the trucks
could pass. While the direct action did not stop the dump, it generated significant publicity, and
residents did exact guarantees that gained them immunity from additional dumping and that close
monitoring of the existing facility. On a larger scale, the Warren County protests introduced
'environmental racism' into to the public discourse, placing issues of power, racism, and public
health at the center of the environmental debate for the first time. The actions in Warren County
residents inspired hundreds of other similar protests across the country in the decades that
followed. Warren County is also credited with having spurred several groundbreaking studies by
government and other institutions. The US Environmental Protection Agency affirms this on its
website stating that it was "Vigorous protests led to an investigation by the General Accounting
Office."' 93
Protest and direct action tactics have remained central to Environmental Justice disputes in the
United States." Successful cases abound: The closing of a yeast production plant in West
Oakland195 and a separate commercial incineration plant in East Oakland both occurred after
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growing public protests by the communities' predominantly African American residents '9 In
Richmond, California, a Chevron Oil Refinery belched smoke daily into a poverty stricken,
predominantly African-American neighborhood. After Chevron Corporation refused to negotiate,
citizens staged repeated protests at the plant, earning substantial media attention, the support of the
city council, and sympathetic lawyers and scientists as allies. The combined pressure forced the
company into negotiation, and an agreement was reached to reduce emissions, increase plant
safety, and invest $5 million on community-based organizations as compensation. ' In Detroit,
Michigan, protest rallies were used to solidify community support in a campaign which
successfully shutdown the Henry Ford Medical Waste Incineration plant. The Vice President of the
facility cited 'community mobilization' and 'negative news coverage' as key reasons to shutting
down the facility." Other cases of projects being stopped include the Select Steel Plant in
Genessee, Michigan in 1998 " and a Shintech's plastics plant near the town of Convent,
Louisiana. Cumulatively, efforts such as these elicited a federal response: Executive Order 12898,
"Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations" issued by President Bill Clinton in 1994, required that all federal agencies evaluate
whether and to what extent actions that they are considering may disproportionately adversely
affect low income and minority populations.
While protests against already-existing toxic facilities did not usually succeed in shutting them
down, health and safety requirements were frequently won by neighboring communities as well as
monetary compensation to affected residents. Meanwhile, many planned projects were scrapped or
moved. While this is difficult to measure, the greatest effect of the Environmental Justice
movement may have be preventative, as both the laws and industry practice have been changed. As
one Waste industry magazine cautioned: "environmental justice has been recognized fully by
legislators, administrative agencies and the courts. Ignorance of environmental justice policies can
1 Fischer, D. Controversial Medical Waste Incinerator Shuts Down Monday. Oakland Tribune. December 8, 2001.
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result in substantial legal fees and government investigations, and can destroy small operators."200
Environmental Justice has also become standard course material in urban planning departments and
law schools across the country. 20 1
Public Transit
The challenge of providing adequate transit to the city Los Angeles is not trivial: it is populated by
over 10 million people and spreads out over 4,000 square miles. To address this, the LA
Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) began construction on an underground light rail system in
the early 1990's to connect the outlying suburbs regions to the downtown financial area at a
projected cost of tens of billions of dollars202. Once the plan become public, however, inner city
residents began to speak out, arguing that the light rail plan diverted transportation funds away
from the majority of transit users: minorities who lived in the inner city that relied primarily on
diesel buses. The facts supported their case; 10 times more people relied on buses than on rail.
Meanwhile, 80% of bus users were minorities, whereas rail users were mostly white and suburban
(and owned their own cars). At the same time, the city had all but stopped purchasing new buses,
and the existing buses were deteriorating. Inner city residents saw this as another case where
"minorities and the poor bear greater burdens and enjoy fewer benefits from development decisions
made by government and industry." 203 Inner city residents founded an organization in 1992, named
the Bus Riders Union/ Sindicato de Pasajero (BSU) and demanded that instead of 'second class
transit' LA's working class and minority residents deserved a "clean fuel, first-class, state-of-the-
art bus system." 2o4
The MTA planning authorities remained indifferent to their case, so the BSU filed a Title VI civil
rights lawsuit in 1994 with the support of the NAACP. At the same time, the BSU remained
skeptical of a lawsuit's ability to produce change by itself, so they began an intensive organizing
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campaign at the local level.' The suit resulted in a consent decree which stipulating the MTA
purchase new buses, reduce fairs, address overcrowding, and improve service to underserved areas.
Almost immediately the MTA began to actively avoid compliance with the court order." As one
BRU strategist stated: "We had no illusions that the MTA would comply with the consent decree
without an escalation of mass pressure."2" So, having spent the previous two years preparing
through grassroots community organizing, the BRU was able to unleash a militant campaign that
used protest and public mobilization as its primary means of enforcement.
The BRU began holding public rallies and teach ins, and disrupted public MTA public meetings
with raucous demonstrations', often being dragged away in handcuffs", and even engaged in
direct shouting matches with Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan."1 Using direct action tactics
reminiscent of the Montgomery bus boycotts, they initiated a campaign of weekly 'fare strikes'
where as many as 40,000 riders refused to pay for inadequate service. Meanwhile, they boarded
buses and conducted hundreds of 'teach-ins' as commuters were riding, creating a base of support
among everyday riders, attracting as many as 1,200 dues paying members. Organizers recount that
they "put teams of organizers on the buses daily, made presentations to community groups,
churches, synagogues, and unions, launched a major radio and print media campaign, and held
dozens of demonstrations at MTA meetings as well...mass marches to City Hall." 211 One of their
more memorable chants bears repeating:
A thousand more buses, to get to work and classes,
Mass transportation belongs to the masses.
We're the BRU, and this is our fight,
Mass transportation is a human right.
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The BSU's creative and confrontational tactics garnered considerable press attention within LA,
and in national news sources. According to the Los Angeles times, the MTA's non-compliance
strategy began to crumble in 2000 as a result of public opposition.2 Caving under the prolonged
onslaught of aggressive protest tactics (and media coverage that favored the BSU) the MTA finally
began complying with the demands of the consent decree. In a cascade of concessions, the MTA
began reducing fares, buying new busses, addressing overcrowding, and providing new service
lines to major centers of employment, education and health care centers throughout LA County.
They agreed to purchase nearly 800 brand new, compressed natural gas buses at a cost of over
$250 million.
By engaging in protracted conflict with planning authorities, the BSU altered the course of transit
history in Los Angeles to include the interests of the cities least powerful residents. Reflecting on
the confrontational approach of the BSU, an official MTA spokesman stated: "They have totally
hijacked the debate on this. They're David and we're Goliath with bad breath ...They were right in
that we allowed the bus system to go to pot. The BRU gave us a push." To which he added: "The
problem is they are still kicking us." 2m The success of the BRU in Los Angeles has inspired the
creation of other Bus Riders' Unions in Tucson, St. Louis, Pittsburg, Boston, San Francisco, and
Vancouver. The original LA BRU maintains a political presence at the time of this writing. They
have already held raucous, noisy protests during their meetings with the new mayor of Los
Angeles, Antonio Villaraigosa. 4
For the purposes of this paper, it is worth noting, the BRU had direct experience with repressive
anti-protest measures described in the Protest Repression Data When it held a march during the
2000 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, BSU members were among those attacked
by tear gas and rubber bullets when police eventually cleared all downtown streets through force.
Shortly after the DNC, they received similar treatment at smaller, joint protest they held against
police brutality at LAPD headquarters, in which a dozen people were injured 211
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International Development and Regional Planning
The effective use of protest and direct action within the arena of International Development and
Regional Planning is perhaps even more stark than in the United States. Without going into as
much detail, a quick review of just the last few years demonstrates its prevalence.
In 2001, Mexico's newly elected president Vincente Fox sought to anoint the capital city as 'a
global city' by constructing a 'world class' airport, in the belief that this would attract more foreign
corporations looking to invest. However, the impoverished farmers who owned the land in question
were not consulted, and were being forced to leave. To make matters worse, they were not offered
new homes or significant compensation in exchange for the loss of their land, so they responded
with militant protests and dramatic direct action. They marched into the city riding tractors and
horses and waving their machetes. A firestorm of national and international media coverage
resulted from their dramatic protests, and under increased public scrutiny, the project was cancelled
and they were able to keep their land.
In 2000 in Bolivia, the government granted control over the capital city's water to Bechtel
Corporation, as part of a 40-year lease to privatize the water supply on the advice of the World
Bank. Immediately, the company raised prices, effectively doubling and tripling water rates for an
urban population that on average makes only 2$ a day. Interpreting the privatization scheme as a
plan that benefited the wealthy at the expense of the poor, the city's overwhelmingly poor
population responded with mass demonstrations and blockaded the streets, bringing the city to a
standstill. The deal with Bechtel was eventually cancelled. One of the protesters reflected: 'Since
the 'Water War' in 2000, people have realized that the only weapon we have is blockades... When
we have used other kinds of mobilizations, the government has never listened.' When the
government signed a deal to let foreign corporations invest in Bolivia's natural gas industry (and
only return 18% of the profits to Bolivia), protests erupted again, and the government was toppled.
In South Africa in 2001, the post-apartheid regime began to visibly retreat from its "people-driven
development" platform and embarked on a path of privatization municipal services, under pressure
from western governments and economic advisors. In order to make these utilities more attractive
to foreign investors, the energy sector had to increase profit margins so the government
implemented a strict cost recovery regime which entailed shutting off the power to the poorest
urban communities. In Soweto, the largest working class black township in the nation, households
were being cut off at a rate of nearly 20,000 households every month. In response, a grassroots
organization arose calling itself the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee and began leading mass
demonstrations, as well as "Operation Khunyasa" a direct action campaign that taught people how
to reconnect their own power. This campaign soon rendered the shutoff tactics of the government
inoperable.216 Similar widespread direct action campaigns have occurred in surrounding water
privatization, and forced evictions.
The case studies reveal that across the planning spectrum, the tactics of protest, civil disobedience
and direct action have provided irreplaceable tools for marginalized groups to address inequity and
lack of democracy in the planning process. To be clear, this in not the same as claiming that protest
is the only means by which marginalized communities achieve gains. Community organizers are
often the first to make this point.m The meaningful conclusion is that protest cannot be left out of
any conception of a democratic planning process. When imbalances in power exist, even within
deliberative settings, there are crucial moments where protest and direct action can accomplish
things for marginalized groups that nothing else can. Any democratic planning strategy (and any
planning education for that matter) should incorporate these lessons.
Protest and Planning Theory
By omission, contemporary urban planning appears to dismiss the importance of these kinds of
political action and by extension, the repression of protest in cities has not presented a particular
concern for planning theory. Democratic planning theory, at present, does not acknowledge the
types of democratic actions used b in the cases above. However, new critiques emerging among
political theorists offer a basis to inject a more complete notion of democracy into the planning
discussion, one that views protest, civil disobedience and direct action as an inherent part of
democratic process. This more complete view brings the issue of protecting dissent to the
foreground.
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Many political theorists make distinctions between two contrasting realms of democratic action. I
will use the rather simple terms of 'inside' versus 'outside', as most authors' labels roughly
conform to this dichotomy (see table). To make the differences clear, this paper will use the 'inside'
category to describe political actions that seek to produce democratic change by working within
given decision-making institutions, relying on non-conflictual forms of engagement such as
dialogue, cooperation, negotiation and social learning. Within the planning arena, deliberation and
multi-stakeholder process are the key actions taken as part of 'inside' category, as they are
techniques actively promoted and facilitated by mainstream institutions.
In contrast, "outside" forms of democratic action loosely encompass those political activities which
seek to produce social change by working outside of mainstream political institutions, often
employing forms of contestation and purposeful conflict that seek to alter the very construction of
the decision-making structure itself. Broadly defined, this is the arena of public participation that is
commonly associated with autonomous civil society, outside both the market and the state, where
collective mobilization by the public is the primary structure. Protest, direct action and civil
disobedience are tactics that fall within this arena.
Both of these types of actions must also rely on particular kinds of spaces and places. Inside action
tends to take place literally, inside: inside legislative halls, courtrooms, and planning offices.
Primarily, these are 'representative spaces,' the places and spaces where elected and appointed
representatives meet to make decisions. Secondarily, these are 'invited spaces,' the places where
power holders solicit the opinions and input of the general public, through participatory settings. In
contrast, outsider action tends to take places, quite literally, outside: in the streets, in public plazas,
in parks, at development sites. These are spaces which are claimed and invented, where members
of the general public has the right to construct and reconstruct the space temporarily for their social
purpose. These are not merely physical spaces, but social spaces as well, each of which facilitates
particular kinds of political action.
Recent political theory and newly emerging critiques of deliberation and multi-stakeholder process
assert that both inside and outside forms of action are essential to producing democratic outcomes.
However, the notion that 'insider' forms of politics like deliberation are by themselves synonymous
with democracy is so accepted these days as to have become 'commonplace'218 Meanwhile, the
exclusive reliance on these approaches has framed any political action that marginalized groups
undertake outside the given framework as as both illegitimate and undemocratic.
This has translated into a disregard for the spaces, places and legal rights that outside politics
requires. While planners are quick to point out the aesthetic and entertainment needs for public
space, there is relatively little emphasis on the political function of public spaces. These emerging
critiques reveal how the current democratic planning paradigm is impaired, using a fundamentally
incomplete notion of democracy.
In order to set the stage for this comparison, the differences between the insider and outsider forms
of democratic actions are outlined below:
Two aspects of Democratic Action:
Inside Outside
Labels Traditional Politics Non-traditional politics (Morris) 219
Formal Politics Informal Politics (Giddens,*
Ordinary Politics Cherry 221)
Elite politics Extra-ordinary Politics (Euchner)
Non-elite politics (Lee222)
Actions Deliberation Public Protest
Multi-stakeholder forums Civil Disobedience
Lawsuits and Mediation Direct Action
Process Consensus Contestation
Conflict Resolution & Negotiation Purposeful Conflict
Observance of Official Process Transgression & Disruption of Process
Assumptions Outside action is illegitimate Outside action is necessary
Everyone is equal partner Inequality permeates all institutions
Participation Specific parties invited on the basis Public
of having a perceived 'stake' Open to everyone
Location Community Input Meetings Public Spaces in the city (Plazas, Parks
Mediation settings sidewalks, and Streets)
Courtrooms Development Sites
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The current planning paradigm is composed of two main types of action, multi-stakeholder forums
and deliberation. The multi-stakeholder approach seeks to find those people or groups perceived as
'major stakeholders" and invite them into a decision-making process, with the goal of reaching
agreement through dialogue and consensus. Complimenting this, the deliberative approach
proposes that all participants in the decision-making process are considered to be equals and
decisions are made on who has the better rational argument. Taken together, these approaches can
summed up as pursuing democratic by (a) working within the system, and (b) by avoiding or
resolving conflict. However, the planning case studies outlined above show that these approaches
can be insufficient by themselves in their ability to produce democratic outcomes. In all of those
cases, political action that was both (a) outside the given system and (b) purposefully conflictual
was necessary.
Several political theorists have stated how 'working within the system' runs counter to the most
important episodes of democratic change in the US. Aldon Morris writes:
"In a loud and clear voice the civil rights movement demonstrated to those groups that
organized nontraditional politics was a viable method of social change, capable of bringing
about the desired results far faster than traditional methods... Indeed, the modem women's
movement, student movement, farm worker's movement, and others of the period were
triggered by the unprecedented scale of nontraditional politics in the civil rights movement.
Following the civil rights movement it has become commonplace for groups traditionally
excluded from power to pursue their interests through demonstrations and protest."2 2 3
(emphasis added)
Charles Euchner, writing in the mid 1990's, brings this same argument further into the present.
"Some of the most important public dialogue in recent years has occurred as a result of
outsider politics. The civil rights movement -- which changed the nation's basic attitudes
about acceptable racial arrangements, and also rearranged the alignment of party politics
throughout the nation -- is the obvious case in point. The feminist movements represent
another example of outsider politics altering the basic patterns of life in society and
politics. Other movements to assert basic human rights -- the gay rights, gray rights,
handicapped rights, consumer rights, student rights, children's rights, and even
international human rights movements -- all were framed in important ways by people who
22 Morris, Aldon D. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change. New York: Free Press,
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took to the streets and demonstrated or attempted to obstruct the normal procedures of
politics". (emphasis added)
Taeku Lee, also citing the civil rights movement, points out that historical narratives about social
change often mistakenly attribute change to elite actors, such as presidents, Supreme Court judges,
and political parties. However, these versions of history overlook the preceding periods of mass
protest "outside conventional political channels" that propelled these issues onto the legislative and
electoral agenda in the first place.22 In other words, it is outside forms of action undertaken by
marginalized groups that create the pre-conditions within which elite reformers then implemented
change from the inside.
Francis Fox Piven and Cloward, argue that rather than working within the system it was "acts of
mass defiance" that produce results for the poor. According to their findings, participation by
marginalized groups in formal structures only served to "blunt militancy and therefore lessen
movement impact." The tactics of protest and direct action are effective precisely because they are
'outside of normal politics' and 'against normal politics' in the sense that people 'break the rules
defining permissible modes of political action'.22 s
John Dryzek, in examining the role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the environmental
movement, asserts the importance of oppositional movements of civil society that remain outside
the state. In addition to their professionalized modes of work, NGO's are effective because they
support and participate in demonstrations and protest activity. In order to be successful, social
movements must stand apart from the state and become their own agents in independent action.
These theorists argue for the 'outside' aspect, but what about the conflictual aspect? Isn't change
made by less powerful groups of people getting more powerful groups of people to agree with
them, and isn't this best achieved by rational argumentation, respectful dialogue and cooperation?
In the last several years, a growing number of scholars have been questioning the non-conflictual
nature of the deliberative and multi-stakeholder approaches.
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Archon Fung, an advocate of deliberation, cites lessons learned from his observation of the
successful 'living wage' campaign at Harvard University. He recounts how serious deliberation
over the issue of Harvard's employment practices only became possible once the protesters,
dismissed by the university administration, undertook forms of civil disobedience. Fung concludes
that when decision-making is highly entrenched and bureaucratized, or the inequality of power is
so great-then there can be no feasible path to advance deliberation. When this occurs, people are
"at liberty to engage with them using the full array of bargaining, negotiating, purchasing,
protesting, and more militant confrontational tactics that are regulated by the ordinary non-
deliberative political ethics of pluralist regimes."226
Chantal Mouffe argues that in a democracy with diverse interests and groups it becomes necessary
to engage in conflict, what she calls 'agonistic pluralism' where opposing interests parties are
'constructively adversarial'. Mouffe states that "far from jeopardizing democracy, agonistic
confrontation is in fact its very condition of its possibility. To be sure, pluralist democracy...calls
for the expression of dissent and the institutions through which conflicts can be manifested."m
John Ploger, connects the concept of agonism directly to the practice of planning, stating that
"Conflict is immanent to planning, and perhaps particularly to practice within a pluralistic,
multicultural society."2
Pieterse, applying Mouffe's theoretical formulation to his experience of urban planning in post-
apartheid South Africa, concludes that "formal liberal democratic norms and institutional
procedures ....are wholly inadequate." 229 There is great need for "agonistic engagement" and
"transgressive urban politics" to achieve democracy in urban government. As an antidote, truly
democratic planning requires "direct action or mobilization against state policies or to advance
specific political demands." He does not reject multi-stakeholder forums, but citing a number of
planning examples claims they function best when marginalized groups also maintain their
autonomy from them and actively pursue political strategies that "unfold in spheres of engagement
outside of the chambers of stakeholder forums." He argues that power any power that marginalized
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stakeholders have inside these forums is determined by power built in the larger public sphere
through "direct action to shape agendas and lay claims to constitutionally defined rights and
entitlements" as well as the "grassroots organizational capacity to enforce accountability, and
incessantly compel powerful actors."2 0
Iris Marion Young concludes that despite their best intentions, deliberative arenas can still uphold
many of the larger patterns of inequality and exclusion of the larger society. Activists may choose
to confront given decision-making structures, rather than join them, because they are often more
attenuated to these power imbalances than the deliberators who facilitate them, and confrontation
allows them to address the inequalities, rather than confer legitimacy upon these forums by
participating in them.3'
Robert Fisher, in evaluating the history of neighborhood struggles in the United States makes a
similar assessment. He concludes that the history of neighborhood organizing makes clear that
"conflict -- ideological and direct action challenges -- is essential to push the context, policies, and
programs towards meeting basic human needs and implementing more democratic processes.r 2
Because protest is both 'outside' the formal process, and conflictual, it has often been dismissed by
powerholders and planners alike as an irrational activity, in contrast to the rationality and civility of
the deliberative process.3 3 . But many authors point out that protest is a rational form of political
participation that can make strategic sense for marginalized groups seeking to address their
grievances." 4 "Young, who is familiar with activist operations, points out that protesters do not
reject official structures based on impulse, but usually arrive at the approach after previous
experience of trying to working with mainstream institutions. Furthermore, considerable internal
deliberation usually takes pace, only within the activist organizations themselves, as well as a
strategic assessment of possible options within the given political context.36
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To gain a cleared understanding of the reasons that marginalized groups undertake protest, the
following lists provide a summary of scholarly insights into the reasoning:
I. Marginalized groups may choose to undertake political action outside the system (as opposed to
engaging in deliberative and multi-stakeholder planning forums) because...
Lack of power ...they discover that the available forums are not much more than 'rituals' that
give participants no real power over decision making. (Young, 2003)
Autonomous Power ...they seek to construct autonomous levers of power that are not conditioned
by the official planning process - power which can then be used as leverage
within or against the official process. (Piven and Cloward 1977; Young 2003)
Structural change ...they seek to avoid the trap of working towards cosmetic 'band-aid' fixes that
are often promoted as good negotiated compromise by planning institutions, but
can ironically prolong the life of unjust institutions, or make bad plans just
palatable enough to get built.
Avoid Cooptation ... their non-complicity leaves them available raise more fundamental questions
about the status quo, whereas once they choose to participate they confer
legitimacy on existing institutions and plans, underming their ability to make
more potent forms of criticism.2
Question the process ... they may experience 'inclusive' and 'participatory' forums as still imbued
with patterns of economic, racial, and gender privilege and disenfranchisement
Efficiency ...they decide to conserve limited resources and devote them towards other
forms of democratic action that may produce better results.
Inclusion ... the public nature of street protests (as they literally take place 'outside') are
non-elitist, Anyone can join, contrasting the often exclusionary and non-
transparent nature of many decision-making bodies.(ACORN)23
Courage ...protests are a means of strengthening the internal resolve of groups that may
doubt their own ability to make change (Collins, Randall, 2001)239
37 Ibid.
2 As one ACORN organizer states: "Virtually any other public forum is stacked against our members, for reasons of class, culture, or
race... Direct action is a forum in which vast numbers can participate" (Accessed on July 19, 2005)
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/124/directaction.html
2 Collins, Randall. "Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention" in Goodwin, J. et al (eds.), Passionate Politics:
Emotions and Social Movements. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001: 27-44
This is not to disregard the practice of deliberation and use of multi-stakeholder forums, but to
illustrate their incompleteness, a fact that necessitates other forms of democratic action. Walzer, an
advocate of deliberation concludes "it is not easy to imagine a democratic politics to which popular
mobilization has become superfluous." He warns that exclusive reliance on deliberation is not
enough, and there are larger contexts and necessary compliments to which deliberation must "fit
into" in order to create a truly democratic process, or for that matter, for deliberation itself to work.
Walzer points out the tendency of all hierarchies to consolidate wealth and power over time,
2 Wilson, James Q. The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action. Conflict Resolution. 1961. (5):292
21 Biggs, Michael. "When Costs are Beneficial: Protest as Communicative Suffering." Sociology Working Papers. Department of
Sociology, University of Oxford. 2003 (04)
242 As one ACORN spokesman commented on direct action: "All the people you want to meet with, they don't listen without direct
action. [Negotiation only] works once you get an audience that will listen. It's hard to get that audience." (Accessed on July 10, 2005)
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/124/directaction.html
24 Lipsky, Michael. Protest as a Political Resource. American Political Science Review, 1968. 62(4): 1144-58
24 See Biggs, above.
II. Marginalized groups may choose to undertake conflictual political action (as opposed to engaging in
deliberation and conflict resolution) because...
Demonstrate power ... protest offers marginalized groups real power in the form of 'negative
inducements' against powerholders if they pursue an unwanted plan. 20
Actions speak louder than ...protest reveals not just how many people disagree with a plan (which
opinion polls could be achieved by polls), but the number of people committed to taking
action against it.m
Naming and Shaming ...protest using the power of 'shame and exposure' can damage the valuable
public image of gov't agencies or private developers
Blockage and disruption ...direct action, which can physically block a plan, or disrupt an operational
routine, imposes actual material costs upon the opponent, or it can make the
public to 'wake up' the severity of a crisis.
Widen Agendas ... protest can be used to pressure deliberators to include more stakeholders,
or widen their agenda, or to redefine the problem ( Tarrow; ACORN 2 )
Public Attention ...conflict tends to capture more public attention than accord or
acquiescence, bringing increased attention to a previously ignored message
or group
Enlists Allies ... increased attention can enlist public support; recruit new members; or
enlist allies with specialized skills (pro-bono lawyers, scientists, etc.)
(Lipsky, 1968)24
Question Normalcy ... disruption encourages people to re-consider what they may have found
normal and acceptable, undermining the advantages that powerholders
accrue due to habituated patterns of thought and behaviour (Young, 2003)
Reveal Crisis ...when protesters risk their own safety their level of commitment illustrates
to others the severity of the injustice they face (Biggs, 2003)24
creating perpetual cycles of inequality in society. This requires "endlessly renewed struggle" to
create democratic egalitarianism, and "non-deliberative" popular organization and mass
mobilization are the best ways to do this. 5 Young concludes that while deliberation has its place in
democracy, "the best democratic theory and practice will affirm [both activism and deliberation]
while recognizing the tension between them." 2
While this paper asserts the importance of outside forms of action, it is important that the 'inside
vs. outside' framework not be viewed as an either/or scenario, but as two contrasting approaches
that can mutually reinforce each other.24 These two realms could be visualized as a kind of mobius
strip (00) where two loops feed into each other.' As the strategic demands and opportunities of
the political situation change, marginalized groups continually traverse back and forth between
these two arenas, accumulating important resources on one side that give them greater power in
the other. If groups are able travel fluidly within and between these two arenas, this creates a kind
of virtuous cycle. A narrow interpretation of democracy, one that disallows conflict and direct
action, undermines this cycle, and hence can weaken marginalized groups even when they choose
to engage in inside forms of action. Similarly, when political repression prevents a marginalized
group from utilizing the outside arena of action, the virtuous cycle is broken as well. When the
spaces and places that outsider action depends upon are constrained, through repressive laws
against public protest or through direct coercion by police, then marginalized groups are seriously
damaged in their ability to participate in democracy.
Police Repression and Democratic Planning
In terms of professional planning practice, a few planners are actively working to synthesize both
inside and outside tactics into a cohesive theoretical approach. A noteworthy example is Kenneth
Reardon's 'Empowerment Planning' approach to the East St. Louis Redevelopment Project: "an
approach to urban problem solving that integrates the key principles and methods of participatory
24 Michael Walzer, "Deliberation, and What Else?" in Macedo, Stephen (ed). Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and
Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999: 91-94. 104
2 Young, Iris. Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy. Political Theory. 2003. 29(5): 670-90
2 Banaszak, Lee Ann. Inside and Outside the State: Movement Insider Status, Tactics and Public Policy Achievements. Paper presented
at the Workshop on Social Movements and Public Policy, January 11-13, 2002, Laguna Beach, California. 2002.
2 This could also be described as an infinity sign, called a lemniscate in precise mathematical terms.
action research, direct action organizing, and popular education into an effective method of social
change."249 Time will be needed to evaluate this formula; meanwhile, there remains a vast, fertile,
realm of uncharted territory for future planners.
However, whether or not professional planners choose to undertake outside forms of action
themselves is a secondary issue. What is at stake is the ability of others to be able to undertake
political action outside the official system, and this is something that should concern all planners,
regardless of their position. Even when planners are working to improve the system from the
inside, the case studies make clear that the success of insiders is often dependent upon the ability of
marginalized groups to act outside of it.
In light of this, the state of basic political rights in cities becomes a critical planning issue. Basic
political rights preserve the space that allows marginalized groups to participate in the full range of
democratic action. The freedoms of speech and assembly, and the freedom to engage in non-violent
political action without fear of violent reprisal are what allow groups to occupy both sides of the
political spectrum. In contrast, police repression of protest significantly narrows political
opportunities for groups seeking social change.25 When cities become antagonistic to public
protest, marginalized groups find it more difficult to get their message heard, increase public
support, or enlist skilled allies to their cause. In short, repressive policing eradicates one of the few
avenues of democratic action available to marginalized groups.
Fortunately, planners need not sit idly on the sidelines. Even those who choose not to participate in
protest themselves can still play an important role in protecting it. Social movements scholars
assert that third party observers play a crucial role in reversing the effects of repression: "the
relationship between repression and dissent is an indirect, mediated one in which public discourse
and the mass media play a crucial role....Third parties who watch, comment on, and intervene are
crucial [to the effect that repression has]." When police receive criticism from the public for
repressive acts, they must restrain their actions, which re-opens political space for protesting
249 Reardon, Kenneth. Combating Racism through Planning Education: Reflections on the East St. Louis Action Research Project.
Planning Research and Practice. 1998. 13 (4): 421-432
2,O Della Porta, Donatella quoted in Schweingruber, David. "Mob Sociology and Escalated Force: Sociology's Contribution to
Repressive Police Tactics." The Sociological Quarterly. 2000. 41(3):371-389.
groups to address their grievances2"'. Interestingly, the intervention of third parties can even turn
repression into a positive opportunity for marginalized groups When an act of repression is
witnessed and then widely perceived as illegitimate in the public sphere, it becomes a catalyst for
further protest often giving the message of protesting groups further legitimacy.m
The Origin of Rights
Rights are the preconditions for democracy and democratic planning, and these rights cannot be
assumed to exist, the must be fought for and protected jealously. It is all too easy to remain passive
in defending these rights, even in the face of escalating repression, when one is under the belief that
because rights are 'guaranteed' by law, they exist in practice. History does not support this view.
Rights are not fixed, invincible things, that are applied universally to all, but are strengthened or
weakened depending on the degree to which people work maintaining them. Recent literature
examining the 'origins of rights' concludes that despite the high-minded justifications of the
constitution, political rights are in fact, neither natural, nor divinely granted.' Even though all
people certainly deserve these rights on the basis of their humanity, deserving them did not
transform them into a practical reality. Rights were invented by the population as a product of
social struggle, and it required continued struggle to make sure they applied to everyone. It is only
when people mobilized collectively and transformed their practical demands into rights that these
protections become enshrined into law.7  Furthermore, once rights were achieved, it has only been
ongoing mobilization by the public that sustains them.
Said simply, if rights are created when people actively struggle for them, then they can be taken
away when people cease to be active. More to the point, rights can be taken away selectively for
certain powerless groups even while they are maintained for the rest of the population, creating
contained spaces of disenfranchisement and repression that the rest of the population may not even
be fully aware of. Unsurprisingly, it is marginalized groups that tend to inhabit those spaces where
21' Brockett, Charles D. 1995. "A Protest-Cycle Resolution of the Repression/Popular-Protest Paradox" in: M. Traugott, M. (ed.)
Repertoires and Cycles of Contention. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.
252 Biggs, Michael. "When Costs are Beneficial: Protest as Communicative Suffering." Sociology Working Papers. Department of
Sociology, University of Oxford. 2003 (04)
' Dershowitz, Alan M. 2004 Rights From Wrongs: A Secular Theory Of The Origins Of Rights, New York: Basic Books
25 Foweraker, J. and Landman, T. Citizenship Rights And Social Movements: A. Comparative And Statistical Analysis. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997.
rights are most easily stripped away. To be serious about the practice of democratic urban planning
means being active in the preservation of basic political rights for all who inhabit the city.
Summary and Conclusions
The history of urban planning shows that protest is a rational and effective means for marginalized
groups to democratize the planning process and address grievances, employing both outside and
confrontational forms of civic engagement. Protest enables marginalize groups to build
independent sources of power that can force a process, plan or institution to become more inclusive
and equitable. Protest is also a means of generating public outcry and enlisting the support of allies
with specialized skills in order to enhance their effectiveness in legal, scientific or academic
arenas. The current democratic planning paradigm relies almost exclusively on deliberation and
multi-stakeholder forums, effectively depriving marginalized groups of these important and often
necessary forms of democratic action. The democratic planning paradigm must be widened to
include these forms of action. Planners should not only encourage and celebrate these approaches
as part of any democratic planning formulation; they also must actively ensure that political space
remains available in cities for marginalized groups to practice them.
Chapter VI
Conclusions
The data shows that within US cities, there is considerable erosion of political rights within US
cities. The increased militarization of protest policing, coupled with the increasing integration
between of federal and local law enforcement agencies, has facilitated this process. As a result,
cities as 'Gateways of Democracy' in the US are in the process of being systematically
Towards a Political Right to the City
The federalization and militarization of local police departments acts contrary to civil liberties, and
has undermined local autonomy. The response by many critics, however, has been to empower
local governments by demanding greater local autonomy and isolation from the federal
government.' This critique mistakenly conflates autonomy with democracy.
Structure vs. Content: Local Autonomy vs. Local Democracy:
Local autonomy and local democracy are not the same thing. Drawing on the work of Pratchett, an
important distinction can be made between the two. Local autonomy refers to local institutions'
independence from the central government. Local democracy refers to the rights of inhabitants
determine the just application of law and resources of their city. While they are closely associated,
they are not necessarily connected. In some cases, greater degrees of local autonomy can actually
undermine local democracy.
Local governments can be just as oppressive as national ones, and granting them greater autonomy
can compound this. During the Civil Rights era, it was local governments and law enforcement
agencies who were asserting their autonomy, in order to uphold racist segregation laws. It was the
federal government, far more democratic (in comparison), that intervened to dismantle these anti-
democratic local systems.
255 Kayyem, Juliette. A Waste of Time. The Boston Review, Dec/Jan, 2005; See also, Corey, Robin. History's Shadow. The Boston
Review, Dec/Jan, 2005.
Without the existence of such rights of inclusion and participation, local autonomy can actually
reinforce existing local structures of oppression. In the case of the rights of immigrants, a
frequently marginalize population, one study showed that increased local autonomy merely assisted
regressive white suburbanites to practice NIMBY-ism against immigrant populations. '
A more direct corollary from the law enforcement arena would be the __ riots in 1968. When the
urban African-American community rose up in rebellion against the racist policies of local police,
many welcomed the presence of federal troops to the area, as they were seen as less racist in
comparison (Fogelson) 1 . This has much to do with local character and history of oppression.
Stockdill argues that police forces with a greater history of police brutality will be more likely to
repress social movements and protest events.
This is not to say that local autonomy can serve to enhance local democracy. There is ample
literature that states how the more control that local populations have over the local institutions of
government, the more responsive and accountable those local institutions are." The important
point here is that local autonomy only enhances local democracy when the local government is
actually more democratic than that of the federal level. The structural aspect of government (local
vs. federal) is not wholly determinant of its character.
This is essentially an argument of content vs. structure. The existence of local democracy does not
simply depend upon the structure of government (local vs. Federal), but upon the degree of
inclusion of different interests at each of those levels, guided by a commitment to democratic
values. A structure by itself does not dictate the content that resides within it.
Henri Lefebvre's "Right to the City" offers a way forward. It is exactly this kind of rights based
notion which fills the gap in the local autonomy vs. democracy debate. By stating that control over
a city's resources and spaces belong to all those who inhabit it, by prioritizing the use value of
space over it's exchange value and the unequal power relations which result, The Right to the City
directly challenges local undemocratic structures.
256 Julie-Anne Boudreau. Questioning the use of 'local democracy' as a discursive strategy for political mobilization in Los Angeles,
Montreal and Toronto. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. December, 2003. 27(4): 793
257 Personal conversation with Robert Fogelson.
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Lefebvre's Right to the City is both "a cry and a demand" to make the cities epicenters of social
and economic justice. It is the notion that all of those who live within a city have an equal right to
its spaces, its resources, and the many social benefits it produces.2" This is a radically democratic
notion, one that is being taken seriously by social movements such as the World Social Forum, and
intergovernmental agencies such as the United Nations.
Re-envisioning Lefebvre's "Right of the Inhabitant"
While the Right to the City offers an inspiring way forward, it is not necessarily sufficient in its
original formulation. It was not an approach that Lefebvre had fully theorized, and so, to be
practicable, it requires additional theorization by others." The notion presenting in this paper, that
cities are the Gateways of Democracy, presents a significant democratic challenge to The Right to
the City as it is written. In Lefebvre's conception, The Right to the City is a place-based 'right of
the inhabitant': a right owned by all those who inhabit the city, regardless of class, race, gender or
any other social or economic distinction.2"' While this equalizes rights within the city, this does not
adequately address the rights of those outside the city. If Cities are Gateways of Democracy, how
are those who do not inhabit the city use it to exercise their democratic rights?
If cities are indeed Gateways of Democracy, it is because urban space has become the avenue
through which the entire population, not merely urban inhabitants, addresses regional, national, and
global institutions of power. The city plays an important political role for everyone. Therefore, for
the right to the city to be truly democratic, it must be a right that all people, whether they are
inhabitants of a city or not, have equal entitlement to. The groundwork for expanding Lefebvre's
notion is already present in his writing, however. Lefebvre posited that the function of the city was
its 'social centrality,' that the city was "the pre-eminent site of social interaction and exchange" for
the entire society. In other words, cities play a central role in the functioning of the entire society,
not merely their inhabitants, an idea that foreshadows the political notion I propose.
25 Henri Lefebvre, "The Right to the City" in Writings on Cities (London: Blackwell Publishing, 1996) pp. 14 7 - 16 0
26 Purcell, Mark. Excavating Lefebvre: The right to the city and its urban politics of the inhabitant. Geoournal NetherlandKluwer
Academic Publishers, 2003: (58)
261 Ibid.
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In the global era, cities do not only play a central role in neo-liberal restructuring262 they are also the
key sites where "counter-hegemonic projects" are built or aimed.2 3 Cities are the staging grounds
for contestation over the organization of the global economy. In other words, Lefebvre's notion of
'social centrality' should not be limited to economic, cultural and social exchange, but to forms of
political exchange as well. The Right to The City, is not a privilege of the urban inhabitant.
If the city is to fulfill its political function in a democracy, then the doors of the "gateway" must be
open to all. Scaling up a level from the function the agora played for the Greek city-state, the city
itself has now become the agora for the entire nation-state, and like Greek isegoria, all voices must
be considered equal inside of it.
This is particularly relevant in situations where urban protests are aimed at impacting national or
global institutions. These protests provide critical times and spaces when massive numbers of
constituencies from "outside" enter the city, and use it as a physical stage to launch their messages
into the global sphere. The protests are typically composed of farmers, rural workers, and urban
inhabitants from other less politically central cities. In fact, it is often people from these hinterlands
that often have the most to lose from global trade agreements.
However, while the red carpet is rolled out for the visiting trade delegates, city officials deny
protesters equal rights to participation in city life by branding them as the ones who are "outsiders."
In the most egregious cases, protesters are regarded as violent invaders by city officials, or
"outsiders who have come to terrorize and vandalize the city."2" At best, they are designated as
"guests" who must "behave" if they want to the chance to exercise their political rights.2 5 In other
words, they are told they are welcome, as long as they do not do anything to interrupt the status quo
social and economic workings of the city, such as marching in the streets and obstructing traffic, or
interrupting trade meetings, which the city has entered into a financial contract to host and protect.
262 Keil and Brenner, Mayer, in Kohler, Bettina and Markus Wissen, Glocalizing Protest: Urban Conflicts and Global Social
Movements", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. December, 2003.27 (4): 942
263 ibid.
26 Miami Police Chief John Timoney referred to protesters as "outsiders coming to terrorize and vandalize our city." In Figueras, Tere.
Big Police Presence; Few Clashes. Miami Herald. Nov. 21, 2003.
265 New York Mike Bloomberg was firm about the police attitude to protesters without permits: 'If you disrupt traffic, if you behave in a
way that is against the law, the NYPD will enforce the law. Period." In Harris, Paul. New York ready to unleash fury on Republicans.
The Observer. August 15, 2004
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This strategy of "othering" protesters implies that their right to use the urban landscape as a
political forum is less important than the trade representatives' right. For that matter, protesters'
political rights are less important than local residents' 'right' to engage in their normal, mundane
activities, such as driving a car without traffic interruption. In this formulation, while the gates of
the city are open to residents with an economic purpose, and visiting trade delegates, they are
closed to vositing protesters. These days, when visiting protesters enter the city, their movements
become highly constrained by repressive restrictions, couched in a bureaucratic language of traffic
laws and 'parade' ordinances. Intimidated and openly surveilled, these visitors are shadowed by an
everpresent threat of state violence. These constraints on the use of urban space effectively deny
them their fundamental right as citizens to launch demands directly at their regional, national, or
global representatives. For these reasons, Lefebvre's Right to the City must not merely be
understood as a right of the urban inhabitant, but a right of all those who inhabit a democratic
society and who depend on the city as a political resource.
Implementing the Right to the City
Lefebvre offered little guidance on how his vision might be carried into existence. However, there
is increasing momentum in social movement networks globally to bolster The Right to the City
with a more precise articulation followed by real political action. One example, the World Charter
of the Right to the City, is a platform of urban rights being articulated and promoted by the World
Social Forum (WSF) network. This is not an effort that can be easily dismissed, as the WSF (with
it's many regional sub-for a) is the largest single meeting of civil society actors in the world. In
their formulation of The Right to the City, they have been careful to include the political aspects of
urban life. The charter states: "the democratic right to organize and engage in forms dissent is seen
as fundamental to [The Right of the City]" and it expressly asserts "The Right Of Association,
Assembly, The Expression And The Democratic Use Of Urban Public Space."26 As cities become
the predominant place where the world's population lives, these grassroots movements are
demanding that cities reassert the national and international rights already conferred by their
democratic constitutions and the International Declaration on Human Rights.
266 World Charter on the Right to the City. Elaborated at the Social Forum of the Americas (Quito, Ecuador: 2004) & the World Urban
Forum (Barcelona, Spain : 2004; World Social Forum, Porte Alegre, Brazil: 2005.
103
However, in terms of moving from demanding these rights, to crafting what these rights would
look like in terms of institutional practice, there is much work that remains to be done. In regards to
the question of upholding cities function as "gateways of democracy" one important avenue of
future research would be to outline the kinds of institutions and laws that would be needed to
uphold and sustain the political rights of all those who seek to use the city as an epicenter of
democratic practice.
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Appendix: Data Citations
World Trade Organization (WTO) Seattle, WA. Nov 30 - Dec 3, 1999
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 50,000 Protests overshadow WTO talks. BBC News. November'30, 1999.
# of police deployed: 1,100 De Armond, Paul. "Netwar In The Emerald City:WTO Protest Strategy
And Tactics" in Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt (eds). Networks And
Netwars: The Future Of Terror, Crime, And Militancy. Rand Corporation,
2001.
# of law enforcement: 28 After Action Report, World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference
Seattle, Washington November 29 - December 3, 1999. Seattle Police
Department. April 4, 2000.
Ratio of police to protesters: 1:25
# of arrests: 631 Ibid.
# of convictions: 1-20 There were 613 misdemeanors and. 23 felony vandalism charges. Only the
misdemeanor records were available: 93% of the cases were dropped, 7%
took deals. Only six cases went to trial. Five were acquitted or dismissed.
Only 1 person was convicted in trial and given community service. -
Komisaruk, Katya, Examples of Solidarity Tactics in Mass Civil
Disobedience Actions. Just Cause Law Collective, 2003. The 1-20 figure
account for the possibility of felony convictions.
Convictions (as % of arrest): 1-3%
Security expend. (in millions of $ 11.2 WTO Accountability Review Committee. "Lost Opportunities: The Budget
for the Seattle Meeting of the World Trade Organization" in Report of the
Citizens' Advisory Panel on WTO Invitation, Part Two. September 14,
2000.
Federal funding (in millions of $) 0 Murakami, Kery. Seattle Saddled With Millions In WTO Bills: City
Turned Down 1998 Federal Offer To Pay Expenses. Seattle Post-
Intelligencer. June 15, 2000.
Police overtime (in millions of $): 6 The Battle In Seattle. Time (Europe). December 6, 1999. 154 (23)
Tactics Data (Qualitative):
Demonization of protesters
[Inferring protesters/violence link: X Despite widespread media and police reports of 'violence', the most
militant protest actions were directed at property, not persons. Few police
and no bystanders were injured as a result of protester actions. Police did
experience some 'minor' injuries, mostly due to fatigue and the handling
their own weapons. - ACLU. "Improper Arrests And Prosecutions" in
Out Of Control: Seattle's Flawed Response To Protests Against The
World Trade Organization. July, 2000.; In contrast, over 100 protesters,
bystanders and press were injured by police actions, some seriously. -
Prattle in Seattle. Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting. December 10,
1999; see also Marx, Gary T. "Complexity & Irony in Policing and
Protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle" n Social Justice,
2000. 27 (2): 212-236
Inferring protesters/terrorism link:
Planted/arranged/ misrep. evidence
Media: embedded/targeting non-
embedded:
Laws used to restrict assembly
Delayed issuance of permits:
Improper termination of event
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive: X "Police made hundreds of improper arrests, detaining for days people who
would never stand trial. Then, after the demonstrations were over, charges
were dropped. The City Attorney doggedly pursued other charges that later
were dismissed." - ACLU. "Improper Arrests And Prosecutions" in Out Of
Control: Seattle's Flawed Response To Protests Against The World Trade
Organization. July, 2000.
Arrest: journalists/legal obs/medics X St. Clair , Jeffrey. Seattle Diary. Counterpunch. December 16, 1999.
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Prolonged detention of arrestees: X ACLU. "Improper Arrests And Prosecutions" in Out Of Control: Seattle's
Flawed Response To Protests Against The World Trade Organization.
July, 2000.;
Malicious pros./exorbitant bails: X Ibid.
Random detention and searches:
Excessive force: X See below.
Chemical Weapons: X Seattle City Council. TheWTO Accountability Review Committee Final
Report. September 14th, 2000; See also, Out Of Control: Seattle's Flawed
Response To Protests Against The World Trade Organization. July, 2000.
Projectile Weapons: X Ibid.
d Electroshock Weapons:
Experimental Weapons:
Injuries: X Ibid; See also Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting. Prattle in Seattle.
December 10, 1999.
Critical Injuries: X Ibid.
'Free Speech'/'No-Protest' Zones: X Associated Press. Court: Seattle Police Perhaps Erred in WTO Protest.
June 3, 2005.
Restrict access to protest site: X Associated Press. Court: Seattle Police Perhaps Erred in WTO Protest.
June 3, 2005.
Max. Security Perimeter/ Fencing:
Mobile Netting/ Barriers:
Shut Down of Business Areas of City X After the mayor declared a civil emergency, a 25 square block 'no protest
zone' was created in downtown Seattle protected by police lines, making
any form of assembly an arrestable act. However, the city is currently
being sued on constitutional grounds for enforcing the zone selectively,
discriminating on the basis of political affiliation. See: ACLU. Appeals
Court Finds Government May Have Violated Rights of WTO Protesters in
Seattle. June 1, 2005.
Public Training Drills
Media Showcase of weapons, tactics
n Prominent display of force capabilities
US armed forces on streets X 400 National Guardsmen were called in after the civil emergency was
declared.
Deployment of Helicopters or APCs X ACLU. Out Of Control: Seattle's Flawed Response To Protests Against
The World Trade Organization. July, 2000.
Activist Homes Surveilled
Activist meeting spaces raided
Surveillance (electronic) X According the Seattle Weekly, police and 30 other local, state, and federal
agencies have been aggressively gathering intelligence on violent and
nonviolent protest groups since early summer (FBI agents even paid
personal visits to some activists' homes to inquire about their plans)."
Redden, Jim. "Police State Targets the Left" in Snitch Culture: How
Citizens are Turned into the Eyes and Ears of the State. Feral House,
2000.
Infiltration of non-criminal groups; X See above.
Agent provocateurs
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International Monetary Fund/World Bank, Washington, D.C., April 16-17, 2000
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 10,000 CNN.com, "Prize-winning journalist arrested" in Washington police useforce
to control World Bank, IMF protests. April 16, 2000
# of police deployed: 1400 Geov Parrish, Lessons From D.C.
# of law enforcement agencies: na
Ratio of police to protesters: 1 to 5
# of arrests: 1300
# of convictions: ns
Convictions (as % of arrest):
Security expend. (in millions of $): 10 Protest Groups To Sue DC Police, WJLA-TV, Monday August 13, 2001.
Federal funding (in millions of $): 16
Police overtime (in millions of $):
Tactics Data (Qualitative):
Demonization of protesters X "MPD officials provided erroneous and misleading information to the public
concerning what was found and confiscated at the convergence center, in a
manner that suggests an attempt to characterize demonstrators as prone to
violence." Committee on the Judiciary. Report on Investigation of the
Metropolitan Police Department's Policy and Practice in Handling
Demonstrations in the District of Columbia, City Council of the District of
Columbia. March 11, 2004.
[Inferring protesters/violence link: X Just prior to the protests, the Police Chief announced: "Whatever takes place,
we are going to keep control of these streets. Washington, D.C., is not going to
burn."
Inferring protesters/terrorism link:
Planted/arranged! misrep. evidence X Police raided an activist artspace, confiscated signs, and claimed that they
found materials for making Molotov cocktails, a laboratory for mass
production of pepper spray and bomb-making materials. This, in part, justified
arrests that ran to near 1200 people for the week. In a later retraction, police
admitted that the Molotov cocktail supplies were plastic containers and rags
that smelled of solvents. The pepper spray factory was nothing more than a
kitchen, and bombmaking materials were limited to simple plastic water pipe.
All of these materials are consistent with activities related to the convergence
and art projects. See Ream, Tim. "False Police Reports are part of Police
Strategy" in Waging War On Dissent:A Report by the Seattle National
Lawyers Guild WTO Legal Group, August 10, 2000. See also, CNN.com,
Washington police use force to control World Bank, IMF protests. April 16,
2000; See also, "Charges Dismissed in 2 IMF Cases." Washington Post. June
9, 2000; Page B04
Media: embedded/targeting non-
embedded:
Laws used to restrict assembly
Delayed issuance of permits:
Improper termination of event
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive:
Arrest: journalists/legal obs./medics X CNN.com, "Prize-winning journalist arrested" in Washington police useforce
to control World Bank, IMF protests. April 16, 2000
Prolonged detention of arrestees:
Malicious pros./exorbitant bails:
Random detention and searches: X First person account posted on DC Indymedia: Chameides, Michael. Police
Harrass Activists; Confiscate Literature, April 12, 2000.
http://dc.indymedia.org/newswire/display-any/519
Excessive force: X One nonviolent protester had his ribs broken while arrested.. Another
protester was beaten in the face and then loaded into a 'patrol wagon,... US
Marshals slam people's faces into a wall.Primary sources: Abuse Of
Protesters In Dc, April 2000. April 19, 2000. (Accessed July 10, 2005.)
http://prorev.com/psa16.htm
Chemical Weapons:
D Projectile Weapons:
Electroshock Weapons:
Experimental Weapons:
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Injuries:
Critical Injuries:
'Free Speech'/'No-Protest' Zones:
Restrict access to protest site:
V Max. Security Perimeter/ Fencing:
, Mobile Netting/ Barriers:
Shut Down of Business Areas of City X Large sections of downtown were blocked off by police. Estimates are as
high as 60-90 blocks. Starhawk, Police Lessons, 2000. Available at:
http://www.starhawk.org/activism/activism-writings/policelessons.html
Public Training Drills
Media Showcase of weapons, tactics
Prominent display of force capabilities
US armed forces on streets
Deployment of Helicopters or APCs X Jones, Jack. "Knuckleheads with nightsticks." Urban 75. April 17, 2000
Activist Homes Surveilled
. Activist meeting spaces raided X Police and fire department officials shut down that activists main meeting
2 space a day before the protest. It was characterized as a 'pre-emptive show of
force". "Police Move Against Trade Demonstrators". New York Times April
- 16, 2000. : see also, Committee on the Judiciary.Report on Investigation of
the Metropolitan Police Department's Policy and Practice in Handling
Demonstrations in the District of Columbia, Council of the District of
Columbia, March 11, 2004. Police Chief Ramsey was quoted as saying, ""It
was to our delight that it did discombobulate a bit the protesters, and to the
extent it threw them off balance, that was helpful too."
Surveillance (electronic) X Vest, Jason. "The DC Cop Crackdown". Alternet, April 1, 2000.
Infiltration of non-criminal groups; X Meetings were infiltrated.
Agent provocateurs
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Republican National Convention (RNC) Philadelphia, PA Jul 31 - Aug 1, 2000
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 10,000?
# of police deployed: 7000
# of law enforcement: Democratic National Convention Preliminary Briefing Paper. Los Angeles
Police Department. August 22, 2000.
Ratio of police to protesters:
# of arrests: 420 The R2K Legal Collective (Philadelphia), RNC Legal Statistics, 2004.
# of convictions: 23 The R2K Legal Collective (Philadelphia), RNC Legal Statistics, 2004.; Out of
420 arrestees, and 43 felony charges "not a sigle defendant was sentenced to
jail time, and most had their cases dismissed or reduced to misdemeanors."
Steven Stycos, Boston Phoenix, May 31, 2004.
Convictions (as % of arrest): 5%
Security expend. (in millions of $13.3 Public Financing Of Presidential Candidates And Nominating Conventions,
Campaign Finance Institute, 2003.
Federal funding (in millions of $):
Police overtime (in millions of $):
Tactics Data (Qualitative):
Demonization of protesters X See below
Inferring protesters/violence link: X Police evidence of protesters intent to do violence were later proved false.
Inferring protesters/terrorism link:
Planted/arranged/ misrep. evidence X Mter raiding the activist main meeting space police made a range of claims to
the media about finding evidence of activists' violent intent, including C4
explosives and acid-filled balloons for throwing at police. Police also stopped
a truck containing 'poisonous animals' claiming they were to be used to
attack delegates. Later it was revealed that no C4 was found, nor any
weapons or acid. The truck belonged to a pet shop owner. See Ream, Tim.
"False Police Reports are part of Police Strategy" in Waging War On
Dissent:A Report by the Seattle National Lawyers Guild WTO Legal Group,
August 10, 2000.
Media: embedded/targeting non-
embedded:
Laws used to restrict assembly
Delayed issuance of permits:
Improper termination of event
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive: X "when it came time to prove the allegations, the city could not make the
cases. Many charges were dropped for lack of evidence; others failed to
impress judges or juries (a minuscule number of protesters were found guilty
of anything). But by the time the prosecutions fell apart, the spotlight had
moved elsewhere. Very convenient -and very disturbing to anyone who
thinks the 4th, 5th, 8th and 14th amendments to the Constitution ought to
mean something in the city where it was written." -- Philadelphia Daily
News, July 30, 2001
Arrest: journalists/legal obs./medics
Prolonged detention of arrestees: X A majority of the arrestees were kept in detention past legal limits until the
demonstrations were over. The Philadephia Inquirer, January 14, 2001
Malicious pros./exorbitant bails: X Bail was commonly set at $10,000 for minor offenses. One protest organizer
charged with sewing "violence and mayhem," had bail set at $1 million for a
misdemeanor, based on charges that were later dismissed.
Random detention and searches:
Excessive force:
Chemical Weapons:
Projectile Weapons:
Electroshock Weapons:
Experimental Weapons:
Injuries:
Critical Injuries:
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'Free Speech'/'No-Protest' Zones:
Restrict access to protest site:
Max. Security Perimeter/ Fencing:
Mobile Netting/ Barriers:
Shut Down of Business Areas of City
Public Training Drills
Media Showcase of weapons, tactics
Prominent display of force capabilities
.2 US armed forces on streets
1 Deployment of Helicopters or APCs
Activist Homes Surveilled
Activist meeting spaces raided X Based upon information of illegal activity that later proved to be false, police
conducted a raid on an activists' puppet-making arts space, arresting over 70
people. They confiscated and destroyed a majority of the banners, signs and
giant puppets that activists had made for the event.
Surveillance X Morgan, David. "Philadelphia Police Admit Surveillance Of Protesters."
Reuters, July 21, 2000.
Infiltration of non-criminal groups; X Despite the fact that Philadelphia police are specifically barred from engaging
in infiltration as a result of a 1987 mayoral order police documents unsealed
in court revealed that four undercover Pennsylvania state troopers, posing as
union carpenters had infiltrated the activists' meeting space. Lombardi,
Kristen. "Rough justice." The Boston Phoenix. Oct. 26-Nov.2. 2001.; Six
undercover officers were arrested while posing as protesters. Associated
Press, "Undercover troopers among those arrested during GOP convention."
CNN.com, November 16, 2000.
Agent provocateurs
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Democratic National Convention (DNC) Los Angeles, CA Aug 14, 2000
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 8,000
# of police deployed: 2,000 Pelisek, Christine. "Just the Facts, Ma'am: Everything you wanted to know
about the LAPD", LA Weekly, September 6 - 12, 2002
# of law enforcement agencies: 30 Included the FBI, U.S. Secret Service, CHP, Los Angeles County Sheriffs
Department, Los Angeles Department of Transportation, Los Angeles City
Attorney's Office, Los Angeles Fire Department, and numerous others.
During the planning process, the Department closely monitored the events of
civil unrest in Seattle, Washington; Washington, DC; and Philadelphia. in
Democratic National Convention Planning Group, Democratic National
Convention Preliminary Briefing Paper. Los Angeles Police Department.
August 22, 2000.
Ratio of police to protesters: 1 to 4
# of arrests: 170 Komisaruk, Katya, Examples of Solidarity Tactics in Mass Civil
Disobedience Actions, Just Cause Law Collective, 2003.
# of convictions: 50 120 had their cases dismissed. About 50 remaing cases had their charges
reduced to an infraction. Komisaruk, Katya, Examples of Solidarity Tactics in
Mass Civil Disobedience Actions, Just Cause Law Collective, 2003.
Convictions (as % of arrest): 29%
Security expend. (in millions of $): 22 Abraham, Yvonne and Milligan , Susan. "City seeks $25m for DNC
Added funding needed to cover security expenses." The Boston Globe.
October 9, 2003.
Federal funding (in millions of $):
Police overtime (in millions of $): 11.6 Abraham, Yvonne. DNC has price tags, details galore for '04, The Boston
Globe, December 17, 2002.
Tactics Data (Qualitative):
Demonization of protesters X
[nferring protesters/violence link: X Lt. Horace Frank, an LAPD spokesman stated about the protesters: "I think it
is reasonable to believe that there are individuals out there whose sole
mission is to perpetrate violence against businesses, individuals and against
police officers... Some of these individuals are getting more and more
violent towards innocent people in the community. That's a very big concern
to us." Quoted in CNN.com. Schools, businesses preparefor Democratic
Convention protests, August 11, 2000.
Inferring protesters/terrorism link:
Planted/arranged/ misrep. evidence
Media: embedded/targeting non-
embedded: "LAPD had to pay $60,00 to seven journalists who were clubbed with batons
and shot with rubber bullets" in Pelisek, Christine. Just the Facts, Ma'am:
Everything you wanted to know about the LAPD", LA Weekly, September 6 -
12, 2002; See also, Seeley, John. "Shoot the Messenger. ACLU lawsuit says
LAPD targeted reporters." LA Weekly, August 25-31, 2000.
Laws used to restrict assembly
Delayed issuance of permits:
Improper termination of event X 'Tippit, Sarah LA Police Sued Over Democratic Convention Protests, Reuters,
August 9, 2001
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive: X Ibid.
Arrest: journalists/legal obs./medics X lid
U Prolonged detention of arrestees:
-l Malicious pros./exorbitant bails: X Ibid.
Random detention and searches: X Henry Weinstein and Ted Rohrlich, Judge Bars LAPD From Preempting
Protest ActivitieS, Los Angeles Times, August 12, 2000; Incidents at the
protesters' headquarters have included police arrests of people for
jaywalking.. .and pushing people against the wall. "LA police issued
restraining order from headquarters of DNC protests." CNN.com. August 11,
2000.
Excessive force: X Mayor Richard Riordan promised to use rubber bullets if protesters any
nonviolent civil disobedience. 'Tippit, Sarah LA Police Sued Over
Democratic Convention Protests, Reuters, August 9, 2001
Chemical Weapons: X
111
Projectile Weapons: X
Electroshock Weapons:
Experimental Weapons:
Injuries: X As one journalist stated: "I was in Kosovo last year, you know, and I didn't
get shot there. I got shot in Los Angeles."
Critical Injuries: X
Mistreatment of arrestees:
'Free Speech'/'No-Protest' Zones: X
'To facilitate the lawful exercise of the first amendment, a public
demonstration area was identified and set aside from the beginning"
Democratic National Convention Preliminary Briefing Paper, LAPD,
Tuesday, August 22, 2000
Restrict access to protest site: X 'Tippit, Sarah LA Police Sued Over Democratic Convention Protests,
Reuters, August 9, 2001
Max. Security Perimeter/ Fencing:
Mobile Netting/ Barriers:
Shut Down of Business Areas of City X Police
Public Training Drills
Media Showcase of weapons, tactics X
Prominent display of force capabilities X
US armed forces on streets
Deployment of Helicopters or APCs X Tippit, Sarah LA Police Sued Over Democratic Convention Protests, Reuters,
August 9, 2001
Activist Homes Surveilled
Activist meeting spaces raided X
Surveillance (electronic) X LA police issued restraining order from headquarters of DNC protests
Infiltration of non-criminal groups;
Agent provocateurs
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Presidential Inauguration Washington, DC Jan 20, 2001
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 3000 There was no agreement yesterday on just how many had braved the weather
to protest, but it was without question the biggest anti-inaugural
demonstration since 1973, when 20,000 turned out to rain on Richard Nixon's
parade and protest against the Vietnam war. Borger, Julian and Martin Kettle.
"Bush Faces Jeers, Not Cheers." Guardian Unlimited. January 22, 2001.
# of police deployed: 6800 Washington Post, January 13, 2001.
# of law enforcement: 16 Washington Post, January 13, 2001.
Ratio of police to protesters: 3:1
# of arrests: 9 Lindsey, Daryl. "Thousands protest Bush's Inauguration." Salon.com, January
20, 2001.
# of convictions:
Convictions (as % of arrest):
Security expend. (in millions of $): 6 US Senate committee on appropriations, Subcommittee on the District of
Columbia Hearing on the Local FY05 Budget for D.C.: Testimony of Linda
W. Cropp, Chair, City Council of the District of Columbia, May 19, 2004.
Federal funding (in millions of $): 6 Historically the District has been directly reimbursed for the costs associated
with the Presidential Inauguration. Ibid.
Police overtime (in millions of $): 3 Statements made by D.C. Police Chief Charles Ramsey. Quoted in
Tactics Data (Qualitative):
Demonization of protesters
[Inferring protesters/violence link:
6 Inferring protesters/terrorism link:
9 Planted/arranged/ misrep. evidence
Media: embedded/targeting non-
embedded:
Laws used to restrict assembly
Delayed issuance of permits:
Improper termination of event
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive:
Arrest: journalists/legal obs./medics
Prolonged detention of arrestees:
Malicious pros./exorbitant bails:
Random detention and searches:
Excessive force:
Chemical Weapons:
Projectile Weapons:
Electroshock Weapons:
Experimental Weapons:
Injuries:
Critical Injuries:
'Free Speech'/'No-Protest' Zones:
Restrict access to protest site: X The "parade areas" which encompass a substantial portion of downtown D.C.
were for the first time in inauguration history, encircled in five miles of steel,
six-foot high fences--with only 10 checkpoints for entry. Despite requests,
police issued no guidelines, leaving the basis for entry entirely up to the
discretion of the police. Beghosian, Heidi. The Assault on Free Speech,
Public Assembly, and Dissent, National Lawyers Guild, p. 43- 44
Max. Security Perimeter! Fencing: X "Protesters line inaugural parade route." CNN.com. January 20, 2001
Mobile Netting! Barriers:
Shut Down of Business Areas of City
Public Training Drills
E. Media Showcase of weapons, tactics
Prominent display of force capabilities
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Democracy In Action Project, George Washington University. Downloaded
July 10, 2005 from: http://www.gwu.edu/-action/chrninau.html
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US armed forces on streets
Deployment of Helicopters or APCs
Activist Homes Surveilled
Activist meeting spaces raided
Surveillance (electronic) X DC police officials admitted to that plainclothes officers were sent to
protesters' organizational meetings without identifying themselves, but would
not discuss the operation further "Open intelligence is pretty fair game,
whether it's the Internet, reading the newspaper, watching TV or going to the
meetings." Santana, Arthur. Washington Post. December 28, 2000; Page BO1
Infiltration of non-criminal groups; X
Testifying in court, police officials admitted that that D.C. officers infiltrated
local protest groups, for which a city lawyer stated is not because of
suspected criminal activity. Montgomery, David. Stirring a Cause,
Washington Post. Monday, May 12, 2003; Page CO.; See also: Gossett,
Sherrie . D.C. Undercover Operations Blown?: Police Appeal Order To Turn
Over Identities Of Cops To Anti-Bush Group, WorldNetDaily, October 15,
2003.
Agent provocateurs X "Two men in street clothes -- one wearing a black ski mask -- were captured
on amateur videotape roaming through the inauguration crowd. They shove
bystanders and one pepper-sprays people seemingly at random. After two
years of legal pressure, the District acknowledged the men were on-duty
police officers." quoted in Montgomery, David. Stirring a Cause ,
Washington Post. Monday, May 12, 2003; Page COI; See also, Committee on
the Judiciary.Report on Investigation of the Metropolitan Police
Department's Policy and Practice in Handling Demonstrations in the
District of Columbia, Council of the District of Columbia, March 11, 2004.
World Economic Forum (WEF) New York, NY Jan 31 - Feb 4, 2002
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 7,000 Barry, Dan. "Forum In New York: Protests" New York Times. February 3,
2002.
# of police deployed: 4,000 Fine, Larry and Soo Youn. 'Thousands Rally Outside World Economic
Forum." Reuters. Feb 2, 2002.
# of law enforcement:
Ratio of police to protesters: 1:2
# of arrests: 201 Kaplan, Esther. "Spies in Blue: Cops Pushed Legal Limits in WEF Protests."
The Village Voice. February 13, 2002.
# of convictions:
Convictions (as % of arrest):
Security expend. (in millions of $):44 This is an estimate based upon the police overtime costs. See Below.
Federal funding (in millions of $):na
Police overtime (in millions of $): 44 d i hiL.UVIIIJUIj~ LU l. III  l thL~ fJL i i t lin 2002 ... overtime jumpe tO ts g est eve over e ve-year nerva as
a result of the $44 million police overtime cost associated with the January
2002 World Economic Forum." in New York City Independent Budget
Office. "Police Overtime: Tracking the Big Growth in Spending." Fiscal
Brief. April 2004. p 5 .
Tactics Data (Qualitative):
Demonization of protesters X See Below.
Inferring protesters/violence link: X Media quotes from NY daily news: "legions of agitators," "crazies,"
"parasites" and "kooks" In "Confab Welcome, Crazies Not." New York
Daily News. Jan 13, 2002. p. 42; When no violence occurred, CBS played a
clip of a masked man breaking a Starbucks window -- in Genoa, from a year
before. Flanders, Laura. "Question Authority." Working For Change. Feb 5,
2004.
Inferring protesters/terrorism link: X 'There are some very serious bad guys out there," Timoney told the Post,
"and I am not talking about Osama bin Laden. We are talking about pretty
sophisticated bad guys." Dunleavy, Steve. "Econ Summit Brings Own Terror
Threat." New York Post. January 18, 2002.; These protesters are "less
known for their deep thinking than for their willingness to trash
cities"..."some would say that New York needs this [protest] about as much
as it needs another airplane attack." Haberman., Clyde. New York Times.
January 19, 2002.
Planted/arranged/ misrep. evidence
Media: embedded/targeting non-
embedded:
Laws used to restrict assembly
Delayed issuance of permits:
Improper termination of event
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive: X While police stated the arrests were for blocking traffic, 50 protesters were
arrested who were marching exclusively on the sidewalk, not even blocking
pedestrians. Kaplan, Esther. "Cops Pushed Legal Limits in WEF Protests."
The Village Voice. February 13th, 2002.
o Arrest: journalists/legal obs./medics X 50 protesters arrested who were marching exclusively on the sidewalk, not
even blocking pedestrians.. Kaplan, Esther. "Spies in Blue: Cops Pushed
Legal Limits in WEF Protests." The Village Voice. February 13th, 2002.
Prolonged detention of arrestees: X "Spies in Blue: Cops Pushed Legal Limits in WEF Protests." The Village
Voice. February 13th, 2002.
Malicious pros./exorbitant bails:
Random detention and searches:
Excessive force:
Chemical Weapons:
Projectile Weapons:
Electroshock Weapons:
Experimental Weapons:
Injuries:
Critical Injuries:
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'Free Speech'/'No-Protest' Zones: X A separate 'pen' was created to allow the anti-globalisation group to play
music and recite diatribes against the IMF and World Bank. Behind them the
majority of the protestors were kept in a larger cordoned-off area. Ravilious,
Emmeline. "Anti-WEF protest passes off peacefully." Financial Times.
February 2, 2003.
Restrict access to protest site: X Metal 'protest pens' around the demonstration area kept many protesters from
reaching the permitted demonstation site. Flanders, Laura. "Question
Authority." Working For Change. Feb 5, 2004.
Max. Security Perimeter/ Fencing: X concrete barriers and sanitation trucks filled with sand closed off some 10
blocks around the hotel. Anderson, Kevin. "Protesters slam New York police
tactics." BBC.com. January 31, 2002.
Mobile Netting/ Barriers:
Shut Down of Business Areas of City
Public Training Drills X NYPD practiced many well publicized crowd control operations in front of
the media, and in Shea Stadium. Esposito, Richard. Law of the Fist: "New
York Cops Vow to Crush Violent Protest at World Economic Forum."
Village Voice. January 22, 2002.
Media Showcase of weapons, tactics X Local newspapers carried continual, multiple visual imagesaE"often on the
front page"of police officers wearing defensive body armor (riot gear) and
carrying automatic weapons. NLG Report. p. 22.
g Prominent display of force capabilities X Police security was tight, with demonstrators preceded by nine lines of police
in riot gear, and parade organisers verbally tussled with their NYPD
counterparts, calling for more road space in which to march. Demonstrators
were also flanked by police on motorbikes, horses and bicycles. Ravilious,
Emmeline. "Anti-WEF protest passes off peacefully." Financial Times.
February 2, 2003.
US armed forces on streets
Deployment of Helicopters or APCs X NI-G Report, p. 85
Activist Homes Surveilled X Undercover police were posted outside the apartment of Eric Laursen for two
days; at one point, four of his houseguests were tailed for blocks after they
headed out. Kaplan, Esther. "Spies in Blue: Cops Pushed Legal Limits in
WEF Protests." The Village Voice. February 13th, 2002.
Activist meeting spaces raided
Surveillance (electronic)
Infiltration of non-criminal groups; X The independent media center was infiltrated by police. Kaplan, Esther.
"Spies in Blue: Cops Pushed Legal Limits in WEF Protests." The Village
Voice. February 13th, 2002.
Agent provocateurs
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Anti-War (Port Protest) Oakland, CA Apr 7, 2003
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 500 Garofoli, Joe et al. "Oakland cops fire dummy bullets at protesters," San
Francisco Chronicle, April 8, 2003.
# of police deployed: 40 Ibid.
# of law enforcement agencies: I
Ratio of police to protesters: 1:10
# of arrests: 31 Garofoli, Joe et al. "Oakland cops fire dummy bullets at protesters," San
Francisco Chronicle, April 8, 2003.
# of convictions: 0 "Charges Against ILWU BA, Protestors Dropped." The Dispatcher,
International Longshoremen and Warehouse Union. June 9, 2004.
Convictions (as % of arrest): 0%
Security expend. (in millions of $): na
Federal funding (in millions of $): na
Police overtime (in millions of $): na
Tactics Data (Qualitative):
Demonization of protesters X See below
[Inferring protesters/violence link: X Law enforcement agencies "blended solid facts, innuendo and inaccurate
information about anti-war protesters expected at the port. Taken together,
this information painted a monolithic portrait of violent activists." Hoffman,
Ian. "Intelligence Agency Does Not Distinguish Between Terrorism and
Peace Activism." The Oakland Tribune. May 18, 2003. the Oakland Tribune
(5/13/03) reported that Contrary to police claims the police video "doesn't
show objects being thrown at police, or any other type of physical attack
against officers." The Los Angeles Times (6/8/03) reported "Police officials
have said they have videotapes that show protesters throwing objects at
officers. The Times reviewed the tapes and compact discs of the protest and
saw no instances of demonstrators throwing objects."
Inferring protesters/terrorism link: X Police responded with force in part because they were issued a terror
warning about the protesters from state anti-terrorism officials. It was later
discovered that this connection was made-up by a CATIC enforcement
official. Hoffman, Ian. "Intelligence Agency Does Not Distinguish Between
Terrorism and Peace Activism." The Oakland Tribune. May 18, 2003.
Planted/arranged/ misrep. evidence X Police justified their actions by claiming that protesters attacked them by
throwing rocks and bottles, which their own video later showed to be false.
Burt, Cecily. "Video doesn't show rocks being thrown: No attacks against
police appear in a film shot by an internal affairs investigator," Oakland
Tribune. May 15th, 2003.
Media: embedded/targeting non-embedded:
Laws used to restrict assembly
Delayed issuance of permits:
Improper termination of event
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive:
1 Arrest: journalists/legal obs./medics X Legal observers were among those arrested. NI (G Repurt. p. 52
Prolonged detention of arrestees:
Malicious pros./exorbitant bails:
Random detention and searches:
Excessive force: X The UN actually listed this as one of the worst incidents of government
repression against activists anywhere in the world during 2003. Jilani, Hini .
Promotion And Protection Of Human Rights: Human Rights Defenders,
U.N. Commission On Human Rights, 23 March 2004. P. 151: 476.
Available At: http://Www.Unhchr.Ch/Pdf/Chr60/94add3av.Pdf; See also,
Garofoli, Joe et al. "Oakland cops fire dummy bullets at protesters," San
Francisco Chronicle, April 8, 2003.
Chemical Weapons: X Ibid.
Projectile Weapons: X Ibid.
Electroshock Weapons:
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Experimental Weapons:
Injuries: X Garofoli, Joe et al. "Oakland cops fire dummy bullets at protesters," San
Francisco Chronicle, April 8, 2003.
Critical Injuries: X Inuries from police weapons included a woman shot in face, a woman shot
in the leg who required surgery to replace a lost area of tissue, and a man
whose thumb was broken as a result of being hit by a wooden bullet.
Stallone, Steve. "Charges, Lawsuits and Investigations: April 7
Reverberates Through Oakland. "ILWU Dispatcher, July 2003.
'Free Speech'/'No-Protest' Zones:
e Restrict access to protest site:
Max. Security Perimeter/ Fencing:
c Mobile Netting/ Barriers:
Shut Down of Business Areas of City
Public Training Drills
Media Showcase of weapons, tactics
Prominent display of force capabilities
3 US armed forces on streets
Deployment of Helicopters or APCs
" Activist Homes Surveilled
Activist meeting spaces raided
Surveillance (electronic)
Infiltration of non-criminal groups;
Agent provocateurs
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International Monetary Fund, World Bank Washington, D.C., Sep 22, 2002
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 4000 Reel, Monte and Manny Fernandez. "Anti-Globalization Protests in
Washington Smaller Than Anticipated." Washington Post. September 28,
2002.
# of police deployed: 3200 Mass Arrests At Anti-IMF Demo In Washington, EmergencyNet NEWS
Service. September 28, 2002-Vol. 6, NO. 271
# of law enforcement: 25 Vanden Brook, Tom. World Bank Protesters Vow To Disrupt D.C., USA
Today.
Ratio of police to protesters: 1:1
# of arrests: 649 Bob Franken, Shirley Hung and Mike Ahlers. "Hundreds arrested at IMF
protests." CNN. September 27, 2002.
# of convictions:
Convictions (as % of arrest):
Security expend. (in millions of $): 14.8 Report to Congressional Requesters: Structural Imbalance and Management
Issues. United States General Accounting Office. May 2003. p. 67
Federal funding (in millions of $): NA
Police overtime (in millions of $4.7 Report to Congressional Requesters: Structural Imbalance and Management
Issues. United States General Accounting Office. May 2003. P. 67
Tactics Data (Qualitative):
Demonization of protesters X See below.
Inferring protesters/violence link: X "There has been a persistent effort by MPD leadership to exaggerate the
numbers of and threat posed by anti-globalization demonstrators."
Committee on the Judiciary.Report on Investigation of the Metropolitan
Police Department's Policy and Practice in Handling Demonstrations in the
District of Columbia, Council of the District of Columbia, March 11, 2004.
( Inferring protesters/terrorism link: X Police Chief Charles Ramsey said: "We have concern that a large protest like
this could become the cover to conduct terrorist-related or some other
criminal activities." The police chief claimed police presence was not against
protesters, but to "protect" protesters from a possible terrorist attack. Quoted
in Isaacs, Jerry. Police threats against Washington anti-war protesters, World
Socialist Website, April 20, 2002.
(http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/apr2002/demo-a20.shtml)
Planted/arranged/ misrep. evidence
Media: embedded/targeting non-embedded:
Laws used to restrict assembly
Delayed issuance of permits:
Improper termination of event
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive: X D.C. police arrested 647 protesters, bystanders, journalists and medics in one
day, 400 at one event in Pershing Park, charging them with "failure to obey a
police order." All charges were ultimately dropped. An internal review by the
department revealed that the arrests were 'unsound' made without proper
cause and absent any warning. In Metropolitan Police Office Of Professional
Responsibility Civil Rights & Force, Final report by Force Investigation
Team (Confidential Memorandum To Chief Of Police), Wash D.C. undated.
The Chairperson of the City Council's Judiciary Committee stated: "Not
only were arrests preemptive and wrongful, not only was the detention
inhumane, but officers in the field were directed to sign arrest forms that
were inaccurate on their face," Patterson Criticizes Mayor for Inaction on
Rights Violations, Press Release, Wash. D.C. Feb. 26, 2003. See also,
Leonnig, Carol D. "IMF Arrests Improper, Police Found." Washington Post.
September 13, 2003; Page B02; the arrested activists won $425,000 from
police. "D.C. Settles With Mass Arrest Victims," Washington Post, January
25, 2005; Page AOl.
Arrest: journalists/legal obs/medics X "17 journalists were arrested during the September 2002 mass arrests"
Committee on the Judiciary.Report on Investigation of the Metropolitan
Police Department's Policy and Practice in Handling Demonstrations in the
District of Columbia, Council of the District of Columbia, March 11, 2004.
Prolonged detention of arrestees: X Many were detained in excess of 24 hours, with wrists bound to ankles so
they could not straighten up. Patterson Criticizes Mayorfor Inaction on
Rights Violations, Press Release, Wash. D.C. Feb. 26, 2003
Malicious pros./exorbitant bails:
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Random detention and searches:
Excessive force:
Chemical Weapons:
0 Projectile Weapons:
Electroshock Weapons:
Experimental Weapons:
Injuries:
Critical Injuries:
'Free Speech'/'No-Protest' Zones:
Restrict access to protest site:
Max. Security Perimeter/ Fencing: "When finance ministers arrive they will find themselves besieged behind a
two-mile fence ... around a 220-acre zone enclosing the White House, the US
State Department, and the World Bank and IMF buildings." IMF, World
Bank Count Cost of Protest World Bank Development News
September 4, 2001.
Mobile Netting/ Barriers:
Shut Down of Business Areas of City
Public Training Drills
Media Showcase of weapons, tactics
Prominent display of force capabilities
US armed forces on streets X "In a possible Posse Comitatus violation, the U.S. military was providing
security and surveillance at the anti-IMF demonstrations.... These are
normally duties performed by law enforcement officers" dc.Indymedia.org
Deployment of Helicopters or APCs
Activist Homes Surveilled
Activist meeting spaces raided
Surveillance (electronic) X "MPD assigned undercover officers to conduct surveillance of political
organizations and activists in the absence of criminal activity." Committee
on the Judiciary.Report on Investigation of the Metropolitan Police
Department's Policy and Practice in Handling Demonstrations in the
District of Columbia, Council of the District of Columbia, March 11, 2004
- Infiltration of non-criminal groups; X Ibid.
Agent provocateurs
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Anti-War (Global Day of Action) New York, NY. 15 February, 2003
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 250,000
# of police deployed: 5,000 Kadison, Dan And Larry Celona. "NYPD Estimated Saturday's Anti-War
Rally Cost The City Approximately $5 Million," The New York Post.
February 17, 2000.
# of law enforcement agencies:
Ratio of police to protesters:
# of arrests: 257 Kadison. Dan And Larry Celona. "NYPD Estimated Saturday's Anti-War
Rally Cost The City Approximately $5 Million," The New York Post.
February 17, 2000.
# of convictions:
Convictions (as % of arrest):
Security expend. (in millions of $):5 See Below.
Federal funding (in millions of $):0
Police overtime (in millions of 5 Commissioner Kelly reported that $5 million was spent on February 15 to
pay for the use of thousands of officers. This is in sharp contrast to reports
in the New York Times that expenses for policing the 1996 Yankees
celebration parade of between 2 and 4 million people cost approximately $1
million. In Dunn, Christopher, et al. Arresting Protest, New York Civil
Liberties Union, April, 2003 ; See also, Kadison, Dan And Larry Celona.
"NYPD Estimated Saturday's Anti-War Rally Cost The City Approximately
$5 Million," The New York Post. February 17, 2000.
Tactics Data (Qualitative):
Demonization of protesters
[nferring protesters/violence link:
Inferring protesters/terrorism link:
Planted/arranged/ misrep. evidence
Media: embedded/targeting non-embedded:
Laws used to restrict assembly X See below.
Delayed issuance of permits: X The city denied a permit for a protest march "for the first time in Modem
History", despite the fact that these permits had been granted to other huge
marches and parades in the past. Police also confused organizers by offering
an alternate route and then denying it days later. Barrett, Wayne. "Why
Mike Banned the March." The Village Voice, February 19 - 25, 2003.;
Saulny, Susan. "Court Bans Peace March In Manhattan." New York Times.
February 11, 2003.
W Improper termination of event
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive:
Arrest: journalists/legal obs./medics
Prolonged detention of arrestees: X Police delayed the release of 215 arrested demonstrators and held arrestees
for up to ten hours on buses with no heat in temperatures below freezing.
NLG Report. p. 50; ACLU complaint details of arrestees held in the back of
police vans without access to food, water or bathroom facilities. In Jeremy
Conrad V. The City Of New York; Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner of the
New York City Police Department; New York, N.Y. November 19, 2003.
Malicious pros./exorbitant bails:
Random detention and searches:
Excessive force: X There were numerous reports of police using horses to charge into dense
crowds, and unnecessarily rough treatment of arrestees. Dunn. Christopher,
et al. Arresting Protest. New York Civil Liberties Union, April, 2003
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Chemical Weapons: X "Police squirted pepper spray into the eyes of penned-in protesters and
backed kicking horses into crowds of people, according to video footage...
'That makes you feel good, doesn't it?' one officer yelled." Lefcowitz
Melanie. Protesters: NYPD Used Violence, NY Newsday. See also: Video
From F15 Press Conference on Police Misconduct, New York Independent
Media Center, February, 2003. Available at:
http://f15.nycimc.org/video/quicktimes/PressTape.mov
Projectile Weapons:
Electroshock Weapons:
Experimental Weapons:
Injuries:
Critical Injuries:
'Free Speech'/'No-Protest' Zones: X While not labeled as such, the police created a de-facto 'free speech zone'
by denying protesters the right to conduct march anywhere in the city, and
restricting a permitted stationary assembly to tightly controlled, heavily
barricaded area. See Below.
Restrict access to protest site: X Thousands of protesters were prevented from reaching the permitted rally
site by police use of 4 sided metal barri cades called 'pens' placed at scores
of downtown intersections which "unreasonably restricting access to and
participation in [the] demonstration." New York Civil Liberties Union vs.
The City of New York. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS) p. 79; See also, "Let us
through,"Video From F15 Press Conference on Police Misconduct, New
York Independent Media Center, February 2003. Available at:
http://fl5.nycimc.org/video/quicktimes/w005 3rdave_52stblock.mov
Max. Security Perimeter/ Fencing: X See above.
Mobile Netting/ Barriers: X Police used metal barricades as mobile barriers. Indymedia video shows
police lifting them up and rushing at crowds, using them to push people
backwards. Video From F15 Press Conference on Police Misconduct, New
York Independent Media Center, February, 2003. Available at:
http://f15.nycimc.org/video/quicktimes/PressTape.mov
Shut Down of Business Areas of City
Public Training Drills
Media Showcase of weapons, tactics
Prominent display of force capabilities
US armed forces on streets
Deployment of Helicopters or APCs
Activist Homes Surveilled
Activist meeting spaces raided
Surveillance (electronic) X NYPD used a "Democratic National Convention Preliminary Briefing Paper
Tuesday, August 22, 2000" to interrogate people arrested at the February
15, 2003, antiwar rally about their political activities and associations and
was using the information to build a database. McCool, Grant. "NY Police
Admit Keeping Anti-War Protest Database." Reuters. April 10, 2003.
- Infiltration of non-criminal groups;
Agent provocateurs
122
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Miami, FL Nov 20-21, 2003
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 8,000 "Police Arrest Scores Of Miami Trade-Talk Protesters." NBC6. November
21,2003.
# of police deployed: 2,500 Nesmith, Susannah A. "Security Boosted For FTAA Talks." Miami Herald.
Nov. 10, 2003.
# of law enforcement agencies: 40 Ibid.
Ratio of police to protesters: 1:4
# of arrests: 283 Solnit, David. FTAA Scorecard: 283 Arrested / 0 Convictions. Save Our Civil
Liberties. May 3, 2004.
# of convictions: 0 Ibid.
Convictions (as % of arrest): 0.00%
Security expend. (in millions of $): 23.9 Nesmith, Susannah A. "Summit security costs public millions. " Miami
Herald. Feb. 22, 2004.
Federal funding (in millions of $): 8.5 Ibid. Part of $87 Billion Iraq Reconstruction Bill.
Police overtime (in millions of $): 10.5 Ibid.
Tactics Data (Qualitative):
Demonization of protesters X See below.
Inferring protesters/violence link: X Miami Police chief referred to protesters as "outsiders coming to terrorize
and vandalize our city." Figueras, Tere. "Big Police Presence; Few Clashes."
Miami Herald. Nov. 21, 2003.
Inferring protesters/terrorism link: X See above;
Planted/arranged/ misrep. evidence X Police Chief Timoney stated that police officers did not fire tear gas, but in
fact it was the protesters who did. However, extensive video and photography
show police firing tear gas into crowds.
Media: embedded/targeting non- X Said one police spokesman: "I believe that every reporter I have spoken to
S embedded: that was embedded said that they were able to see things from our point of
view. I think during the event, and you go back and look at coverage--
particularly television coverage--you will find it very positive and pro-
police." the FTAA embedding plan was adopted almost word-for-word from
the U.S. military's media plan for Iraq. "We just adapted it to the situation." In
Pacenti, John. "Embedded Obstacles." American Journalism Review.
February./March, 2004; Reporter appeared on camera wearing police riot
helmets and flack jackets, and one stated without evidence, "She took a
rubber bullet in the stomach, she must have done something. You wanna
play, you gotta pay." Quoted in Tom Hayden, Miami Vice, AlterNet.
November 20, 2003.; Meanwhile, reporters who were not-embedded were
arrested and had their equipment confiscated by police. Scahill, Jeremy . "The
Miami Model," Democracy Now! November 24, 2003.
Laws used to restrict assembly X At the request of police chief John Timoney, city officials passed an
ordinance that prohibited protesters from carrying props such as balloons and
bottles and required a permit for public gatherings of seven or more people if
gatherings lasted more than 30 minutes. The ordinance was used during the
protests as a pretext to unlawfully arrest demonstrators. It was passed into law
just before the event, leaving insufficient time to repeal it. It was repealed on
constitutional grounds, after the event had occurred. NL . .37 See also,
O'Neill, Ann W. and Diana Marrero. "Judge says Miami anti-protest law has
'serious constitutional problems." South Florida Sun Sentinel. February 6,
2004.
U Delayed issuance of permits:
1 Improper termination of event X 'Insufficient time to disperse was given to some demonstrators arrested ... on
Friday afternoon." Independent Review Panel. FTAA Inquiry Report. City of
Miami. September 20, 2004; See also, Hayden, Tom. "Arresting The
Future."AlterNet. November 21, 2003.
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive: X "baseless arrests were made" in Police overreaction, St. Petersburg Times,
December 2, 2003.
Arrest: journalists/legal obs./medics X Blumner, Robyn E. "Miami crowd control would do tyrant proud," St.
Petersberg Times, November 30, 2003. ;See also, Scahill, Jeremy . "The
Miami Model," Democracy Now! November 24, 2003. Hayden, Tom.
"Arresting The Future."AlterNet. November 21, 2003.
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Prolonged detention of arrestees: X The police themselves admit: "The courts assisted by staggering bond
hearings and releases so that arrestees were not able to quickly return to the
conference site." Miami Dade Police Department, MDPD After Action Report
Summary, City of Miami, p. 6
Malicious pros./exorbitant bails:
Random detention and searches: X "Protesters claim that without being arrested they are being stopped,
questioned and searched by police officers with no apparent cause. ... [in the
days before the protests] three were arrested for loitering and resisting arrest
without violence, five for obstructing a sidewalk. " in Ellman, Steve. FTAA
protesters bristling at low-level police efforts." Daily Business Review.
November 18, 2003; see also Hayden, Tom. "Miami Vice."AlterNet.
November 20, 2003.
Excessive force: X "The members of the Independent Review Panel strenuously condemn and
deplore the unrestrained and disproportionate use of ... For a brief period in
time, Miami lived under martial law. Civil rights were trampled and the
sociopolitical values we hold most dear were undermined." Independent
Review Panel. FTAA Inquiry Report. City of Miami. September 20, 2004.;
According to Amnesty International, police used a level of force that "does
not appear to have been at all justified. "Amnesty International, USA:
Allegations of excessive use offorce and ill-treatment of protestors in Miami,
November 26, 2003.
Chemical Weapons: X Dozens of peaceful protesters and reporters were hit with tear gas (CS) and
pepper sprayed (OC). Many arrestees reported being sprayed in the face at
point blank range after they had already been handcuffed.
Projectile Weapons: X Dozens were injured by "less lethal" projectile rounds, requiring
hospitalization. One reporter had a bean bag embedded in his skull. Another
youth lost an eye.
Electroshock Weapons: X Photo Series of police chasing fleeing protesters and tasing them:. FTAA
Independent Media Center: http://ftaaimc.org/en/2003/11/2531.shtml
Experimental Weapons: X A photo shows the long-range acoustic device (LRAD) prominently stationed
just behind police lines. FTAA Independent Media Center
:http://ftaaimc.org/images/2003/11/1717.jpg
Injuries: X See Below.
Critical Injuries: X "12 demonstrators were treated at hospitals, and at least 125 demonstrators
were treated by medics affiliated with protest organizations." Pacenti, John.
"Miami Trade Summit Security Both Hailed And Reviled." Palm Beach Post.
November 22, 2003.
'Free Speech'/'No-Protest' Zones: X An large portion of the downtown surrounding the FTAA meeting site was
surrounded by a chain link fence.
Restrict access to protest site: X Breaking a promise they had made to retired union workers, Miami police
prevented 13 busloads of retirees from reaching the site of the FTAA
demonstrations. Driscoll, Amy. "Union: Police Broke Protest Promise,"
Miami Herald. November 26, 2003.
Max. Security Perimeter/ Fencing: X Miami Dade Police. "Security Zones." FTAA After Action Report. ; "Security
fences cut updowntown like a jigsaw puzzle, with numerous checkpoints."
Pacenti, John. "Miami Trade Summit Security Both Hailed And Reviled."
Palm Beach Post. November 22, 2003.
Mobile Netting/ Barriers:
Shut Down of Business Areas of City X "Police turned normally vibrant downtown Miami into a ghost town. As a
result... marching citizens, tremendously communicative of their concerns,
were seen by only a handful of Miami residents." in Barclay, Elizabeth.
"Protesters Face Intimidation by Police." Seattle Post-Intelligencer.
November 28, 2003; See also Cannon, Angie. "Miami prepares for the latest
protest." U.S. News and World Report. November 24, 2003;
A -2 Public Training Drills
Media Showcase of weapons, tactics
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Prominent display of force capabilities X Defede, Jim. "Police using intimidation as a weapon." Miami Herald.
November 20, 2003.; Lt Bill Schwartz: "Just about every alleyway or street
you tried to go up you'd see a show of force. I think the psychological factor
worked very well." Williamson, Eric. "Savannah police won't have Miami's
muscle for G-8." Savannah Morning News. November 25, 2003.
US armed forces on streets
Deployment of Helicopters or APCs X "The first day of the Free Trade Area of the Americas convention was
relatively quiet, but there was still a large police presence in downtown
Miami... The city even rolled out its fleet of armored personnel carriers." in
"Armored Vehicles Patrol Quiet, Empty Streets." WPLG. Nov. 21, 2003
Activist Homes Surveilled
Activist meeting spaces raided X The convergence space was not entered, but groups of police vehicles
'rushed' the site several times in an apparent attempt to scare protesters.
Surveillance (electronic) X Costello, Andrea. "Letter Issued to Miami City Attorney Meant to Stem
Preemptive Action and Possible Raid of Anti-FrAA Activist Welcome
Center." Miami Activist Defense. November 18, 2003.
Infiltration of non-criminal groups; X Police officials admitted to having officers planted within a number of protest
groups.
Agent provocateurs X Protestors seemed to skirmish with heavily armored Miami police outside the
Riande Hotel Thursday morning, but... these "anarchists" were undercover
police officers whose mission was to provoke a confrontation. Hayden, Tom.
"Miami Vice."AlterNet. November 20, 2003.; See also. see also, Scahill,
Jeremy. "The Miami Model," Democracy Now! November 24, 2003'
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Group of 8 Summit (G-8) Sea Island, GA Jun 8-10, 2004
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 300 Bynum, Russ. "Many G-8 Protesters Were Undercover Cops," Associated
Press. July 27, 2004.
# of police deployed: 20,000 Ibid.
# of law enforcement agencies involved: 136 Although the federal government did not disclose the number of officers it
sent to the G-8 summit, Hitchens claimed that 136 state and local agencies
deployed some 11,056 police and security forces, including 4,800 National
Guard troops and a small number of state police from Florida and South
Carolina.
Ratio of police to protesters: 66:1
# of arrests: 15 Davis, Jingle. "15 Indicted Over G-8 Protest." The Atlanta Journal-
Constitution. June 23, 2004.
# of convictions: 15 Ibid.
Convictions (as % of arrest): 100% All 15 arresteed were indicted by a judge on misdeamenor charges of
obstructing a public passageway. "They were told they would be arrested if
they crossed the police line. They never crossed that line. They were told they
were blocking the road and [yet] the road was already shut down," "14
protesters arrested on St. Simons Island." Morris News Service. June 11,
2004.
Security expend. (in millions of $): 37 Kirton, John. Energizing Global Sustainable Development: Promising
Prospectsfor the Gleneagles G8. G8 Research Group, University of
Toronto. 2, 2005. p. 23 To pay for the agents and equipment, Georgia
received $25 million as part of the $87 billion Congress allocated for Iraq.
The Pentagon chipped in another $10 million for the National Guard troops.
Federal funding (in millions of $): 25 Haddix, Dar. "Georgia has high hopes for the G8 Summit" United Press
International. February 23, 2004.
Police overtime (in millions of $): 9.6 Bell, Bret. G-8 protesters mobilize "Savannah Morning News." December 16,
2003.
Tactics Data (Qualitative):
Demonization of protesters X See below.
[Inferring protesters/violence link: X In the state of emergency declared by the governor it reads: "potential danger
from unlawful assemblages, threats of violence and otherwise. "in Executive
Order 05.07.04.01. The State of Georgia. May 7, 2004.; "As many as
100,000 protesters - some with the potential for extreme violence - are
expected to swarm coastal Georgia during the G-8 Summit in June" in
Basinger, Brian. "Protesters expected en masse for G-8, security expert says"
Savannah Morning News. January 29, 2004.; Coast Guard officials estimate
the potential for as many as 1,000 'violent' protesters. In Fabey Michael.
"Coast Guard prepares for terrorist threat" Savannah Morning News. May
11, 2004.
.S Inferring protesters/terrorism link: X Threats of violent protest and international terrorism were 'largely
undifferentiated.' "G8: Lockdown on Sea Island." London Independent. June
8, 2004. As an example, see In Fabey Michael. "Coast Guard prepares for
terrorist threat" Savannah Morning News. May 11, 2004. . Even as they
covered an expert on international meetings predicted 'close to zero' chance
of violence, the press inferred that protests could be 'hijacked' by AI-Qaida
and possibly, neo-nazis. In Peterson, Lanie Lippincott. "Expert: 'close to
zero' chance of violence." Savannah Morning News. April 23, 2004. No
actual terrorism took place, except for several false bomb scares that turned
out to be triggered by a hearing aid, a smoke detector, and bomb sniffing
canine in heat. "Martz, Ron. A few quirky entries on police blotter." The
Atlanta Journal-Constitution. June 10, 2004.
Planted/arranged/ misrep. evidence
Media: embedded/targeting non-embedded:
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Laws used to restrict assembly The governor declared a state of emergency in Executive Order 05.07.04.01,
The State of Georgia. May 7, 2004. The state of emergency allowed the
deployment of the national guard, gives police the right to break up any
gathering. It was complimented by a local ordinance that limited public
assembly to a maximum 6 people and 2.5 hours without a state-issued permit
and required a deposit to cover all police and cleanup costs. Miriam Haskell,
"Glynn to Review G-8 Law," Brunswick News, 6 May 2004 in NLG Report,
p. 38;
Delayed issuance of permits: X Smith, Janel and Montana Burnett. "Report on Civil Society Presence at 2004
G8 Summit." 2004 G8 On-line. June 10, 2004.
Improper termination of event
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive:
Arrest: journalists/legal obs./medics
Prolonged detention of arrestees:
Malicious pros./exorbitant bails:
Random detention and searches: X Protesters were randomly stopped and had their persons, possessions and cars
searched.
Excessive force:
Chemical Weapons:
Projectile Weapons:
Electroshock Weapons:
Experimental Weapons:
Injuries:
Critical Injuries:
'Free Speech'/'No-Protest' Zones:
Restrict access to protest site: X The entirety of Sea Island, Georgia was restricted to 'unauthorized personnel'
for the duration of the G-8, forcing protesters to remain on the nearest
mainland city, New Brunswick.
Max. Security Perimeter/ Fencing: X The same 8 foot foot high fencing used in Miami FTAA was used to create 3-
mile 'exclusion zone' around the meeting site. "G8: Lockdown on Sea
Island." London Independent. June 8, 2004.;
Mobile Netting/ Barriers:
c Shut Down of Business Areas of City X The entirety of Sea Island was completely closed to protesters. In addition,
many downtown businesses and public services in neighboring Savannah
were closed. "G-8 Openings and Closings: Businesses and services closed, or
with changed hours, of operation, June 6-13" Savannah Morning News,
June 6-13: As one non-protester stated: "It looks like the whole town's under
military occupation. This is unreal." Wyatt, Doug. "On Your Mark.. .Get
Set... Snore." Savannah Morning News, June 7, 2004.
Public Training Drills X Williamson, Eric. "Police demonstration previews G-8 crowd control
training." Savannah Morning News. February 12, 2004. Felty, Dana Clark.
"Police Drills Mean More Delays, Sirens." Savannah Morning News. May 5,
2004.
Media Showcase of weapons, tactics X Ibid.
Prominent display of force capabilities X "Protesters, encountered military Humvees on virtually every corner and
around-the-clock surveillance by police in cruisers and on motorcycles,
bicycles, horses and foot. 'We're surrounded by guys with guns' stated one
protester." In Kaplan, Paul. Outdone, outwitted and outside looking in.
Atlanta Journal-Constitution. June 12, 2004.; A US BICE spokesman
justified the massive show of force by stating: "I think a visible presence is
important to deter aggression." "On Downtown Streets A Show of Force,"
Savannah Morning News, June 8, 2004.
US armed forces on streets X 4,800 Nationail Gaurdsmen were deploycd for thc G-8. Bynum, Russ. "Many
G-8 Protesters Were Undercover Cops," Associated Press. July 27, 2004.;
See also, Schoettler, Jim. "A show of force on Savannah streets." Morris
News Service. June 7, 2004.; "Thousands of police and military officials were
expected in Savannah and Brunswick to guard against possible violent
protest". Schoettler, Jim. "A show of force on Savannah streets." Morris
News Service. July 7, 2004.
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Deployment of Helicopters or APCs X "Helicopters and military jets fly overhead practically non-stop." in "Anxiety
runs high at G-8 summit site." The Detroit News. June 7, 2004. To deal with a
protest presentation of a total of 10 people, an Army helicopter was deployed,
"drowning out" the presentation. Dickson, Terry. "So far, law enforcement
outnumbers activists." Georgia Times-Union. June 7, 2004.
Activist Homes Surveilled X A local reverend and peace activist who signed applications for protest
permits had military vehicles and personnel stationed outside his home. "G8
Meeting Means Repression for Protest Organizers." San Francisco Bay Area
Independent Media Center. May 3, 2004.
Activist meeting spaces raided
Surveillance (electronic) X "The legal team and activists were constantly being filmed by uniformed
police, soldiers in fatigues, and men who were clearly undercover... when we
were simply walking down the street". In Beghosian, Heidi. The Assault on
Free Speech, Public Assembly, and Dissent, National Lawyers Guild. 2004.
p. 33; Undercover cops had access to a comprehensive database of digital
photos of 'everyone in the country' who was labeled as having an association
with a 'potentially violent' group. .in Bynum, Russ. "Many G-8 Protesters
Were Undercover Cops," Associated Press, July 27, 2004.; See also, ACLU.
Documents Obtained by ACLU Expose FBI and Police Targeting of Political
Groups, May 18, 2005.
S Infiltration of non-criminal groups; X
As many as 40 undercover police officers infiltrated protests who took classes
before the summit on how to dress and blend in with the crowds. Bynum,
Russ. "Many G-8 Protesters Were Undercover Cops," Associated Press, July
27, 2004.; Undercover infiltration was done by Strategic Tactical Anti-
terrorism Response (STAR) teams who gathered intelligence on "terrorism
indicators and protestor tactics." Annual Report: Edward Byrne Memorial
State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Drug Control and System
Improvement Formula Grant: July 1, 2003-June 30, 2004.
State of Georgia, 2004. p. 22
Agent provocateurs
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Democratic National Convention (DNC) Boston, MA Jul 25-29, 2004
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 2,000
# of police deployed: 5,000 Bombardieri, Marcella and Jonathan Saltzman. "Activists Appear To Save
Anger For NYC." Boston Globe. July 29, 2004.
# of law enforcement: 40 Meeting Minutes, Combined RRT/RISC Meeting, US National Coast Guard,
May 11-12, 2004. Available at:
http://www.uscg.mil/d1/staff/m/rrt/meetings-reports/051 meetingminutes.htm
Ratio of police to protesters: 5 to 2
# of arrests: 5 Finer, Jonathan. Few Arrests Among Diverse Protesters. "Washington Post."
July 30, 2004; Page A22. One accepted a plea deal for geographic reasons, as
they would be unable to return to Boston for further proceedings. Of the local
residents arrested, including one charged for a highly publicized charge of
'felony assault on a police officer,' were fully aquitted. (Information from Ben
Evans, National Lawyers Guild, August 7, 2005).
# of convictions: 1 Plea deal.
Convictions (as % of arrest): 20%
Security expend. (in millions of $): 60 Long, Bryan. "Boston rolls out $60 million security plan." CNN. July 25,
2004.
Federal funding (in millions of $): 50 Ibid.
Police overtime (in millions of $): 32.5 Klein, Rick. "Security overtime put at $32.5m." Boston Globe. June 25, 2004.
Tactics Data (Qualitative):
Demonization of protesters X One report
Inferring protesters/violence link: X "it looks like the FBI's Boston field office faked a threat of domestic
terrorism just before the start of the Democratic National Convention by
leaking 'unconfirmed' reports of white supremacist groups readying an attack
against media vehicles in Boston....The effect... was to make the press even
more suspicious of anti-war demonstrators than it already is-to even view
them as possible terrorists, and if not actual terrorists, then a crowd within
which terrorists could operate. "James Ridgeway, "'Terror' Against the
Press." The Village Voice. July 29, 2004. The fact that these intelligence
reports referenced groups from the radical right wing, while the protesters
were overwhelmingly from the left, was totally omitted in most news reports
which simply labeled the threat as coming from 'protesters' and/or 'radical
domestic groups'. McQuarrie, Brian and Bryan Bender. 8 Fighter Jets Added
to Security. Boston Globe. July 24, 2004.
Inferring protesters/terrorism link: X "There are huge security precautions that were never, never even thought of
prior to 9/11," said Lt. Kevin Foley, a Boston Police Department spokesman.
"From terrorists to a biological attack to demonstrators to anarchists, you try
to plan for everything." Goldstein, David. Boston security forces taking no
chances for convention, Knight Ridder Newspapers. July, 2004.
Planted/arranged/ misrep. evidence X The only altercation of the convention came when police 'moved in' to the
crowd to subdue a man they said had a Molotov cocktail near the convention
center. Once in custody, they continued reporting finding this dangerous
device. However, this later proved to be a papier mached 'hook' that was part
of a protesters home made pirate costume. Said Police Superintendent
""There was no necessity to have any item like this that could be mistaken for
a molotov cocktail unless you were trying to provoke an incident"
Media: embedded/targeting non-
embedded:
Laws used to restrict assembly
Delayed issuance of permits:
Improper termination of event
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive:
Arrest: journalists/legal obs./medics
Prolonged detention of arrestees:
Malicious pros. /exorbitant bails:
Random detention and searches:
Excessive force:
Chemical Weapons:
1 Projectile Weapons:
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Electroshock Weapons:
Experimental Weapons:
Injuries:
Critical Injuries:
'Free Speech'!' No-Protest' Zones: X Surrounded by concrete barriers, steel fencing, razor wire, overhead netting,
and situated beneath a construction site, a judge deemed the "Free Speech
Zone" site an "affront to free expression" and its comparison to a
concentration camp "an understatement". Despite this, the judge allowed the
site to persist, based purely upon unknown intelligence delivered to him by
the Secret Service in private. Theo Emery, "Judge upholds 'free speech zone'
but permits march on FleetCenter." Associated Press. July 22, 2004.
Restrict access to protest site:
Max. Security Perimeter/ Fencing:
Mobile Netting/ Barriers:
Shut Down of Business Areas of City
Public Training Drills X
Media Showcase of weapons, tactics X Police put their gear on display for the media: "These are hand-held grenades,
these are finger balls with no gas, these are finger balls with OC ... and we do
have CS gas.. .This is a pepper ball gun." in "State Police Ready For DNC."
The Boston Channel. July 22, 2004.
Prominent display of force capabilities X
US armed forces on streets X "Military police.. .watched the crowd of protesters... Soldiers trained for a
week with state police to prepare for the DNC, learning civil disturbance
techniques" Claffey, Spc. David J. "Massachusetts National Guard backs up
Democratic Convention." On Guard. Army and Air National Guard.
September 2, 2004. Vol. 32, Issue 9.
Deployment of Helicopters or APCs X During the rally on Boston Common: all afternoon, one police helicopter kept
buzzing by like a mammoth mechanized mosquito, often drowning out the
sound system. Dodero, Camille. "A Big 'Fuck You."'Boston Phoenix. July
27,2004.
Activist Homes Surveilled X Activists in Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New York and other states were
visited by JTTF (FBI) agents at their homes just prior to the national policial
conventions. Somewere tracked by FBI cars for days. Some were required to
attend grand jury hearings on the days of the conventions, causing them to
miss the events. Yet, none were arrested and no charges were filed against any
of them. "FBI keeping tabs on potential GOP protesters." Associated Press.
August 17, 2004.; see also Associated Press. "Grand-jury subpoena forces
activists to miss convention protest." July 30, 2004.
Activist meeting spaces raided
Surveillance (electronic) X "Video surveillance has become a common tool for police and private security
personnel, Boston police and federal officials concede that the additional
cameras and new technology represent another chapter in Boston. And it's
here to stay: Boston police say the 30 or so cameras installed for the
convention will be used throughout the city once the event is over."We own
them now,' said police Superintendent Robert Dunford. "We're certainly not
going to put them in a closet."' in Ranalli, Ralph and Rick Klein
"Surveillance targeted to convention." The Boston Globe. July 18, 2004.
- Infiltration of non-criminal groups; X
mem- bers of the NYPD/FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force visited the home of a
New York activist who was alleged to be on a Boston police list of potential
AScetrouble- makersi
Agent provocateurs
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Republican National Convention (RNC) New York, NY Aug 29-Sep 4, 2004
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 400,000 Mishra Raja and Tatsha Robertson. "Crowds Protest As GOP Gathers:
Hundreds Of Thousands March Against Bush, War." The BostonGlobe.
August 30, 2004. Note: estimates varied from 300,000 to over 500,000.
# of police deployed: 36,000 NY City Councilman called the force assembled for the convention: "perhaps
the world's tenth-largest standing army." In Goldberg, Michelle. "New York
Lockdown." Guardian/UK. August 11, 2004.
# of law enforcement: 66 Powel,l Michael and Michelle Garcia. "Waking Up to Security That Never
Sleeps." Washington Post. August 28, 2004; Page A05.
Ratio of police to protesters: 1:11
# of arrests: 1821 Dwyer, Jim. "Videos Challenge Accounts of Convention Unrest." NY Times.
April 12, 2005.
# of convictions:
Convictions (as % of arrest): 9% "91 percent ended with the charges dismissed or with a verdict of not guilty
after trial. " In Dwyer, Jim. "Videos Challenge Accounts of Convention
Unrest."NY Times. April 12, 2005. Many of those who plead guilty to minor
infractions cited financial reasons, being unable to afford the multiple return
trips to NY for legal proceedings.
Security expend. (in millions of $76 The Impact of the Republican National Convention on the New York City
Economy, Beacon Hill Institute, June 2004.; see also, Pickert, Kate. An RNC
Index: The convention by the numbers, New York Magazine, September 6,
2004.
Federal funding (in millions of $): 50 Pickert, Kate. An RNC Index: The convention by the numbers, New York
Magazine, September 6, 2004.
Police overtime (in millions of $): 59 Williams, Timothy. "New York GOP Convention Security Estimate at
$76M."Associated Press. May 11th, 2004.
Demonization of protesters X Claims by police and media about protesters included the presence of 50
"hard-core extremists" who were plotting to disrupt the convention by hurling
Molotov cocktails at military recruiting centers; protesters coating themselves
in gunpowder to trigger bomb-sniffing dogs in order to force a shutdown of
Penn Station; and that members of the Weather Underground "recently
released from prison" and " trained in kidnapping techniques, bomb-making
and building improvised munitions," were orchestrating operations. A police
training manual advises cops to brace for possible attacks with nail-studded
potatoes, hockey pucks, and even flaming "frisbee-like" devices. These
reports are summed up in: Ferguson, Sarah. "Dispatch from New York:
Whose Streets?" Mother Jones. August 27, 2004; See also, Dunn,
Christopher, et al. Rights and Wrongs at the RNC: A Special Report about
Police and Protest at the Republican National Convention, ACLU. P. 18.p.
18; It is important to note that the police reports plans by anarchists to enact
violence were found "on the internet" could not be found by any third party
sources. "Did the Daily News Lie About The 'Anarchist Threat'?" RNC
Watch July 19. 2004.
, ,I
Inferring protesters/violence link: X "These hard-core groups are looking to take us on. ... They have increased
their level of sophistication and violence." Stated Police Commissioner
Raymond Kelly. Patrice O'shaughnessy,."Fury At Anarchist Convention
Threat." NY Daily News. July 11, 2004.
Inferring protesters/terrorism link: X NY Mayor Bloomberg describedprotesters who argued with convention
delegates as "a handful of people have tried to destroy our city by going up
and yelling at visitors.. .That's exactly what the terrorists did." Archibold,
Randal C. "Protesters Try To Get In Last Word Before Curtain Falls."NY
Times. September 3, 2004.
Planted/arranged! misrep. evidence
Media: e mheddedltargetinp non- X -.. .v 'r..,.ln- iknoarco isrtgi omncun Luo ~uaJim Wilkinson, irector of strategic communications at U.S. Centra
Command in Iraq, was in charge of media operations for the RNC. "We're
looking at embedding reporters," he said of his plans to use some of the Iraq
tricks during the convention. Klein, Naomi. "America's Enemy Within"The
Guardian. November 26, 2003.
embedded:
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a 3 . .
Laws used to restrict assembly
Delayed issuance of permits: X Even though hundreds of thousands of protesters were expected, the city
denied a permit to hold a rally in central park, citing possibly impacts on 'the
grass'. Furthermore, march permits that had been applied for nearly a year in
advance, were delayed approval until just days before the event, leaving
organizers scrambling to accommodate changes to the route.
Improper termination of event
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive: X Of the 1821 arrests, most charges "were dropped without any finding of
wrongdoing, but also without any serious inquiry into the circumstances of
the arrests." In Dwyer, Jim. "Videos Challenge Accounts of Convention
Unrest."NY Times. April 12, 2005.... Videotape of one mass arrest indicating
that many of those jailed that day had not actually participated in civil
disobedience. The tape showed police officials arresting more than 100
people who were peacefully walking near ground zero, heeding police
orders." In Robbins, Tom. "Convention Detention: For Bloomberg, A
Looming Showdown Over Civil Liberties And The Right To Protest," The
Village Voice, September 21st, 2004; See also Powell, Michael and Michelle
Garcia. "Arrests at GOP Convention Are Criticized Many in N.Y. Released
Without Facing Charges" Washington Post. Monday, September 20, 2004;
Page AO1.
Arrest: journalists/legal obs./medics X Convention Ends With Numerous And Lengthy Journalist Detainments,
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Sep. 3, 2004.
(http://www.rcfp.org/news/2004/0903rncarr.html); see also Cardwell, Diane.
"Lawyers' Group Sues City Over Arrests of Protesters," New York Times.
October 8, 2004.
Prolonged detention of arrestees: X "Despite official police department claims that no one is being held at the
facility for more than eight hours, many of the arrestees have been
incarcerated there for over 40 hours, up to 24 hours of that at Pier 57, in
conditions lawyers and medics have described as 'unhealthy' and
'inhumane."' In Dangl, Benjamin. "Arrestees, Lawyers, Medics Condemn
Conditions of RNC Protest Detention." The NewStandard. September 3,
2004.
Malicious pros./exorbitant bails:
Random detention and searches:
Excessive force:
Chemical Weapons:
Projectile Weapons:
Electroshock Weapons:
Experimental Weapons:
Injuries:
Critical Injuries:
'Free Speech'/'No-Protest' Zones:
Restrict access to protest site: X Dunn, Christopher, et al. Rights and Wrongs at the RNC: A Special Report
about Police and Protest at the Republican National Convention, ACLU. p
17.
0. Max. Security Perimeter/ Fencing:
Mobile Netting/ Barriers: X Police used orange plastic mesh, often while riding on scooters, to shift and
corral protest routes, and to enclose large numbers of people on streets and
sidewalks as a prelude to mass arrests.
Shut Down of Business Areas of City
Public Training Drills X "Memo to protesters .. the NYPD is ready for you.. the department displayed
its techniques for keeping the peace during the convention." Messing, Philip.
"Cops Drill To Rein In Rally Rowdies"' New York Post. Aug 20, 2004. Pg. 8;
NYPD conducted of a series of training drills on August 19 at Floyd Bennett
Field with the press present... The clear suggestion was that confrontational
protests were expected and that the Department was prepared to use
overwhelming numbers of officers to control any type of protest activity.
Dunn, Christopher, et al. Rights and Wrongs at the RNC: A Special Report
about Police and Protest at the Republican National Convention, ACLU. P.
18.
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Media Showcase of weapons, tactics X The NYPD showed off to reporters last week some of the latest hardware it
has developed to use against protesters. Devices include an Italian-made
helicopter with a "night sun" floodlight, small handsaws that can cut through
chains linking protesters, and a new 45-pound mega-megaphone that can be
heard by demonstrators several blocks away.
Prominent display of force capabilities
US armed forces on streets
Deployment of Helicopters or APCs
Activist Homes Surveilled X Activists in Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New York and other states were
visited by JTTF (FBI) agents at their homes just prior to the national policial
conventions. Some were tracked by FBI cars for days. Some were required to
attend grand jury hearings on the days of the conventions, causing them to
miss the events. Yet, no charges were filed against any of them. Associated
Press, "FBI keeping tabs on potential GOP protesters.".August 17, 2004.; see
also Associated Press. "Grand-jury subpoena forces activists to miss
convention protest." July 30, 2004.
Activist meeting spaces raided
Surveillance (electronic) X NYPD has dispatched hundreds of cops around the country to put some 56
people under 24-hour surveillance in advance of the Republican National
Convention (RNC). One of those interviewed stated: "The message I took
from itwas that they were trying to intimidate us into not going to any protests
and to let us know that, 'hey, we're watching you.'" Lichtblau, Eric. "F.B.I.
Goes Knocking for Political Troublemakers." NY Times. August 16, 2004.; at
convention the police videotaped lawful protests with hand-held, pole
mounted, and even blimp mounted videos.
Infiltration of non-criminal groups; X Another group of 20 police officers have been masquerading as anarchist
-. 
protesters as part of a deep undercover operation. They "have been meeting
with, traveling with, and secretly reporting on the activists' plans" for nearly
two years. In Solis, Marcus. "NYPD to Shadow 56 Protesters Believed Most
Dangerous." WABC. New York, August 18, 2004.
Agent provocateurs
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Presidential Inauguration Washington, DC Jan 20, 2005
Generic Data (Quantitative):
# of protesters present (est.) 10,000
# of police deployed: 13,000 Hsu, Spencer S. et. Al., "Crowd Control, Not Terror, Causes Tense
Moments." Washington Post. January 21, 2005.; 6,000 police officers from
across the country and 7,000 military troops," Yang, John. "Unprecedented
Security Planned for Inauguration." ABC news. Jan. 15, 2005.
# of law enforcement: 60+ Hsu, Spencer S. et. Al., "Inauguration Shutdown Of Downtown
Extensive." Washington Post. January 12, 2005; Page BO; One report
stated that 85 agencies were involved.
Ratio of police to protesters: 3 to 2
# of arrests: 6 Gainer, Terrance W. 2005 Presidential Inauguration, United States Capitol
Police Public Information Office, January 2005.
# of convictions:
Convictions (as % of arrest):
Security expend. (in millions of $): 17.3=fed* "The $17.3 million doesn't count what federal agencies spent for the
inauguration.... One federal security official doubted the federal inaugural
cost would ever be released because it would be too controversial." In
Horwitz, Sari and Spencer S. Hsu, "Experts Weigh Costs, Benefits of
Inauguration Security." Washington Post. Sunday, January 30, 2005, p. CO1.
Federal funding (in millions of $): NA
Police overtime (in millions of $): 9.2 Horwitz, Sari and Spencer S. Hsu, "Experts Weigh Costs, Benefits of
Inauguration Security." Washington Post. Sunday, January 30, 2005, p. CO.
Tactics Data (Qualitative):
Demonization of protesters X
Inferring protesters/violence link: X "Since September 11, 2001, [the inauguration] has met intense,
unbelievable security and an angry nation. The protesters are set up in
various spots. One of the authorized ones is right in back of me. ... The
police forces are probably going to outnumber the demonstrators. They are
part of a security effort -- most of which we're seeing, highly visible, some
.9 of which we're not -- which is designed to allow this to be a national
security event that becomes a celebration, as opposed to something that
would be unthinkable." A quote from national correspondent Bob Franken,
during CNN coverage of the inaugural on January 20, 2005. Available at:
http://mediamatters.org/items/200501210007
Inferring protesters/terrorism link:
Planted/arranged/ misrep. evidence
Media: embedded/targeting non-
embedded:
Laws used to restrict assembly
Delayed issuance of permits:
Improper termination of event
Arrests: False/ mass/ pre-emptive:
4 Arrest: journalists/legal obs./medics
Prolonged detention of arrestees:
Malicious pros./exorbitant bails:
Random detention and searches:
Excessive force: X See below
Chemical Weapons: X The first blast of pepper spray, directed at Shenk's face and upper torso by a
Washington police officer in full riot gear, rendered him temporarily blind.
"He did nothing to provoke." Rhodes, Robert. "Student's Protest Met with
Pepper Spray." Mennonite Weekly Review. January 26, 2005.
Projectile Weapons:
Electroshock Weapons:
Experimental Weapons:
Injuries:
Critical Injuries:
L 'Free Speech'/'No-Protest' Zones:
136
Restrict access to protest site:
The parade route was lined with bleachers, where seats were reserved for
supporters or the president. Protest areas were stationed behind the
bleachers. Thousands of people who came to protest were turned away at
security checkpoints. ANSWER Coalition, et al.v. Gale Norton, Secretary of
the Interior, et al. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.; The
inaugural committee blocked the public from getting tickets to the inaugural
parade route and has allowed only selected donors and supporters to
purchase seats... who have received an invitation and special identification
number from the committee. Leonnig, Carol. "Lawsuit Filed Over
Availability Of Tickets. Washington Post." January 15 2005.
Max. Security Perimeter/ Fencing: X The Judge commented on how it seemed difficult for protestors to ever
challenge the system, since it would be instituted shortly before the
Inauguration without adequate time for judicial review. ANSWER Coalition,
et al.v. Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior, et al. U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia.
Mobile Netting/ Barriers:
Shut Down of Business Areas of City X A hundred block area was shut down
Public Training Drills
Media Showcase of weapons, tactics
Prominent display of force capabilities X the cops that encircled the protesters, countless numbers of them,
surrounding the rather innocuous demonstration like a fortified wall.
Blinking cruisers were parked in at every angle in the intersection.
Helicopters were hovering above, search-lights visually frisking the crowd.
Lombardi, Kristen. "Scenes from a Coronation." The Village Voice. January
20, 2005.
US armed forces on streets
Deployment of Helicopters or APCs X Lombardi, Kristen. "Scenes from a Coronation." The Village Voice. January
20, 2005.
Activist Homes Surveilled
Activist meeting spaces raided
Surveillance (electronic)
Infiltration of non-criminal groups;
Agent provocateurs
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